The paper aims to discuss the reasonable observer test as a tool for assessing judges’ expression. The argument begins by analyzing the relevant provisions of international soft law, as inscribed in the instruments developed and adopted by the CoE and the UN. Subsequently, an operationalization of the test is proposed by identifying the factors to be taken into account in the application of the test. In the following step, the expectations placed on the reasonable observer test are addressed, whereby the juriscentric (“strong”) and post-analytical (“weak”) positions are outlined. The former relies on Artur Kozak’s law-philosophical conception, and the latter is underpinned by the topography of juristic power developed by Paweł Jabłoński and Przemysław Kaczmarek. The paper makes the case for the post-analytical approach, which places rather modest expectations on the reasonable observer test and considers it instrumental in structuring the discussion, rather than yielding
indisputably reliable conclusions.

This paper focuses on the issue of whether the boundaries of the private lives of judges are shaped according to cultural conditions and gender. My main assumption is that gender inequality in a culture is reflected in how the boundaries of the private life of judges are interpreted. In this regard, women judges may face more restrictions than their male colleagues in what they wear, what they do and what they say in their lives generally. And ultimately, an interpretation of private life that reinforces gender roles also limits the freedom of expression. I concretise my discussion regarding gender stereotypes that influence what judges do or say in their private lives in different cultures.

The aim of this paper is to present the issue of judicial freedom of expression in the perspective of obligations that are inherent in the judicial role. The fulfilment of such a task is dictated firstly by the presentation of an epistemic and egalitarian view of judicial humility. Based on this distinction I hypothesise two directions of thinking about judicial freedom of expression. The epistemic variant, focusing on the role aspect, presents the judge as a special category of citizen due to the obligations connected with his or her profession. The egalitarian variant presents an image of the judge as a citizen. The whole study is completed by the justification of the choice of a research topic. Among the reasons, technological changes and the related development of social media deserve special attention. The implementation of the tasks mentioned above allows several conclusions to be drawn. One of them concerns the mentioned hypothesis, which is given a correction. The other conclusion, in turn, concerns the variables in view of which the scope of judicial freedom of expression can be examined. The first of these is the sphere in which the judge’s expression occurs, the second is the object of that expression, and the third variable is the cultural aspect.

The purpose of this publication is to show and analyse the issue of transsexual people who feel the need to reassign their sex assigned at birth and their biological sex due to a gender identity disorder. The paper is a polemic against the views presented in the case-law practice, suggesting the uniform and statutory regulation of transgender people’s situation in Polish law, drawing from the achievement of the ‘Principles’ written in Yogyakarta. One of the main postulates resulting from this publication concerns the regulation of the conditions and procedure of the legal sex transition that guarantee transsexual people the enjoyment of their fundamental rights and freedoms on equal terms with other members of society. The article is supposed to contribute to combating discrimination and increasing awareness in the area of transsexuality which is viewed stereotypically and is unknown to most people, with the exception of a small group of experts who fight against exclusion that conditioned by a different gender identity.

The purpose of the article is the legal and comparative analysis of how the principle of the proportional restriction of the rights and freedoms of an individual is understood by the Constitutional Tribunal and the European Court of Human Rights. The author made a comparative profile of selected statements of the indicated judicial bodies, which refer to the essence, theoretical basis, structure and the practical application of the concept of proportionality, which allowed for distinguishing the basic similarities and differences between how proportionality is perceived by the CT and how it is viewed by the ECHR. The main thesis of the paper assumes that the most important and the most far-reaching differences concern the proportionality test structure as presented by both judicial bodies, as well as some practical aspects of the application of the test in the circumstances of specific actual states, however, the essence itself and its axiological basis remain similar in both cases.

The ambiguity of understanding and use of the term “human rights” reduces the effectiveness of the law-making and law enforcement activities of state and inter-national bodies, creates negative conditions for the formation of the unified worl-dview and legal position of future lawyers and representatives of other humanities. This article aims to define, formulate the content and describe the legal essence of the term “human rights,” and to substantiate the thesis about the harmfulness of the legal science, law-making and law enforcement use of this term with different meanings. The leading method of research is the method of analysis, which allows one to study the subject, imaginatively dividing it into constituent elements, and to consider each of the selected elements separately within a single whole. This article presents the argumentation of the need for a single wording, understanding, and use of the legal term “human rights.” The materials of the article have practical value for the effective implementation of the law-making and law enforcement activities of state and international bodies, for the formation of the unified worldview and legal position of future lawyers and representatives of other humanities, as well as for a correct and clear explanation of problems with the implemen-tation and protection of human rights.

The article is devoted to the study of the correct application of the evaluative concepts contained in the norms of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Attention is drawn to certain difficulties in the application of the evaluative norms in the Convention: despite their objective necessity and usefulness, they create a room for the law enforcement entity’s own discretion up to subjectivism in resolving specific cases; they serve as an objective obstacle to the unification of the case law of the ECtHR and this creates preconditions for unequal implementation of ECtHR judgments in the national legal order; they cause the risk of errors in the application of the provisions of the Convention by the competent authorities of the Contracting States. It is established that the application of legal norms containing evaluative concepts is challenging not only owing to the specific properties of the evaluative concepts themselves, but also due to the peculiarities of adjudication by the ECtHR when applying the evaluative norms. The relevant case law of the ECtHR as well as examples of national legislation are analysed in support of these theoretical conclusions. Since the lack of uniform application of the evaluative norms of the Convention causes divergent use of the ECtHR’s judgments in the domestic judicial system, it is advised to follow a number of rules for reasoning of decisions by the domestic court. These rules will serve as a certain guarantee against ambiguous implementation of ECtHR judgments at the national level.

One of the main provisions in shaping legal obligations between the parties is the freedom of contract. Although the parties are free to choose the provisions of their agreement, the content and the aim of the contract cannot contradict the essence and nature of the contract of employment, the act and the principles of the community life. Thereby, in order to engage an employee based on a long term contract of employment for a specified period, along with a short, two weeks notice termination period, justified and rational presumptions should be in place. In other words, taking into consideration current provisions of law, long term contract of employment is acceptable; however its validity is depended on the circumstances of each individual case.

The article offers an analysis of the inscription of the 2nd century AD, engraved on a bronze board, founded in Souk el-Khmis in North Africa. It includes a complaint of colons from the area of saltus Burunitanus, addressed to Emperor Commodus, about the abuse of law by the procurator and the general land lessee. The text is a source of knowledge of the work conditions and the situation in the colons, working in the Imperial estates in North Africa (province of Africa proconsularis). It is at the same time one of the most comprehensive sources of information about the organisation and management of the Roman provinces during the time of the Empire. The colons were small land lessees, who on the basis of locatio-conductio contract cultivated land, collected harvested and paid tenancy. Initially they were free Roman citizens and enjoyed the confidence of the landowners. Over time, their situation deteriorated. The abuse in relation to them were
frequent and one such case of complaint is described. It is a testimony to the days, when the colons still had a strong and independent position, largely based on personal freedom.

A large number of opinions have been expressed about the decision C-131/12. Initially, Google’s defeat has been widely welcomed as the giant had suffered a bitter defeat. After a first joy about the containment of Google’s arrogance it became clear that the excessive claim for right to be forgotten will dry out our sources of information. Can privacy be seen as a fear for diversity of opinion? It may be due to the tension between data and reputation protection on the one hand and the possibility to protect against lies and fraud on the other hand. It is not just Google’s freedom of expression, which is in the centre of our interests. We want to find informations and Google is helping us in this regard. Forcing Google to suppress the information flow can not hinder Google to earn money. If we go through the opinion of the Advocate General and compare it with the reasoning of
the ECJ, then we come to the conclusion, that the ECJ had to decide in this a way on the grounds of the current legal status. The ECJ was standing with the back to the wall, because it has to apply the current law and this left no option open. Thus, the ECJ could not follow the opinion of the Advocate General. In the following I will shortly summarize the Spanish Data Protection Authority (SDPA) decision, before moving to the Advocate General opinion and the judgment of the ECJ and finally provide an outlook on possible
future development in this regard.

Transfering duties customarly designated for public entities to private entities is a fact. It is connected with delegating on them a part of legal power in creating rights and duties of individuals. A vast majority of their domineeringly will is commonly stated on the grounds of by-laws. By-laws have different form, content and even different function. At the same time, depending only on the will of private entities several times interfere in the freedom and the rights of their addressee. That is why scientifical research concerning their essence and content, including a progressive and complicated process of “privatisation of public safety” seem to be more and more important. On the ground of this research, several by–laws laid down by private entities are being analysed.

This article deals with the specialised organ of constitutional review – the Constitutional Court of Georgia and analyses the possibility of granting the Constitutional Court the right to consider and adjudicate upon the decisions of common (ordinary) courts. The Constitutional Court mainly carries out repressive and abstract control. In general, it considers the constitutionality of normative acts. Most of the constitutional claims apply to compliance of the normative acts with the second chapter of the Constitution of Georgia, which guarantees basic rights and the freedom of individuals. Recently, the Public Defender of Georgia launched an initiative to add to the power of the Constitutional Court to consider the constitutionality of the decisions of the courts of last resort. Granting the Constitutional Court this authority is associated with many positive factors. First of all, the Constitutional Court will become the court of last resort in terms of the European Convention on Human Rights and thus, the number of applications against Georgia will be reduced. It will require less financial resources than in case of making application to the European Court of Human rights and the final decision will be adopted in shorter terms. Consequently, the new authority of the Constitutional Court can become a more effective human rights protection mechanism. The new authority may interfere with the common court’s competence; however, finally, the initiative should be positively evaluated.

The paper entitled “Counteracting Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion in Selected EU Directives on Direct Taxes” discusses the provisions of Directive 2003/49/EC, Directive 2009/133/EC and Directive 2011/96/EC that are capable of withdrawing the benefits provided under the directives in the case of tax fraud and abuse, tax evasion or tax avoidance. The paper reviews provisions of the directives and also the case law of the European Court of Justice concerning tax fraud and abuse. The jurisprudence of the ECJ plays a key role in setting standards for regulations on the prevention of tax evasion and avoidance adopted by Member States of the European Union. The paper’s centre piece argument is that the solution adopted by the EU legislator, which shifted the burden of preventing tax escape from the EU to Member States, is ineffective and falls short of fulfilling its proper role. The paper emphasises that many tax payers take advantage of the fundamental treaty freedoms and applicable directives to obtain tax benefits or double non-taxation. Limitations imposed by a strict jurisprudential approach of the European Court of Justice also pose a significant barrier to effective tackling the negative phenomenon of aggressive tax planning based on EU laws, the paper suggests. By assessing the effects of the application of the existing regulations and juxtaposing them with the current scale of the problem, the author presents an argument for changing the direction of measures taken to curb international tax avoidance and evasion.

The Greek polis is the birthplace of a culture whose influence persisted despite the fall of the very form of polis. This culture plays a significant part in the life of communities of today, especially in the domain of the so-called Western culture. Polis means both state and city, but most of all it is “a society, a community of people living together”. This form of governance enabled equal citizens to exercise direct supervision over their governments. Polis itself was not an invention of ancient Greeks, but the public nature thereof, especially in the form of the debate-based democracy and the rule of law – not of people – turned out to be their contribution to the idea of a city-state. Democracy as a common form of a political system can be found particularly in the Greek culture of polis. The general notions deriving from the Greek polis, i.e. citizenship, democracy, equality, independence, autonomy or justice, express a desire for a better life of an individual in a community. The democracy of classical times, characterised by equal citizenship and freedom of speech, is considered as the first one to moderate fierce social-economic disputes. It is this polis that made it possible for philosophy and science to develop. The modern-day discussion on the state in a globalised and increasingly urbanised world can surely benefit from a reflection on the civil and legal dimensions of polis.

The aim of the article is to outline the relationship between the rule of law and civic engagement in the public sphere and to attempt to answer the question whether the rule of law can be an effective tool in preventing the transformation of democracy in a tyranny of the majority; whether it can also create optimal conditions for democracy to develop. In other words, does the rule of law serve democracy and political engagement or does it rather limit the spontaneity of civic activity because stability cannot be reconciled with the freedom of citizens? The current “juridification” of the public domain (the expansion of law into various areas of social existence) marginalises the validity and scope of civic presence in the decision-making process in the name of law-abidingness and the neutrality of instruments of control and of choices made by the ruling power. Can the effective solution to this situation be the opening of the concept of the rule of law to the idea of political nature and the expansion of the domain of grassroots participation?

The coronavirus pandemic and the economic consequences it has caused are unprecedented. For the first time ever, we are dealing with the phenomenon of a global pandemic which has undermined the foundations of market economy to such a considerable extent. The fight against it has made it necessary for the govern-ments of individual countries to make decisions radically restricting the freedom of conducting business activity – including decisions to suspend the functioning of particular economic sectors. The imposed lockdown meant that a great many of employers had to completely abandon their operations or radically limit the scope of the activities they were involved in virtually overnight, which obviously had an impact on their ability to make any profit and on their financial situation. At the same time, limiting or even cancelling the possibilities of doing business was a threat to the labour market, heralding its collapse and therefore an increase in the rate of unemployment. This is because a natural consequence of such a situa-tion is that employers decide to dismiss employees. A real threat of an economic crisis of an unparalleled scale prompted the governments of most countries to take far-reaching measures to save the economy. The Polish government imposed restrictions on the functioning of many econo-mic sectors as early as in March 2020. At the same time, there began legislative work on the so-called Anti-Crisis Shield.4 The resulting act, passed on 31 March 2020, was subsequently amended several times. The subsequent editions of the Anti-Crisis Shield featured regulations aimed at, among others, employers affected by the coronavirus pandemic. The purpose of this text is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the measures incorporated in the Anti-Crisis Shield in order to protect the interests of employers, i.e. the solutions related to the situation of employment of employees. The starting point will be an attempt to establish the rationale guiding the legislator when introducing these solutions. Then, the analysis will focus on the instruments used by the legislator to provide the protection of employers’ interests – and on the subject of protection. Finally, an attempt to evaluate the effects of these regulations will be made.

The aim of the publication is to establish the function of the legal regulation of the principle of resolving legal doubts in favour of the citizen (in dubio pro libertate), introduced by the amendment of 2017 to the Code of Administrative Procedure. The purpose of the article is also to compare the state of the regulation in force at the time of its entry into force with the legal state created after the introduction of the amendment. It has been argued that the introduced principle worsened the legal situation of citizens in relation to their situation before its entry into force. The paper briefly presents the functions of law, including procedural law. This principle has been discussed and it has been established that it has a protective function. First and foremost, to ensure the security and stability of the law when the legislator has failed to fulfil its duty to legislate correctly and fairly. This function is of particular importance in cases where an administrative body unilaterally determines constitutional rights and freedoms. Resolving legal doubts in favour of the citizens is of particular importance in administrative law, which is very dynamic area (inflation and atomisation of this law), specialised (e.g. technical conditions of development) and complex due to the existence of various hierarchies of sources of law (constitution, statutes and secondary legislation, including local laws). The principle also protects other values, such as an important public interest. As a result of the comparison of the state of regulation before 2017, it was established that as long as the principle of in dubio pro libertate was a postulate of the doctrine, court judgments, interpreted from other principles of administrative proceedings, it did not suffer such significant limitations and could serve more fully to protect an entity. It the current state of law, administrative bodies can make use of it in a limited way only to several proceedings. Nor does it apply if there is – as is common in administrative proceedings – an important social interest or conflicting legal or factual interests of the parties concerned. The originality of the work results from taking into account the case law developed since the entry into force of the principle and the comparison and analysis of the situation of citizens before and after its introduction into the Code. The research carried out for the purpose of this work will be based on the comparative legal method as well as legal-dogmatic analysis, including the analysis of Polish normative material and the resulting views of the judicature and doctrine of law.