Voting Methods In Single-Member Districts And Their Properties

Kaminski, Marek

Abstract

The paper starts with the defi nitions of fi ve major voting methods that can be applied in single-member districts. Then the political consequences of single-member districts are discussed. The special attention is paid to those consequences that are considered negative and to potential ways of neutralizing them. The next section compares selected subtle effects of using simple majority rule versus alternative vote. The fi nal section reviews methods that mix proportional representation and majoritarian components.

Keywords

electoral law (1)simple majority (1)single-member districts (1)winner takes all (1)alternative vote (1)

References

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Tideman, N. (2015). Multiple-Winner Voting Rules. W: Heckelman, J. C., Miller, N. R., wyd., Social Choice and Voting, w druku, Springer Verlag. [Google Scholar]
Wis, M. (2012). JOW do Sejmu zgodne z Konstytucją. Pobrane z: http://www.madison.org.pl/doce/ kodeks-wyborczy/JOW-do-Sejmu-zgodne-z-Konstytucja.pdf Data dostępu: 29.06.2015. [Google Scholar]

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APA style

Kaminski, Marek (2015). Voting Methods In Single-Member Districts And Their Properties. (2015). Voting Methods In Single-Member Districts And Their Properties. Decyzje, (23), 111-122. https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.48 (Original work published 6/2015AD)

MLA style

Kaminski, Marek. “Voting Methods In Single-Member Districts And Their Properties”. 6/2015AD. Decyzje, no. 23, 2015, pp. 111-122.

Chicago style

Kaminski, Marek. “Voting Methods In Single-Member Districts And Their Properties”. Decyzje, Decyzje, no. 23 (2015): 111-122. doi:10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.48.

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[1] Black, D. (1948). The Median Voter Theorem. The Journal of Political Economy, 56(1), 23-34. [Google Scholar]

[2] CIA. (2015). https://www.cia.gov Dostęp 4 lipca 2015 roku. [Google Scholar]

[3] Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper and Row. [Google Scholar]

[4] Duverger, M. (1952). Public opinion and political parties in France. American Political Science Review, 46, 1069-1078. [Google Scholar]

[5] Duverger, M. (1963). Political parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state. New York: John Wiley. (French version published in 1954) [Google Scholar]

[6] Electoral Knowledge Network (2015). Online interactive map. http://aceproject.org/epic-en/ CDMap?question=ES005&f= Dostęp 4 lipca 2015 roku. [Google Scholar]

[7] Haman, J. (2003). Demokracja, decyzje, wybory. Wydawnictwo Naukowe “Scholar”. [Google Scholar]

[8] Hotelling, H. (1929). Game theory for economic analysis. Economic Journal, 39, 41-47. [Google Scholar]

[9] Ingraham, Ch. (2014). America’s most gerrymandered districts. Pobrane z: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/05/15/americas-most-gerrymandered-congressionaldistricts/ [Google Scholar]

[10] Kaminski, M. M. (2015). Empirical Examples of Voting Paradoxes. W: Heckelman, J. C., Miller, N. R., wyd., Social Choice and Voting, w druku, Springer Verlag. [Google Scholar]

[11] Lissowski, G. (2001). Elementy teorii wyboru społecznego. Wydawnictwo Naukowe “Scholar”, 2001. [Google Scholar]

[12] Mowbray, M., Gollmann, D. (2007, July 12). Electing the Doge of Venice: Analysis of a 13th century protocol. 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, IEEE, Venice, Italy, 295-308. [Google Scholar]

[13] Ordeshook, P., Shvetsova, O. (1994). Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties. American Journal of Political Science, 38(1), 100-123. [Google Scholar]

[14] Raciborski, J. (1997). Polskie wybory: zachowania wyborcze społeczeństwa polskiego w latach 1989-1995. Scholar Books. [Google Scholar]

[15] Shepsle, K. A., Bonchek, M.S. (1996). Analyzing politics: Rationality, behavior, and institutions. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. [Google Scholar]

[16] Tideman, N. (2015). Multiple-Winner Voting Rules. W: Heckelman, J. C., Miller, N. R., wyd., Social Choice and Voting, w druku, Springer Verlag. [Google Scholar]

[17] Wis, M. (2012). JOW do Sejmu zgodne z Konstytucją. Pobrane z: http://www.madison.org.pl/doce/ kodeks-wyborczy/JOW-do-Sejmu-zgodne-z-Konstytucja.pdf Data dostępu: 29.06.2015. [Google Scholar]

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