Although refugees are offered the potential of asylum protection through the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, many states are attempting to curtail the number of asylum applications received each year. Several scholars have argued that even without such deterrence measures, some refugees are less likely to receive a positive asylum decision than others. Using country level data for 32 European states, this project examines the effects of various characteristics – including gender, age, and state of origin – on the likelihood of being granted asylum. This study is a fi rst attempt at empirically testing the asylum literature’s anecdotal evidence of bias in the decision-making processes in determining the outcomes of asylum claims.

The cost-benefi t analysis has a long history, especially in the United States. Its widespread use in Europe is connected with the requirements of the European Commission, the European Union, that preceded the selection of projects fi nanced from EU funds or was the basis for the evaluation of projects. The aim of this article is to draw attention to the social aspects of this analysis, as they conducted limited analysis to the economic and financial aspects.

This paper aims to present a theoretical concept that allows to investigate decision-making in large and ideologically differentiated bodies. Former models of oceanic games were based on the assumption of equal disposition to cooperate with other players among all voters. It is impossible to hold this assumption in a political reality. The paper develops the concept of "hybrid power indices" for oceanic games. Oceanic games with a partial homogeneity structure are analysed in the paper. The paper is the result of my previous studies of decision-making processes in large assemblies and my efforts in modelling ideological differentiation in political bodies. The paper also shows that presented formal models have solid foundations in classical sociological theories.
The last part presents several convenient and reliable sociological interpretations of the models as well as my plans for future studies using the models described.

The paper starts with the defi nitions of fi ve major voting methods that can be applied in single-member districts. Then the political consequences of single-member districts are discussed. The special attention is paid to those consequences that are considered negative and to potential ways of neutralizing them. The next section compares selected subtle effects of using simple majority rule versus alternative vote. The fi nal section reviews methods that mix proportional representation and majoritarian components.