Abstract

Auction theory belongs to one of the most important applications of game theory in economics. The possibility of presenting an auction as a game facilitates its strategic analysis and the comparison of different auction rules in relation to the player`s expected payoffs. The aim of this paper is to review basic knowledge concerning symmetric auctions for which we assume that all bidders possess the same amount of information concerning sold objects and all bidders` valuations are independent as well as identically distributed random variables. The first part of this paper is devoted to unit object auctions. We will present strategic analysis of the family of such auctions within the model proposed by Riley and Samuelson (1981). The second part of the thesis will be devoted to the description of different types of multiple object auctions: the simultaneous ascending auction and the Anglo-Dutch auction which have been created to sell telecommunication licenses, the combinatorial auction, during which buyers receive the possibility to place their offers on sets of items, and finally the double auction in which many buyers and sellers participate.

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