Why do political actors pass legislation that seemingly hurts them? Lustration laws limit access to public offi ce of the ancien regime's collaborators and hurt members of post-communist parties in East-Central Europe. So why has lustration in Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria been passed when post-communist parties held parliamentary majorities? Why did the postcommunist party in Romania switch from no-lustration to pro-lustration after the 1992 elections? We explain this phenomenon by electoral timing and rules of rocedure in legislatures. Specifi cally, we develop an agenda-setter model with a finite number of parties, imperfect information, and multiple potential medians. Our main argument can be summarized as follows: Suppose that the Postcommunists do not introduce any lustration bill and then lose proposal power in elections. If Anti-communists come to power, they are sure to introduce a harsher bill, and the median of the legislature may prefer such a bill to a no-bill status quo. Post-communists can prevent such a scenario by implementing a mild bill themselves. If they manage to appease the new parliamentary median, they will block a harsher bill that would be implemented after they lose power. Additional results show how electoral perspectives and uncertainty affect and modify this typical scenario. We test our model with an exhaustive analysis of all cases from East- Central Europe that meet our assumptions that a Postcommunist party is in power and no lustration bill is already in force.

The cost-benefi t analysis has a long history, especially in the United States. Its widespread use in Europe is connected with the requirements of the European Commission, the European Union, that preceded the selection of projects fi nanced from EU funds or was the basis for the evaluation of projects. The aim of this article is to draw attention to the social aspects of this analysis, as they conducted limited analysis to the economic and financial aspects.

Although refugees are offered the potential of asylum protection through the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, many states are attempting to curtail the number of asylum applications received each year. Several scholars have argued that even without such deterrence measures, some refugees are less likely to receive a positive asylum decision than others. Using country level data for 32 European states, this project examines the effects of various characteristics – including gender, age, and state of origin – on the likelihood of being granted asylum. This study is a fi rst attempt at empirically testing the asylum literature’s anecdotal evidence of bias in the decision-making processes in determining the outcomes of asylum claims.

Even if we ignore the consequences of Russia’s intervention into Ukraine’s internal affairs, Ukraine confronts some seemingly insurmountable problems in transitioning to a stable and prosperous state. Having inherited a top down and largely corrupt political structure, there are those who see decentralization in some form as a partial solution. Here, though, we argue that decentralization, even if crafted on the European Union template of subsidiarity, can introduce problems of collective action that would further undermine the country’s viability. To avoid exacerbating the problems of collective action occasioned by Ukraine’s fractured political economic system, decentralization must proceed with an understanding of how those problems are treated in successful federal states

Systemy proporcjonalnego podziału mandatów między partie, na podstawie wyników wyborów, a przed wyborami między okręgi wyborcze na podstawie danych demograficznych, oceniane są zwykle ze względu na zgodność ostatecznych podziałów z kryterium proporcjonalności. W pewnych sytuacjach odejście od prostej proporcjonalności w kierunku proporcjonalności degresywnej lub progresywnej jest jednak celowe i nie powinno być traktowane w kategoriach błędu. Kwestia ta była już analizowana w odniesieniu do degresywnie proporcjonalnego podziału mandatów, przede wszystkim w kontekście podziału mandatów między delegacje narodowe w Parlamencie Europejskim. W tym artykule koncentruję się natomiast na kwestii proporcjonalności progresywnej podziału mandatów między partie i proponuję sposób mierzenia siły progresji podziału. Nową miarę stosuję do opisu systemów wyborczych w krajach europejskich, a także do oceny wpływu wielkości okręgu wyborczego oraz zastosowanej metody podziału proporcjonalnego (metoda d’Hondta lub Sainte-Laguë) na progresję podziału mandatów, a więc na to, na ile dany system przy podziale mandatów premiuje partie duże.

Each of the EU enlargements raised problem of new apportionment of EP seats among EU member states. Each time solution was found in the process of multilateral negotiations, but since 1970s postulates to replace repeated negotiations by impartial mathematical formula have been raised, based on some concept of ”degressive proportionality”. When in 2007 EP started works on new apportionment before 2009 elections, one of the proposed solutions was ”parabolic method” of V. Ramirez, but in October 2007 EP again accepted allotment of seats not based on a mathematical formula, on the ground that ”apportionment is a political issue and can not be solved only on the mathematical base”. The paper presents the new proposal of degressively proportional apportionment method ua. The ua method leaves to the politicians decision about strength of the degressiveness of proportionality, but after this is politically accepted, the apportionment is based only on an of impartial mathematical formula.