This paper discusses judicial duty of improving the law on epistemic grounds and claims in that regarding this obligation, it is possible to give a place to free speech from an epistemic point of view. As a requirement of having epistemic agency, judges like other human beings have epistemological responsibility. Different from the others’ responsibility, judges’ responsibility is connected to their duty of improving the law, which is required by their job as well as the idea of the rule of law and judicial professional principles. Judges should improve the law’s capacity to guide the conduct of its citizens, who are obligated to obey the law. Improving the law also improves the delivery of justice. The ways of legal interpretation and justification are important to improve it. While applying the law, judges can find the law unclear or they may encounter some norm conflicts. In these cases, they
should resolve them to keep the law ‘legally in good shape’, which should meet epistemological requirements. When fulfilling this obligation, judicial free speech on epistemic grounds should not be limited.

The aim of the article is to characterise selected tax principles included in the Polish financial law literature. Legal academics and commentators widely emphasise that these principles are extremely crucial for the tax system. They express the postulates to which a properly designed tax, as well as a rational tax system, should correspond. In view of the fact that the academic discourse has been emphasising for many years that tax law is of low quality and thus difficult and costly to apply, as well as the low assessment of tax regulations enacted as part of the so-called Polish Deal, it was considered appropriate to remind the significance of the most important of these models, the content of which was expressed as tax principles.

The Polish Personal Income Tax Law provides for a relatively extensive group of tax exemptions related to various benefits offered to doctoral students and academics. It also includes an exemption for scholarships and assistance grants referred to in Law 2.0, as well as scholarships received under programmes or projects aimed at implementing the current state scientific policy. The rule adopted is that the exemption applies as long as the rules for granting the scholarships and grants in question them have been approved by the minister in charge of higher education and science. The research objective adopted in the gloss is to verify the jurisprudential practice regarding the issue of the tax exemption in question. The analysis and evaluation have been performed also in the context of the guidelines and ideas behind the reform of higher education and science (regulations of the so-called Law 2.0). This gloss is a critical commentary. It makes use of dogmatic-legal and normative analysis.

This article provides only a small contribution to the inevitable scholarly discussion on whether excluding the primacy of the literal rule in favour of the priority of a pro-EU teleological interpretation in the judicial and administrative applications of Polish tax law is really reasonable. Firstly, this article sets out to discuss the stages of the transposition of the concept of a household from EU legislation into the provisions of the Excise Duty Act. Secondly, it presents the evolution in the lines of the interpretation of this term as used by tax authorities and national courts. Thirdly, it demonstrates the negative legal and fiscal consequences that are caused in practice by the definition of this term as framed by the Polish legislator.

Using a surname as a trademark or part of a trademark has been the subject of numerous case-laws and has been widely discussed in the literature. However, it seems that after the Messi case (cases C-449/18 P and C-474/18 P), the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) seems to have departed from their previous approach where it was held that surnames in trademarks should be treated as normal signs. In the Messi case, the CJEU, however, ruled that the reputation of Messi – an internationally famous football player – is so well known that an average consumer, seeing the ‘MESSI’ mark placed on clothing, gymnastic or sporting articles and protective equipment, will establish a link between the mark and the sports personality, despite the similarity between the ‘MESSI’ mark to the ‘MASSI’ brand name, a previously registered trademark. However, this ruling gives rise to the following questions, which this article seeks to address:
- How can one prove that someone’s surname is globally recognised?
- Why did the CJEU decide that Messi is better known than, for instance, Picasso who was the subject of the previous case? Who else can be as famous as Messi if Picasso was held not to be?
- Has Messi changed the CJEU’s approach and opened the floodgates to expand trademark protection for an unlimited number of trademarks?

This article attempts to answer these questions.

The resolution of the municipal council on establishing the rules and conditions of situating the objects of street furniture, advertising boards and devices, gates, their dimensions, quality standards and kinds of materials, which they can be made of (it is called thelandscape resolution’ and also the ‘advertising resolution’ in literature), is a legal tool that serves landscape protection. However justified and necessary it is, the legal definition of terms that are basic for its content is accompanied by certain structural doubts that translate into the practice of applying law. In this article, the authors identify those flaws of the applicable regulation and make suggestions of their own legal solutions, especially introducing the legal definition of the term ‘advertising medium’ (replacing the current ‘advertising board’ and ‘advertising device’), as well as the definitions of individual types of media, to the legal order. The dogmatic and legal analysis is concluded with a draft of the appropriate legal provision.

Many of the principles of taxation that were developed in the first half of the 20th century, such as the arm’s length principle and the definition of the term “permanent establishment” (PE) in determining the tax position of international business operations, when applied to the business models of the 21st century, often result in the under-taxation of businesses that are otherwise fully compliant with the laws as presently written and implemented. Compounding the problem is the fact that these rules and principles of taxation are broadly recognized and are enshrined in a wide network of tax treaties. This makes the task of modifying or updating these rules and principals extremely difficult. Using legal-dogmatic and legal-theoretical methods, the author will show that present attempts to tax e-commerce transactions unilaterally are not effective and that, under present conditions, even organizations such as the EU are unable to address the problem at hand. The OECD project, commissioned by the G-20, which seeks to create a set of international e-commerce taxation rules, faces some very serious difficulties – largely because a well-established “set in stone” complement of internationally accepted laws, rules, and regulations is serving to block the development of new, more appropriate rules. This phenomenon has become known as the lock-in effect or legal impossibilism. In order to effectively address this phenomenon, lawmakers on a global basis must understand the mechanisms that are blocking the effective evolution of business taxation.

The purpose of the article is to discuss selected issues connected with the legal meaning of a consignment note, especially its structure, function, classification and rules for the use of it in the national and international transport of goods by road. Most frequently the sender, the recipient and the transporter recognise the consignment note only as a document that confirms the performance of a carriage service. However, in case of irregularities or deficiencies during transport, the meaning of the consignment note is usually key to the decision which entity involved in the transport process will be liable for damages. The author points to the necessity of recognising a wide range of documents which meet the requirements constituted by the Transport Law Act and the CMR Convention. No refusal to acknowledge the value of a consignment note to a document that meets all of the requirements specified by law should take place, even if a given document has a different function at the same time, e.g. it is a waybill.

The rule of law does not govern all human interactions. There are times when the state bypasses legal constraints, as documented by the World Justice Project. Other times, jurisdictions may be mutually unfriendly and refuse to enforce foreign laws. Blockchains create trust between contracting parties at the individual level, enabling them to transact freely and increase consumer welfare. Blockchains can only supple-ment antitrust if the legal constraints do not impede their development. The law should thus support the decentralization of blockchains so that blockchain-based mechanisms may take over (even if imperfectly) where the law does not apply. With that in mind, we justify the attractiveness of that approach by showing that blockchain causes an increase in the number of transactions by creating trust (Part 1), and that it may overall increase the decentralization of economic transactions (Part 2). The law should take into account where it applies (Part 3). We conclude afterward (Part 4).

The article is devoted to the study of the correct application of the evaluative concepts contained in the norms of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Attention is drawn to certain difficulties in the application of the evaluative norms in the Convention: despite their objective necessity and usefulness, they create a room for the law enforcement entity’s own discretion up to subjectivism in resolving specific cases; they serve as an objective obstacle to the unification of the case law of the ECtHR and this creates preconditions for unequal implementation of ECtHR judgments in the national legal order; they cause the risk of errors in the application of the provisions of the Convention by the competent authorities of the Contracting States. It is established that the application of legal norms containing evaluative concepts is challenging not only owing to the specific properties of the evaluative concepts themselves, but also due to the peculiarities of adjudication by the ECtHR when applying the evaluative norms. The relevant case law of the ECtHR as well as examples of national legislation are analysed in support of these theoretical conclusions. Since the lack of uniform application of the evaluative norms of the Convention causes divergent use of the ECtHR’s judgments in the domestic judicial system, it is advised to follow a number of rules for reasoning of decisions by the domestic court. These rules will serve as a certain guarantee against ambiguous implementation of ECtHR judgments at the national level.

The publication examines the legal nature of wars, looks into the law of war genesis, reviews its conventions, as well as identifies the aim, objectives, causes together with the consequences of Russia’s military aggression on February 24, 2022; it provides a testimony on the war of aggression against Ukraine and identifies its threats to post-war international law and order. The aim of the article is to determine the background, nature, fundamentals and nature of the war the Russian Federation launched on February 24, 2022 against Ukraine within the context of confrontation with the values of Western democracy. Historical-legal dialectical, comparative-legal and system-structural methods, as well as methods of formal logic (induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis, abstraction and concretization, etc.) were used to study the issues. The application of these research methods entails a cross-sectoral scientific nature.
Wars have accompanied the entire history of mankind. Since the 17th century the theoretical foundations of the law of war have been laid, which enshrined in international laws and customs of warfare (Geneva Conventions, Hague Convention, etc.) since the 19th century, thus forming the international humanitarian law. After World War II, violations of the latter by the belligerent party are viewed by the world community no less harshly than the mere war. The paper questions the purpose, reasons, conditions and intermediate consequences of the war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Obviously, the military aggression and the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022 marked the beginning of the de facto war, under a specific formal definition by a Russian official as a “special military operation” instead of naming it an attempt to avoid legal responsibility for war crimes committed in Ukraine. The article analyses the aggressive nature of this war on the part of the Russian Federation, demonstrates numerous violations of international law conventions by the Russian armed forces during the military invasion and temporary occupied territories in Ukraine. It emphasizes that the law of war has always been replaced by signing a peace treaty and relevant international agreements, which entails the obligation to severe the political, economic, and legal responsibility of the state violating international humanitarian law. The paper reviews the key institutions and legal tools for bringing the Russian Federation authorities to justice for the war crimes committed in Ukraine. So far, the President of Ukraine, the Supreme Council of Ukraine, and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine have managed to apply legitimate international legal
mechanisms, primarily the International Criminal Court and the UN Security Council, to prosecute Russia for violating the international humanitarian law and committing war crimes in Ukraine. At the same time, on the Ukrainian territories currently liberated from the Russian army’s occupation (Bucha, Gostomel, Irpin, etc.), it is already possible to implement a special mechanism of justice, which consists in the collaboration between national and international experts: specialists, investigators, prosecutors, and judges to collect objective and impartial evidence of gross violations of international law and war conventions in Ukraine. It is obvious that for Ukraine today both the victory and just punishment for the committed and continuing committed war crimes on its territory are important. The aftermath of World War II’s “Never Again” now requires, as never before, its effective guarantee and protection

Mediation in the administrative procedure is a new institution that provides a chance for an improved perception of public administration, yet it also gives rise to a range of doubts. The latter spring chiefly, though not solely, from the nature of administrative control. The principles of the rule of law, objective law, and voluntary mediation, which may be taken an improper advantage of, contrary to the legislator’s intentions, are also identified as barriers.
Analysis of the issue implies that administrative proceedings leave room for mediation. Whether it will fulfil expectations, however, largely depends on the attitudes of parties and administrative authorities, or their employees, to be precise, for whom mediation is undoubtedly both a processual and mental challenge.
The introduction of mediation to the Code of Administrative Procedure is to be applauded, mainly from the perspective of inducing citizens’ trust in public authorities. Mediation may also prove an effective instrument of eliminating conflicts in administration and thus contribute to reducing the caseload to be heard by administrative courts.
It is important, though, for this opportunity to be taken proper advantage of and for the transformation of administration from controlling to mediating and more friendly to subjects administered to continue. This is a trend that deserves to be followed not only in Polish but also other legislations.

The article attempts to present the identity of the judge through the metaphor of the role as an interactive ritual. The framework of this ritual can be described by means of both intersubjective factors (e.g. legal rules) and individual factors (the subjectivity of the role performer). I apply this conception to the iconic symbol of justice in public space, which is usually associated with the figure of a woman whose eyes are covered with a blindfold, holding the scales of justice in one hand and a sword in the other. It is a visual symbol of the judge; one that is comprehensible to both lawyers and the public.
In carrying out this task, I refer to sociological and anthropological research in the field of visual culture. This perspective determines not only the subject matter covered by the theses formulated in the article but also the research method. It is assumed that visual representation constitutes a communication channel that has a great impact on individual and social memory. For this reason, the presentation of the role of the image and the methods of its interpretation is important for the debate about the role of the judge and the image of the judge in public space. This approach to the subject, which consists in shifting the emphasis from text to image, also rehabilitates the significance of visual representation in jurisprudence, a field traditionally dominated by the view that law is a linguistic phenomenon.

Fixed establishment (FE) is one of the institutions of the EU value added tax system; its structure is essential to correctly determine the right tax jurisdiction of an EU Member State for the purpose of VAT settlement in situations of cross-border provision of services. However, the legal structure of a FE adopted by the EU legislator (and, consequently, adapted to national legislation of the Member States) causes uncertainty when it comes to its interpretation. In the absence of unambiguously defined conditions in EU law to consider a specific presence and activity of an enterprise to be a FE, interpretation rules contained in judicial decisions
issued by the Court of Justice of the EU play an important role. Among attempts
made by the CJEU to clarify the ‘blur areas’ resulting from the dynamics of modern
business processes, one of the most interesting ones is the possibility of considering
a subsidiary to be a fixed establishment for a parent company. The purpose of this
paper is to analyse legal and economic factors, the fulfilment of which may constitute a condition for considering a subsidiary to be a fixed establishment for
a parent company, with particular emphasis on the ruling of the Court of Justice
of 7 May 2020 in the Dong Yang case (C-547/18).

There are many theoretical and legal issues related to the operation of private military companies (PMCs) and their presence (location of their registered offices) in democratic states under the rule of law that remain unsolved in legal doctrine and practice. There are no clear rules at an international level that define the status of these agencies and the way in which they carry out their duties. There is also the problem of distinguishing between contractors and mercenaries. PMCs, like private security companies (PSCs), are used by states in exchange for large government contracts in so-called „unwanted wars”, where it is cheaper to conduct operations without parliamentary oversight, media publicity, or social objections to sending military contingents abroad. Sometimes it is a question of providing discrete military aid to „friend countries”. PMCs are politically safer in such a situation. Not only states but also non-governmental organizations, private companies,
rebel groups and declining dictators hire these private armies. The problem requires urgent multifaceted reflection leading to changes in legal doctrine and legislative action, both at the international level and in individual countries.

This article presents legal issues in connection to the relation between the state and the beneficiaries of earmarked subsidies for the realisation of public duty, especially the relation between the state and the local government bodies, as well as the purpose and the role of the subsidy contract in such relations. The provisions of the Public Finance Act referring to the conditions of allocating and reimbursement of the subsidy and, on the other hand, the right to regulate some of the rules in a contract as an institution of private law are being discussed in the context of the public character of the funds from subsidies. Additionally, common problems with the application of the provisions of the law are being reviewed in the above-mentioned context.

The article is a polemic between Leo Tolstoy, a Russian writer and a moralist of the nineteenth century, and Leon Petrażycki, a Polish lawyer and a philosopher of law of that period – on the social significance of law and morality. Tolstoy’s and Petrażycki’s roads crossed due to a young man named Krutik, a law student at the University of St. Petersburg. Krutik wrote a letter to Tolstoy, whom he considered a moral authority, asking to dispel his doubts caused by reading the works of Petrażycki. Indeed, Tolstoy affirmed
that the appropriate regulator of human life is morality. In contrast, Petrażycki proclaimed that the raison d’être has both morality and law, but if one compares their social significance, the higher value should be given to the law. Krutik had a dilemma, which thinker to agree with? Analysis of Tolstoy’s and Petrażycki’s views made in this article leads to the conclusion that in fact they were arguing about how to implement the idea of love, somewhat differently interpreted by them. While Tolstoy categorically rules out the possibility of realizing it on legal grounds, Petrażycki was firmly convinced that the law can, absolutely, be its carrie

Interpretation is one of key notions on the convergence axis of law and literature. Both lawyers and literary scholars during their practices focus on interpreting complex language texts, establishing the meaning of expressions, reconstructing the sender’s intention, penetrating the influence of the text on the recipient, i.e. questions which turn out to be fundamental in both legal as well as literary texts. Analysis of the legal and literary interpretations allows us to identify differences as well as certain analogies between these two spheres of activity. They may be analysed through referring to the specificity of the entities participating in the interpretative practice, which are the sender and the recipient. The essential difference between interpretation in law and interpretation in literature consists of the rule that a legal text should be interpreted in the way that produces an unequivocal result. On the other hand, in the case of literary interpretation, it is difficult to reach a precise or unequivocal effect of reading the sense. Moreover, in literary interpretation it is not required. In a legal text and in a literary text the author-sender’s intention plays an important role. However, in the case of literary interpretation it is possible to apply a more flexible approach to the reconstruction of the author’s intention than in legal interpretation, where it is necessary to take into consideration rules and objectives of law only. The separateness of legal interpretation is justified foremost by the fact that it is specific purpose-oriented, which is establishing the meaning of the substance of applicable law.