The article attempts to present the identity of the judge through the metaphor of the role as an interactive ritual. The framework of this ritual can be described by means of both intersubjective factors (e.g. legal rules) and individual factors (the subjectivity of the role performer). I apply this conception to the iconic symbol of justice in public space, which is usually associated with the figure of a woman whose eyes are covered with a blindfold, holding the scales of justice in one hand and a sword in the other. It is a visual symbol of the judge; one that is comprehensible to both lawyers and the public.
In carrying out this task, I refer to sociological and anthropological research in the field of visual culture. This perspective determines not only the subject matter covered by the theses formulated in the article but also the research method. It is assumed that visual representation constitutes a communication channel that has a great impact on individual and social memory. For this reason, the presentation of the role of the image and the methods of its interpretation is important for the debate about the role of the judge and the image of the judge in public space. This approach to the subject, which consists in shifting the emphasis from text to image, also rehabilitates the significance of visual representation in jurisprudence, a field traditionally dominated by the view that law is a linguistic phenomenon.

Fixed establishment (FE) is one of the institutions of the EU value added tax system; its structure is essential to correctly determine the right tax jurisdiction of an EU Member State for the purpose of VAT settlement in situations of cross-border provision of services. However, the legal structure of a FE adopted by the EU legislator (and, consequently, adapted to national legislation of the Member States) causes uncertainty when it comes to its interpretation. In the absence of unambiguously defined conditions in EU law to consider a specific presence and activity of an enterprise to be a FE, interpretation rules contained in judicial decisions
issued by the Court of Justice of the EU play an important role. Among attempts
made by the CJEU to clarify the ‘blur areas’ resulting from the dynamics of modern
business processes, one of the most interesting ones is the possibility of considering
a subsidiary to be a fixed establishment for a parent company. The purpose of this
paper is to analyse legal and economic factors, the fulfilment of which may constitute a condition for considering a subsidiary to be a fixed establishment for
a parent company, with particular emphasis on the ruling of the Court of Justice
of 7 May 2020 in the Dong Yang case (C-547/18).

There are many theoretical and legal issues related to the operation of private military companies (PMCs) and their presence (location of their registered offices) in democratic states under the rule of law that remain unsolved in legal doctrine and practice. There are no clear rules at an international level that define the status of these agencies and the way in which they carry out their duties. There is also the problem of distinguishing between contractors and mercenaries. PMCs, like private security companies (PSCs), are used by states in exchange for large government contracts in so-called „unwanted wars”, where it is cheaper to conduct operations without parliamentary oversight, media publicity, or social objections to sending military contingents abroad. Sometimes it is a question of providing discrete military aid to „friend countries”. PMCs are politically safer in such a situation. Not only states but also non-governmental organizations, private companies,
rebel groups and declining dictators hire these private armies. The problem requires urgent multifaceted reflection leading to changes in legal doctrine and legislative action, both at the international level and in individual countries.

This article presents legal issues in connection to the relation between the state and the beneficiaries of earmarked subsidies for the realisation of public duty, especially the relation between the state and the local government bodies, as well as the purpose and the role of the subsidy contract in such relations. The provisions of the Public Finance Act referring to the conditions of allocating and reimbursement of the subsidy and, on the other hand, the right to regulate some of the rules in a contract as an institution of private law are being discussed in the context of the public character of the funds from subsidies. Additionally, common problems with the application of the provisions of the law are being reviewed in the above-mentioned context.

The article is a polemic between Leo Tolstoy, a Russian writer and a moralist of the nineteenth century, and Leon Petrażycki, a Polish lawyer and a philosopher of law of that period – on the social significance of law and morality. Tolstoy’s and Petrażycki’s roads crossed due to a young man named Krutik, a law student at the University of St. Petersburg. Krutik wrote a letter to Tolstoy, whom he considered a moral authority, asking to dispel his doubts caused by reading the works of Petrażycki. Indeed, Tolstoy affirmed
that the appropriate regulator of human life is morality. In contrast, Petrażycki proclaimed that the raison d’être has both morality and law, but if one compares their social significance, the higher value should be given to the law. Krutik had a dilemma, which thinker to agree with? Analysis of Tolstoy’s and Petrażycki’s views made in this article leads to the conclusion that in fact they were arguing about how to implement the idea of love, somewhat differently interpreted by them. While Tolstoy categorically rules out the possibility of realizing it on legal grounds, Petrażycki was firmly convinced that the law can, absolutely, be its carrie

Interpretation is one of key notions on the convergence axis of law and literature. Both lawyers and literary scholars during their practices focus on interpreting complex language texts, establishing the meaning of expressions, reconstructing the sender’s intention, penetrating the influence of the text on the recipient, i.e. questions which turn out to be fundamental in both legal as well as literary texts. Analysis of the legal and literary interpretations allows us to identify differences as well as certain analogies between these two spheres of activity. They may be analysed through referring to the specificity of the entities participating in the interpretative practice, which are the sender and the recipient. The essential difference between interpretation in law and interpretation in literature consists of the rule that a legal text should be interpreted in the way that produces an unequivocal result. On the other hand, in the case of literary interpretation, it is difficult to reach a precise or unequivocal effect of reading the sense. Moreover, in literary interpretation it is not required. In a legal text and in a literary text the author-sender’s intention plays an important role. However, in the case of literary interpretation it is possible to apply a more flexible approach to the reconstruction of the author’s intention than in legal interpretation, where it is necessary to take into consideration rules and objectives of law only. The separateness of legal interpretation is justified foremost by the fact that it is specific purpose-oriented, which is establishing the meaning of the substance of applicable law.

The article discusses the differences and similarities between discretionary, judicial power and administrative authority. It indicates a possible recognition of the administrative and discretionary power. The author also considers possible risks in a democratic state governed by the rule of law, associated with the abuse of discretionary by administrative authority.

This article seeks to identify the characteristic features of judicial cosmopolitanism and its product – the emancipation of judges from the constraints of national law. Cosmopolitanism manifests itself in creating normative systems outside and above traditional international law. While the latter draws its binding power from the will of states, cosmopolitan rules are usually created by private actors. Their binding power results predominantly from practical necessity. Such is the status of lex sportiva, of the standards imposed by rating agencies, or of international accreditation bodies. Judicial cosmopolitanism is different, for it rests upon the existing structures and competencies. By resorting to alien legal sources judges free themselves from national constraints, thus enhancing their power and independence. In assessing the impact of cosmopolitanism, one has to differentiate between looking up to foreign laws and precedents as binding sources, and treating them as merely intellectual inspiration. The second, albeit it seems innocuous, entails serious perils to the quality of adjudication. It creates a danger of cherry-picking by selecting foreign inspirations, not necessarily best suited to the case at hand. There is a danger of judicial overstepping of powers by making laws instead of merely applying it. By allowing judges to venture the uncontrolled expansion of their powers we endanger the very essence of the rule of law. On a positive note, drawing on foreign legal sources enables judges to verify the rationality of their decisions, as they were already tested in other jurisdictions.

Women’s rights are an inseparable part of the human rights, and human rights are an integrated part of women’s rights. The Swedish Government has adopted a concept of feminist foreign policy, aiming at strengthening these rights on a global level. Women’s rights are continued to be violated as much as ever, hindering democracy, peace, rule of law, sustainable development and economic growth – the overarching aims of international policy. Women’s rights to education, financial resources and access to the labour market are crucial in defending human rights and having a policy for 100 per cent of the world’s population. A priority task of the feminist foreign policy is supporting women’s inclusion in all decision-making structures, both on national and multilateral level. This in order to achieve wider foreign, development and security policy objectives through a new approach, different way of thinking and different solutions.

In the Roman inheritance law, until post-classical law, the appointment of an heir on the basis of the rule heredis institutio caput et fundamentum totius testamenti est, was the foundation of the whole will. Heredis institutio was a crucial element of the content of the will and it should be placed in the very beginning as all dispositions placed before it, were void. And remained this way until Justinian law where the above mentioned formalism was annulled. First exceptions of the rule heredis institutio caput et fundamentum totius testament est and the order arising from testamentary dispositions placed therein, can be noticed in classical law, according to the constitution of custody, appointment to inherit by the own slave together with his liberation and disinheritance. Moreover, Roman law, based on the performance of praetors and Cesar law, exceptionally allowed the maintenance if the rest of the testamentary content (demises, trusts, liberations) when the heredis institutio fell or did not lead to inheritance. And so, the acceptance of the heir appointed in a will becomes a sole formality in classical law, and a range of deviations and exceptions appear in the discussed rule Heredis institutio caput et fundamentum totius testamenti est. The Western Roman post – classical practice and Justinian omitted the above mentioned rule totally.

The aim of this paper is to address the issue of implementation of international legal instruments regarding cybercrime into the Polish criminal law. Effective protection against cybercrime requires, among other things, the establishment of an appropriate legal framework. Criminal prohibitions of a deterrent effect, which are a part of this framework, seem of particular importance. In Europe such a set of rules is provided for in the instruments of the Council of Europe as well as in the European Union instruments. As a member of both these international organisations, Poland is obliged to implement their standards. The author’s aim is to analyse whether and, if so, to what extent the current Polish criminal legislation is in line with European requirements. The process of implementation of these norms has expanded in the span of over 10 years and was initiated even before Poland accessed the European Union. Polish criminal law, however, is not yet fully compliant with international requirements on cybercrime. This paper is an attempt to identify some areas of the criminal law which are still to be amended as well as to submit some solutions de lege ferenda.

These standards were introduced at four international organizations and supranational associations: 1) the European Union; 2) the Council of Europe; 3) the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; 4) the Commonwealth of Independent States. The article states that the key reason for the introduction of standards for the regulation of lobbying at the international level was considerable corruption in the adoption of legal acts. It is concluded that latent and unregulated lobbying can seriously undermine public confidence in the institution of government, especially in the countries of the so-called “new democracy”. International regulation of lobbying takes the form of resolutions, procedural rules, guidelines, recommendations and model legislation. Notably, the first steps towards international regulation of lobbying were taken by the institutions of the European Union. Today EU standards for the regulation of lobbying is based on a series of articles set out in the EU-founding treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. EU standards for the regulation of lobbying influence not only the EU Member States, but it also extends to EU Partner Countries. Significant steps in the implementation of international standards for the regulation of lobbying are being constantly carried out by the Council of Europe. The establishment of CE standards for the regulation of lobbying is reflected in the activity of statutory bodies of the Council of Europe and its semi-autonomous bodies. In recent years a lot of work on the strengthening of international standards for lobbying regulation has been done by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. To help address the concerns with transparency and integrity in lobbying, the OECD Member Countries adopted in 2010 a Recommendation on Principles for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying as guidance to decision-makers on how to promote good governance in lobbying. Another international organization, which began to regulate actively the practice of lobbying is the Commonwealth of Independent States. In order to intensify the work concerning legislative regulation of lobbying in the member countries of the CIS, at the XXII Plenary Session of the Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS member states the Resolution No. 22-16 of November 15, 2003 was adopted, which approved a model law “On regulation of lobbying activity in state authorities”.

In the correspondence between the governor of Bithynia-Pontus and emperor Trajan in the years 111–113 one can find an exchange on whether to allow a buried body to be exhumed and transported to be buried in a different place. Pliny, who was familiar with Roman practices in this respect, turned to the emperor seeking advice on what policy he should adopt with regard to the inhabitants of the province. The emperor’s answer upheld the common practice that it was possible to move a body to a different burial site only when there was a strong reason for doing so (especially when the tombs were being violated or otherwise under threat). Trajan’s judgement influenced the decisions by subsequent rulers who took their stance in this matter.

In my paper I would like to analyze the topic o academic legal education, using for that purpose tool granted by Rochard Rorty’s neopragmatism and Artur Kozak’s juriscentrism. In this article I consider the possibility of describing higher education and legal culture using both of those concepts, and to form some proposals for future shaping of this proces. In my text I aim to prove, tha contemporary legal education is basem mostly on the mechanisms of socialisation and professional training, which base rather on transfer of rules of legal reasoning and discussion within legal community, than on transfer of actual skills. Therefore I consider to which extent this process should be suplemented by methods which individualise students, and which allow the autocreation, which is, according to Rorty, should be the mian task of higher education. In the further parts of my paper I consuder, how those mechanisms will impact shaping of future lawyers, and by that, the legal community itself, and what benefits could we achieve this way.

The Greek polis is the birthplace of a culture whose influence persisted despite the fall of the very form of polis. This culture plays a significant part in the life of communities of today, especially in the domain of the so-called Western culture. Polis means both state and city, but most of all it is “a society, a community of people living together”. This form of governance enabled equal citizens to exercise direct supervision over their governments. Polis itself was not an invention of ancient Greeks, but the public nature thereof, especially in the form of the debate-based democracy and the rule of law – not of people – turned out to be their contribution to the idea of a city-state. Democracy as a common form of a political system can be found particularly in the Greek culture of polis. The general notions deriving from the Greek polis, i.e. citizenship, democracy, equality, independence, autonomy or justice, express a desire for a better life of an individual in a community. The democracy of classical times, characterised by equal citizenship and freedom of speech, is considered as the first one to moderate fierce social-economic disputes. It is this polis that made it possible for philosophy and science to develop. The modern-day discussion on the state in a globalised and increasingly urbanised world can surely benefit from a reflection on the civil and legal dimensions of polis.

The aim of the article is to outline the relationship between the rule of law and civic engagement in the public sphere and to attempt to answer the question whether the rule of law can be an effective tool in preventing the transformation of democracy in a tyranny of the majority; whether it can also create optimal conditions for democracy to develop. In other words, does the rule of law serve democracy and political engagement or does it rather limit the spontaneity of civic activity because stability cannot be reconciled with the freedom of citizens? The current “juridification” of the public domain (the expansion of law into various areas of social existence) marginalises the validity and scope of civic presence in the decision-making process in the name of law-abidingness and the neutrality of instruments of control and of choices made by the ruling power. Can the effective solution to this situation be the opening of the concept of the rule of law to the idea of political nature and the expansion of the domain of grassroots participation?

Rule of law is one of the most fundamental values of the European Union and the issues related thereto have become one of the top priorities not only in the EU agenda but also in the EU policies of most of the Member States, including Sweden. This is due to the increasing integration, the growing dependence of the functioning of the entire European Union on the way how the system of justice works in different Member States, and the concern over the condition of the rule of law in these Member States. In recent years, the European Union has been making use of some older instruments, whose aim is to control and improve the observance of the rule of law (including Art. 7 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), and has adopted some new solutions too – the European rule of law mechanism and the regulation regarding rule of law conditionality, related to the new EU budget. The need to work out effective procedures to determine the condition of the rule of law and to uphold the main standards of the system of justice in all EU Member States is becoming more and more urgent and remains one of the greatest challenges faced by the European Union to be dealt with by the Swedish government.

This article presents the general characteristics of the joint property of the spouses in family law and the possible ways of division. Particular attention was paid to the possibility of dividing them upon the request of one spouses in the divorce decree. In addition, the results of own research of court files explored in Warsaw in the 2016/2017 academic year regarding in which the court ruled on the division of joint property in a divorce decree and after a divorce. Finally, the article also contains conclusions and observations constructed after the conducted research.