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Decyzje

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Year 6/2015 
Issue 23

Some problems with judging rationality

Piotr Swistak
University of Maryland

6/2015 (23) Decyzje

DOI 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.44

Abstract

The gap between game-theoretic predictions and actual choices people make in, for instance, gaming experiments has been over-interpreted as evidence against rationality of players. I consider a version of the ultimatum game and examine its equilibria under different assumptions about players’ preferences. Using standard notions of rationality I show that the discrepancy between the “normative” and the “descriptive” cannot be established by a simple comparison of what is predicted by the equilibrium choices and the actual choices

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APA style

Swistak, Piotr (2015). Some problems with judging rationality. (2015). Some problems with judging rationality. Decyzje, (23), 5-22. https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.44 (Original work published 6/2015AD)

MLA style

Swistak, Piotr. “Some Problems With Judging Rationality”. 6/2015AD. Decyzje, no. 23, 2015, pp. 5-22.

Chicago style

Swistak, Piotr. “Some Problems With Judging Rationality”. Decyzje, Decyzje, no. 23 (2015): 5-22. doi:10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.44.