The literary activity of Wenceslas Makowski (1880–1942) who was a prominent politician in the Second Republic of Poland (1918–1939) as well as a lawyer and a scholar, encompassed three main subjects: scientific, journalistic (mainly political and social), and artistic. His literary achievements in the scientific field of legal sciences are highly regarded. Of Makowski’s literary work in the scientific and journalistic field, his achievements in the field of criminal and constitutional law are noteworthy. Undoubtedly, this was associated with his extraordinary activity in the state bodies of the Second Republic of Poland. W. Makowski was also devoted to artistic activities and literary criticism.

The paper presents the changes of the constitutional design of the Hungarian political community, in particular complex reconstruction of the Hungarian electoral system between 2011 and 2013, following the adoption of the new Hungarian Constitution.

The constitutionalization of the referendum and law making citizens’ initiatives makes them important institutions and also important tools for exercising direct democracy. The question that arises today is the effective usage of these tools, in the framework of enhancing the direct participation of the citizens in governance. Particularly, in countries like Albania, which represents one of the newest democracies established after the fall of the Communist regime in Europe, the exercising of these instruments encounters different challenges, coming up especially due to lack of traditions and practices in exercising direct democracy, legislation vacuum and the insufficiency of organizational experiences of the civil society. Nevertheless, some experiences in particular have been achieved in the last 15 years, after the current Constitution of the Republic of Albania was enacted. Out of the
direct democracy instruments that are sanctioned in the Constitution of the Republic of Albania, this paper will focus only upon the law making citizens’ initiative and on the abrogative referendum initiative, as well. Legislation, jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court and some other issues identified through the experiences established in Albania will be treated in this paper. These experiences are analyzed in a comparative point of
view with the experiences of other countries, particularly Italy.

The paper analyses a referendum on Scotland’s independence held on 18 September 2014, in particular within the legislative and political framework of the devolution settlement, implemented across the United Kingdom since 1997. Development of Scottish political separatism under the Scottish National Party and its long-time leader Alex Salmond has led to radical changes in the pattern of politics in Scotland. The pro independence SNP has ruled in Edinburgh since 2007, first through a minority government and then securing an absolute majority at Holyrood. It had consistently pushed for a referendum on independence and, after several months of negotiations, managed to sign on 15 October 2012 the Edinburgh Agreement with the British government. The Agreement paved the way for legislation regarding the referendum, in the form of the Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act and the Scottish Independence Referendum Act. “Yes” vote on 18 September would undoubtedly have enormous constitutional, political, economic, and social consequences for everyone involved, including the complex issues of Scotland’s EU and NATO membership, the exploitation of massive North Sea oil and gas reserves and retaining the British pound as future Scottish currency. But “No” vote would also mean significant adjustment of the British territorial constitution and considerable changes of Scotland’s relationship with the rest of the UK.

This article deals with the specialised organ of constitutional review – the Constitutional Court of Georgia and analyses the possibility of granting the Constitutional Court the right to consider and adjudicate upon the decisions of common (ordinary) courts. The Constitutional Court mainly carries out repressive and abstract control. In general, it considers the constitutionality of normative acts. Most of the constitutional claims apply to compliance of the normative acts with the second chapter of the Constitution of Georgia, which guarantees basic rights and the freedom of individuals. Recently, the Public Defender of Georgia launched an initiative to add to the power of the Constitutional Court to consider the constitutionality of the decisions of the courts of last resort. Granting the Constitutional Court this authority is associated with many positive factors. First of all, the Constitutional Court will become the court of last resort in terms of the European Convention on Human Rights and thus, the number of applications against Georgia will be reduced. It will require less financial resources than in case of making application to the European Court of Human rights and the final decision will be adopted in shorter terms. Consequently, the new authority of the Constitutional Court can become a more effective human rights protection mechanism. The new authority may interfere with the common court’s competence; however, finally, the initiative should be positively evaluated.

Testamentum holographum denotes a testament written by the testator in his own hand. It is in this sense that the term is found in papyrological texts in Greco-Roman Egypt. In Roman Law, it appears as late as the fifth century in the constitutions of the Emperors Theodosius II and Valentinian III as an acceptable form of testament written in the testator’s own hand – per holografam scripturam, without witnesses. Emperor Justinian failed to accept this novelty into his code and restored the classical forms of drafting a testament. However, the concept of holographic testament survived in Germanic legal codes (Lex Romana Burgundionum; Lex Romana Visigothorum) and it was through them that it has found its way into modern legislations, indirectly into the Polish civil law as well.

The article presents the powers of the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland in terms of their potential impact on the implementation of the principle of the independence of judges and independence of courts. During the initial analysis of legal regulations of individual competences of the Council the author attempts to assess their potential impact or lack thereof on the implementation of art.186 of the Constitution. This may be a contribution to the evaluation of the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland and its relations with other state authorities.

The recent changes in moral and the influence of other cultures caused that the traditional scope of the term “family” as people bound by the ties of marriage or blood is not so obvious. The Polish legislation does not provide for one legal definition of this term. The family status and its composition is determined by both the provisions of the Polish Constitution and other acts, but the scope of this notion fundamentally differs, depending on the area of legislation which is considered. The question then arises whether there is a need, and if so, whether it is possible to create a definition which would be common to different areas of law. The article contains a semantic analysis of the concept of “family” in Polish legislation on account of its structural scope.

In the Roman inheritance law, until post-classical law, the appointment of an heir on the basis of the rule heredis institutio caput et fundamentum totius testamenti est, was the foundation of the whole will. Heredis institutio was a crucial element of the content of the will and it should be placed in the very beginning as all dispositions placed before it, were void. And remained this way until Justinian law where the above mentioned formalism was annulled. First exceptions of the rule heredis institutio caput et fundamentum totius testament est and the order arising from testamentary dispositions placed therein, can be noticed in classical law, according to the constitution of custody, appointment to inherit by the own slave together with his liberation and disinheritance. Moreover, Roman law, based on the performance of praetors and Cesar law, exceptionally allowed the maintenance if the rest of the testamentary content (demises, trusts, liberations) when the heredis institutio fell or did not lead to inheritance. And so, the acceptance of the heir appointed in a will becomes a sole formality in classical law, and a range of deviations and exceptions appear in the discussed rule Heredis institutio caput et fundamentum totius testamenti est. The Western Roman post – classical practice and Justinian omitted the above mentioned rule totally.

One of the fundamental powers of the Constitutional Tribunal – granted by the provisions of the constitution – is to decide on the compliance of particular statutes with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The Tribunal’s rulings concern tax statutes as well, which implies specific consequences connected with the verification of the accuracy of tax settlements made under a challenged provision and leads essentially to excess tax being calculated. Such situations have not been uncommon recently, which justifies a more profound reflection on this issue in the context of rationality of verification of procedures regulated under the Tax Ordinance Act, which concern tax obligations arising from a declaration or a decision. It seems reasonable to put forward a thesis that the non-uniform nature of the Constitutional Tribunal’s rulings has not been considered to a sufficient extent in the provisions of this statute. This leads to certain practical problems with tax law, which will be outlined in this study.

The paper indicates the most important arguments raised by the participants in the dispute concerning the possibility of control by the administrative courts of decisions of the President of the Republic of Poland on the refusal to appoint a judge and an attempt to make a substantive evaluation of them. In my opinion, the refusal to appoint a judge, as well as refusal to accept the judge’s position under the amended Act on the Supreme Court (SC) should be strictly exceptional and in principle be justified at the constitutional level, which should be seen as the duty of the President to ensure compliance with the Constitution. Both of these resolutions should contain the motives of the President, which would make this act, with all its arbitrariness, more transparent. This is important not only from the point of view of the person concerned, but this also has an important social dimension. The public has the right to know, not only which candidates, who met the requirements for the appointment as a judge and were recommended by the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland (NCJ), were not appointed by the President, but also what reasons were at the heart of such a decision of the Head of State.

The paper presents a comparative analysis of the institutions responsible for the election, promotions and nominations of judges in France, Germany and Poland. At the very eginning – in the introduction – the genesis of institutions which are equivalents of the National Council of the Judiciary was presented, starting from the philosophical basis for the idea of the independence of courts and judges, through international regulations to the constitutions of individual states. The main part was divided into 3 sections: a brief description of the judiciary, the composition of the institution responsible for the election of judges and the manner of appointing its members, and the competence of the council and the manner of appointing judges. Each of these issues was divided by the selected countries, thanks to which it will be possible to get a clear picture of how these institutions work in individual countries. As a summary, conclusions about how the principle of judiciary independence is met in selected countries, and whether meeting this principle depends exclusively on legal framework.

The subject of the analysis presented in the text is an argument that tends to (and used to) be raised in the critical discourse on constitutionalism – the allegation of the so-called constitutional fetishism. The argument is to show why the constitutional discourse has lost its potential to explain and create social processes. The reason is that lawyers focus too much only on the content and interpretation of the provisions of the constitution, without considering a broader social context, which makes the constitutional discourse limited solely to legal issues with a simultaneous omission or underestimation of all other aspects of constitutionalism. This attitude of lawyers to the content of the constitution (or – in broader terms – to the provisions of law) is sometimes referred to even as idolatrous, hence the reference to the notion of fetishism in the religious sense. The aim of the text is to analyse the structure of this argument and to attempt to determine the impact it can have on
constitutionalism.

100 years of constitutionalism of two neighbouring European states – Czechoslovakia, later becoming the Czech Republic, and Poland – encourage a reflection on the paths of development of their respective constitutions, on the historical stages and successive
olitical transformations, not just in the context of individual constitutionalisms of each of those states but with an emphasis on the similarities and differences in this domain. And this is what this study focuses on. Starting from the common fate of rebirth of both states after WWI through the inter-war efforts to establish democratic constitutional systems and the obstacles found on the way, followed by the post-WWII period of real socialism ending with the era of transformations and stabilisation as democratic states of law. The text explores all the similarities found in both general aspects – like the references to the European tradition of parliamentary governance – and in certain specific solutions – like the differences in the concept of the two-chamber parliament. But there are also situations occurring in only one of the states, e.g. the federalisation of Czechoslovakia, the emergence of two separate states of the Czechs and Slovaks, or the differences in the course and sequence of events of democratic transformations in each of the states in the 1980s, which brings us to the conclusion that despite all the possible differences, the two constitutional systems have actually been very similar to each other.

Modernity understood as a permanent crisis of legitimacy and authority is a constant challenge for constitutionalism. The article reconstructs the danger of substituting political nature with moral imperatives. In modern societies, political disputes turn into so-called culture wars, and the dividing lines are marked by two moralities fighting each other: a liberal morality and a conservative morality. Using selected examples from the constitutional judiciary, I put forward a proposal of rethinking the definition of political nature in constitutionalism to deal with the crisis of legitimacy and authority that plagues it.

The article discusses the issue of the place and presence of women in the public sphere, and tries to answer the question of how these matters are impacted by the institution of the Constitutional Tribunal. Applying the method of discourse analysis, I have examined the Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s decisions and looked into the media discussion, with both revealing dominant trends regarding women’s rights in Polish constitutionalism. Using the category of counterpublics, I also cover emancipation movements important on account of women’s rights and their presence in the public domain. I also address the common myths concerning the Constitutional Tribunal. There are also mentions of room for the materialisation of emancipation processes in Polish constitutionalism.

This text aims to prove the thesis that we are currently witnessing a birth of new constitutional solutions. The populist movements across the world, and especially in Central and Eastern Europe, are effectively redesigning liberal-democratic constitutionalism. There is a clear correlation between populism, constitutionalism, and democracy, and so the process of redesign of the Central and Eastern European constitutionalism has an underlying democratic potential. Perhaps it is a sort of necessary adjustment of the system implanted in this part of the world after 1989.

The article is based on an assumption that constitutionalism has a Janus face. A constitution is both a legal and a political act. So far, the public domain has been dominated by legal constitutionalism (constitutional dogmatics), which excludes the constitution from the public sphere, subjecting it to the authority of lawyers-experts. The contemporary political phenomena such as: new populism, illiberal democracy or new constitutionalism should shift the interest of researchers to the political aspect of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is, therefore, a multidimensional social practice. A political game featuring many actors. And the constitutionalism of lawyers is only one of its possible interpretations. Citizens also have their own constitutionalisms, and different perspectives on constitutionalism, reflecting opposing interests, may lead to conflicts. The constitutional law dogmatics applied to resolve such conflicts would argue for the existence of a transcendental framework for their resolution. A more political approach denies the existence of such a framework. In other words, the dogmatics in question requires democracy to adapt to constitutionalism, while the political approach requires constitutionalism to adapt to democracy. The text is an introduction to a part of a volume featuring articles by authors affiliated with the Centre for Legal Education and Social Theory of the University of Wrocław.