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Year 6/2015 
Issue 23

Hybrid Power Indices In Oceanic Games Or A Rational Crowd In An Ideological Structure

Mikołaj Jasiński
Uniwersytet Warszawski

6/2015 (23) Decyzje

DOI 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.47

Abstract

This paper aims to present a theoretical concept that allows to investigate decision-making in large and ideologically differentiated bodies. Former models of oceanic games were based on the assumption of equal disposition to cooperate with other players among all voters. It is impossible to hold this assumption in a political reality. The paper develops the concept of "hybrid power indices" for oceanic games. Oceanic games with a partial homogeneity structure are analysed in the paper. The paper is the result of my previous studies of decision-making processes in large assemblies and my efforts in modelling ideological differentiation in political bodies. The paper also shows that presented formal models have solid foundations in classical sociological theories.
The last part presents several convenient and reliable sociological interpretations of the models as well as my plans for future studies using the models described.

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APA style

Hybrid Power Indices In Oceanic Games Or A Rational Crowd In An Ideological Structure. (2015). Hybrid Power Indices In Oceanic Games Or A Rational Crowd In An Ideological Structure. Decyzje, (23), 71-103. https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.47 (Original work published 6/2015AD)

MLA style

“Hybrid Power Indices In Oceanic Games Or A Rational Crowd In An Ideological Structure”. 6/2015AD. Decyzje, no. 23, 2015, pp. 71-103.

Chicago style

“Hybrid Power Indices In Oceanic Games Or A Rational Crowd In An Ideological Structure”. Decyzje, Decyzje, no. 23 (2015): 71-103. doi:10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.47.