This article discusses the independent state legislature theory, which has been the subject of interest of an ever-growing group of American constitutionalists in recent years. This theory deals primarily with state legislatures’ power – derived directly from the US Constitution – to regulate federal elections. According to its underlying premises, this fact results in the absence of any tools to control the law enacted in this area as to its compliance with a given state’s constitution. Neither the electoral administration nor the state courts can interfere with these laws. They would therefore be subject to federal courts’ review only. However, the Supreme Court, in applying the political questions doctrine, has excluded many election law matters – other than those concerning funding – from its jurisdiction. As a result, such an important part of state law – one concerning fundamental political rights – would remain without any supervision inherent in modern democraci

This article discusses the independent state legislature theory, which has been the subject of interest of an ever-growing group of American constitutionalists in recent years. This theory deals primarily with state legislatures’ power – derived directly from the U.S. Constitution – to regulate federal elections. According to its underlying premises, this fact results in the absence of any tools to control the law enacted in this area as to its compliance with a given state’s constitution. Neither the electoral administration nor the state courts can interfere with these laws. They would therefore be subject to federal courts’ review only. However, the Supreme Court, in applying the political questions doctrine, has excluded many election law matters – other than those concerning funding – from its jurisdiction. As a result, such an important part of state law – one concerning fundamental political rights – would remain without any supervision inherent in modern democracies.

The publication examines the legal nature of wars, looks into the law of war genesis, reviews its conventions, as well as identifies the aim, objectives, causes together with the consequences of Russia’s military aggression on February 24, 2022; it provides a testimony on the war of aggression against Ukraine and identifies its threats to post-war international law and order. The aim of the article is to determine the background, nature, fundamentals and nature of the war the Russian Federation launched on February 24, 2022 against Ukraine within the context of confrontation with the values of Western democracy. Historical-legal dialectical, comparative-legal and system-structural methods, as well as methods of formal logic (induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis, abstraction and concretization, etc.) were used to study the issues. The application of these research methods entails a cross-sectoral scientific nature.
Wars have accompanied the entire history of mankind. Since the 17th century the theoretical foundations of the law of war have been laid, which enshrined in international laws and customs of warfare (Geneva Conventions, Hague Convention, etc.) since the 19th century, thus forming the international humanitarian law. After World War II, violations of the latter by the belligerent party are viewed by the world community no less harshly than the mere war. The paper questions the purpose, reasons, conditions and intermediate consequences of the war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Obviously, the military aggression and the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022 marked the beginning of the de facto war, under a specific formal definition by a Russian official as a “special military operation” instead of naming it an attempt to avoid legal responsibility for war crimes committed in Ukraine. The article analyses the aggressive nature of this war on the part of the Russian Federation, demonstrates numerous violations of international law conventions by the Russian armed forces during the military invasion and temporary occupied territories in Ukraine. It emphasizes that the law of war has always been replaced by signing a peace treaty and relevant international agreements, which entails the obligation to severe the political, economic, and legal responsibility of the state violating international humanitarian law. The paper reviews the key institutions and legal tools for bringing the Russian Federation authorities to justice for the war crimes committed in Ukraine. So far, the President of Ukraine, the Supreme Council of Ukraine, and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine have managed to apply legitimate international legal
mechanisms, primarily the International Criminal Court and the UN Security Council, to prosecute Russia for violating the international humanitarian law and committing war crimes in Ukraine. At the same time, on the Ukrainian territories currently liberated from the Russian army’s occupation (Bucha, Gostomel, Irpin, etc.), it is already possible to implement a special mechanism of justice, which consists in the collaboration between national and international experts: specialists, investigators, prosecutors, and judges to collect objective and impartial evidence of gross violations of international law and war conventions in Ukraine. It is obvious that for Ukraine today both the victory and just punishment for the committed and continuing committed war crimes on its territory are important. The aftermath of World War II’s “Never Again” now requires, as never before, its effective guarantee and protection

The consequence of establishing a health resort is the special rigour of protecting the territory covered by it. The rigour consists i.a. in a ban on mining mineral resources other than natural medical resources, engaging in land development or other works that influence water relations as well as engaging in activities that have a negative influence on the physiography of the health resort. The facts of the case lead to a conclusion that it also does not concern the inside of the earth’s crust ‘under’ the health resort. The dispute as the subject of the judgement voted on concern mining hard coal from a deposit lying several hundred metres below the surface of the resort. The company has had a concession for mining it for years, while it applied for a confirmation of an annex to the plan for moving the mining establishment engaging in such activity. According to the Supreme Administrative Court, the opinion of the municipal executive authority, in whose opinion the change that the company applied for would violate the purpose of the property defined by the health resort status, was lawful. However, many arguments speak for the incorrectness of the assessment.

This article concerns the problem associated with the nature of the institution of a petition for reconsideration of the case in view of regulation No 16 of the Administrative Procedur Code in the version before the amendment dated 3 December 2010, which entered into force on 11 April 2011. Despite the amendment, to this day the provision is the source of many disputes, which is reflected in a very non-uniform judicial practice. On the basis of this regulation can be observed, how defective constructed legal provisions affect the administration of justice and the application of the law by creating situations in which the courts take over the functions of law making. On the selected example is shown, how one decision of the Supreme Court, being the basis of decisions of courts of appeal, causes that victims defective administrative decision are charged with the responsibility for legislative errors. Knowledge of the matter, which is the subject of this publication, is extremely important for all practitioners as well as theorists of the law because of the importance of the issues, which accompany the main theme. The work is based on an analysis of the concept of finality and validity of administration decision and depth on theoretical consideration and extensive discussion of the judicial practice of administrative courts, civil courts and Constitutional Tribunal.

The Act of 17 December 2009 on pursuing claims in class actions regulating court proceedings in cases which involve claims of at least 10 people, is a kind of novelty in Polish law. Undoubtedly, it is a legal act improving and modernizing Polish civil proceedings. However, one should pay attention to new developments and the lack of their clarification, and therefore to the importance of already issued judgments of the Supreme Court. For this reason, existing jurisdiction on this subject has been presented and analyzed, which allows to precise the subjective scope, the term and extent of the unification of claims, as well as the concept and requirement of a representative of the collective. Without any doubts, the practice, which starts to shape, as indicated on the example of jurisdiction, will allow to clarify the scope of the subject and object of the Act. The ability to limit the claims for liability of the defendant has, without any doubts, a very important role in functioning of the class action, because the unification of pecuniary claims is in practice very difficult. Past court decisions show that unification should be understood as occurrence of a members’ request for the generically same forms of protection. Many practical problems are also raised by the concept of the representative of the collective, and the way, in which the collective should choose one.

The paper indicates the most important arguments raised by the participants in the dispute concerning the possibility of control by the administrative courts of decisions of the President of the Republic of Poland on the refusal to appoint a judge and an attempt to make a substantive evaluation of them. In my opinion, the refusal to appoint a judge, as well as refusal to accept the judge’s position under the amended Act on the Supreme Court (SC) should be strictly exceptional and in principle be justified at the constitutional level, which should be seen as the duty of the President to ensure compliance with the Constitution. Both of these resolutions should contain the motives of the President, which would make this act, with all its arbitrariness, more transparent. This is important not only from the point of view of the person concerned, but this also has an important social dimension. The public has the right to know, not only which candidates, who met the requirements for the appointment as a judge and were recommended by the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland (NCJ), were not appointed by the President, but also what reasons were at the heart of such a decision of the Head of State.

In the judgement C-403/16 Soufiane El Hassani v. Polish Foreign Office European Court of Justice noticed that provisions of internal law cannot limit the right to judical-review established in art. 32 par. 3 of Visa Code. The regulation must be interpreted in context of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Meanwhile the sentence was answer to question of Polish Supreme Administrative Court and it arose under Administrative Courts Proceedings Act which prohibits performing judicial review over visa decisions. The aim of the paper is to explain that judicial review at those issues may be effectively performed by common courts, without damaging visa-applicants rights. The possibility comes from wide definition of civil case in code of civil procedure and attribution of common courts in some public administration cases.

The goal of this article is to highlight the role of a school, here understood as an educational facility, during the course of parental rights termination proceedings. There can be no doubt that the process of upbringing, especially the domestic factors and intense stimulus to which the child is subjected translate into patterns of behaviour and the way the child functions at school. Notably, prolonged learn-ing difficulties among children or periods in which the child presents complete disregard for societal norms and a lack of discipline should be a clear signal for the teachers and counsellors to review the family environment of the pupil in question. The article covers data regarding the school’s participation in the parental rights termination proceedings – e.g. opinions and recommendations formulated by the schools, teacher’s testimonies and children scorecards which reflect the educational progress of the child. The materials used include source materials (acts and ordinances, written opinions, Supreme and common court rulings), results of own research – casefile review based on a targeted casefile research questionnaire.

The object of the study the findings of which are presented in this article is the written statements of reasons of selected resolutions issued by the Polish Supreme Court and the dissenting opinions submitted in opposition to them. The situation of this type constitutes a relationship of two or more standpoints regarding a problem presented to a bench, referred to in the text as an opposition. The aim of the article is to offer a typology of opposition that can be reconstructed as a result of a dissenting opinion being submitted. It encompasses axiological oppositions in the strong sense and interpretation oppositions (axiological in the weak sense). Axiological oppositions in the strong sense take the form of unipolar or bipolar opposites. The examined group of resolutions has given grounds to also isolate doctrinal disputes as well as disputes over the legal nature of a given institution. The article, however, focuses only on axiological opposites. The cognitive value of the conducted analyses lies: (1) in the identification of the limited role of interpretation guidelines on the level of written statements of reasons, and (2) in the identification of the dissimilarity of situations where a votum separatum becomes an expression of an equal standpoint on the grounds of ius interpretandi considered in broad terms and situations where a votum separatum is a dissenting opinion not so much against a decision that has been made but against the legal regulation that has required this decision to be as it is.

The paper shows an American model of the participation of the society in the administration of justice. It is crucial for the Polish discussion about the involvement of public factor in that manner. The analysis is divided between the constitutional right to trial by jury and the institution of justices of the peace, which is unique for the Anglo-Saxon legal system. Research conducted here is the result of a detailed analysis of the case law of the Supreme Court of the United States and selected state courts that shaped the views of the American academia on this issue. Hopefully, this brief study will help to reform the Polish judicial process.

The article deals with the practice of invoking philosophers in the reasons for judgments of the Polish courts. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the case law of the common courts, administrative courts, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal allowed for the formulation of several main conclusions. First, although judgments containing references to philosophers constitute only a small fraction of all the case law, at the same time, when measured in absolute numbers, cases of quoting philosophers are not marginal. Second, in the two last decades there has been a clear intensification in the use of philosophical references in judgments. Third, references to philosophers exercise a number of different functions falling within the clarification and persuasive purposes of grounds of judgments. Fourth, there is no one attitude among courts and the parties towards the presence of philosophical arguments in the judicial process. The titular issue is not the further stage of the legal scholarship’s discourse on “judges as philosophers” in the likeness of Dworkin’s “Judge Hercules”. The practice of referring to philosophers by the courts is primarily an issue of the style of reasons for judgment and the role of non-legal sources in the rationalisation of judicial decisions – and not so much in the making of them. In the author’s view, the case law study reveals the utilitarian potential of philosophy for judicial argumentation.

The article deals with the practice of invoking philosophers in the reasons for judgments of the Polish courts. A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the case law of the common courts, administrative courts, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal allowed for the formulation of several main conclusions. First, although judgments containing references to philosophers constitute only a small fraction of all the case law, at the same time, when measured in absolute numbers, cases of quoting philosophers are not marginal. Second, in the two last decades there has been a clear intensification in the use of philosophical references in judgments. Third, references to philosophers exercise a number of different functions falling within the clarification and persuasive purposes of
grounds of judgments. Fourth, there is no one attitude among courts and the parties towards the presence of philosophical arguments in the judicial process. The titular issue is not the further stage of the legal scholarship’s discourse on “judges as philosophers” in the likeness of Dworkin’s “Judge Hercules”. The practice of referring to philosophers by the courts is primarily an issue of the style of reasons for judgment and the role of non-legal sources in the rationalisation of judicial decisions – and not so much in the making of them. In the author’s view, the case law study reveals the utilitarian potential of philosophy for judicial argumentation.

The paper indicates the most important arguments raised by the participants in the dispute concerning the possibility of control by the administrative courts of decisions of the President of the Republic of Poland on the refusal to appoint a judge and an attempt to make a substantive evaluation of them. In my opinion, the refusal to appoint a judge, as well as refusal to accept the judge’s position under the amended Act on the Supreme Court (SC) should be strictly exceptional and in principle be justified at the constitutional level, which should be seen as the duty of the President to ensure compliance with the Constitution. Both of these resolutions should contain the motives of the President, which would make this act, with all its arbitrariness, more transparent. This is important not only from the point of view of the person concerned, but this also has an important social dimension. The public has the right to know, not only which candidates, who met the requirements for the appointment as a judge and were recommended by the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland (NCJ), were not appointed by the President, but also what reasons were at the heart of such a decision of the Head of State.

In 1942 the American military authorities interned over 120 thousand persons of Japanese ancestry in fear of sabotage on behalf of Japan. In a landmark 1944 case the Supreme Court rehabilitated Fred Korematsu but upheld constitutionality of the wartime laws leading to the internment. As transpired later, there was no evidence of the Japanese-Americans’ forming a fifth-column. The court decision was criticized as unconstitutional and driven by racism. In view of the dissenting judges and commentators it was condemned by the court of history. This article claims that the original decision was justified by the circumstances of the war, including the uncertainties it brought with it. Unless we equip the government with the power of clairvoyance, it has to be able to act, and even err, in emergency. The debate around Korematsu ignored the previous experience of both World Wars in which German fifth columns were active and effective. One such eyewitness account, not known in Western literature, is presented in the article. Modern his-tory confirms that the fifth column as such is a timeless phenomenon. The fear of hybrid wars techniques, justified or not, has led to the reemergence of the fifth column legislation in XXI century, although the range legal instruments intended to contain it is different. It is too early for judges and scholars to speak authorita-tively on behalf of the court of history, for history is still in the making.