Simulation Analysis Of SMRA Auction: An Application To Forthcoming LTE Spectrum Auction In Poland

Sobolewski, Maciej; Formański, Tomasz

Abstract

: In the second half of 2014 Poland is expected to conduct the reservation procedure of radio spectrum for commercial high-speed Internet services (LTE). Given the enormous market value of resources, for the first time in the history of the Polish elecommunications market, the allocation of frequency blocks will be determined through a multi-object MRA auction carried out by the Offi ce of Electronic Communications (UKE). Drawing on the theoretical properties of the auction format chosen by the Polish regulator, we have developed a dedicated simulator to analyze auction runs for fi ve 800 MHz blocks. We consider possible developments of LTE auction and expected revenues it brings for four most likely confi gurations of bidders.

Keywords

multi-object auction (1)spectrum auction (1)SMRA auction (1)simulator (1)LTE services (1)telecommunications market (1)

References

Ausubel, L.M., Cramton, P. 2002. Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions. [Google Scholar]
Binmore, K., Klemperer, P. 2002. The biggest auction ever: the sale of the British 3G telecom licences. „The Economic Journal” 112 (478): C74-C96. [Google Scholar]
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Grimm, V., Riedel, F., Wolfstetter, E. 2003. Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany. „International Journal of Industrial Organization” 21 (10): 1557-1569. [Google Scholar]
Gruber, H. 2007. 3G mobile telecommunications licenses in Europe: a critical review. „info” 9 (6): 35-44. [Google Scholar]
Klemperer, P. 2002a. How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions. „European Economic Review” 46 (4): 829-845. [Google Scholar]
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Lewczuk, A. 2006. Modele i własności aukcji symetrycznych. „Decyzje” 6: 81-105. [Google Scholar]
Milgrom, P. 2000. Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction. „Journal of Political Economy” 108 (2): 245-272. [Google Scholar]
Milgrom, P. 2004. Putting auction theory to work: Cambridge University Press. [Google Scholar]
Milgrom, P., Weber, R. 1982. A theory of auctions a nd competitive bidding. „Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society”. Econometrica 50 (September 1982) 1089-1122. [Google Scholar]
POINTTOPIC. 2012. Broadband coverage in Europe in 2 012, s. 212. [Google Scholar]
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APA style

Sobolewski, Maciej & Formański, Tomasz (2014). Simulation Analysis Of SMRA Auction: An Application To Forthcoming LTE Spectrum Auction In Poland. (2014). Simulation Analysis Of SMRA Auction: An Application To Forthcoming LTE Spectrum Auction In Poland. Decyzje, (21), 96-114. https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.23 (Original work published 6/2014AD)

MLA style

Sobolewski, Maciej and Formański, Tomasz. “Simulation Analysis Of Smra Auction: An Application To Forthcoming Lte Spectrum Auction In Poland”. 6/2014AD. Decyzje, no. 21, 2014, pp. 96-114.

Chicago style

Sobolewski, Maciej and Formański, Tomasz. “Simulation Analysis Of Smra Auction: An Application To Forthcoming Lte Spectrum Auction In Poland”. Decyzje, Decyzje, no. 21 (2014): 96-114. doi:10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.23.

Copyright info

CC-BY

[1] Ausubel, L.M., Cramton, P. 2002. Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions. [Google Scholar]

[2] Binmore, K., Klemperer, P. 2002. The biggest auction ever: the sale of the British 3G telecom licences. „The Economic Journal” 112 (478): C74-C96. [Google Scholar]

[3] Brunner, C., Goeree, J.K., Holt, C.A., Ledyard, J.O. 2010. An experimental test of flexible co mbinatorial spectrum auction formats. „American Economic Journal: Microeconomic” 2 (1): 39-57. [Google Scholar]

[4] Cramton, P., Shoham, Y., Steinberg, R. 2006. Combinatorial auctions. [Google Scholar]

[5] DOTECON, & AETHA. 2012. Spectrum Value of 800Mhz, 1800Mhz and 2.6Ghz (pp. 80). [Google Scholar]

[6] Drabik, E. 2007. Aukcje w teorii i praktyce. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo SGGW. [Google Scholar]

[7] Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., Kah n, M.C. 2005. Low-revenue equilibria in simultaneous ascending-bid au ctions. „Management Science” 51 (3): 508-518. [Google Scholar]

[8] Grimm, V., Riedel, F., Wolfstetter, E. 2003. Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany. „International Journal of Industrial Organization” 21 (10): 1557-1569. [Google Scholar]

[9] Gruber, H. 2007. 3G mobile telecommunications licenses in Europe: a critical review. „info” 9 (6): 35-44. [Google Scholar]

[10] Klemperer, P. 2002a. How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions. „European Economic Review” 46 (4): 829-845. [Google Scholar]

[11] Klemperer, P. 2002b. What really matters in auction design. „The Journal of Economic Perspectives” 16 (1): 169-189. [Google Scholar]

[12] Lewczuk, A. 2006. Modele i własności aukcji symetrycznych. „Decyzje” 6: 81-105. [Google Scholar]

[13] Milgrom, P. 2000. Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction. „Journal of Political Economy” 108 (2): 245-272. [Google Scholar]

[14] Milgrom, P. 2004. Putting auction theory to work: Cambridge University Press. [Google Scholar]

[15] Milgrom, P., Weber, R. 1982. A theory of auctions a nd competitive bidding. „Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society”. Econometrica 50 (September 1982) 1089-1122. [Google Scholar]

[16] POINTTOPIC. 2012. Broadband coverage in Europe in 2 012, s. 212. [Google Scholar]

[17] Richter, K. 2006. Simulating Auctions. W: A. Namatame, T. Kaizouj i & Y. Aruka (Eds.), The Complex Networks of Economic Interactions (Vol. 567, s. 209-223): Springer Berlin Heidelberg. [Google Scholar]

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