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Year 12/2019 
Issue 32

Pot and Ladle: A Formula for Estimating the Distribution Of Seats Under the Jefferson-D’hondt Method

Jarosław Flis
Uniwersytet Jagielloński w Krakowie

Wojciech Słomczyński
Uniwersytet Jagielloński w Krakowie

12/2019 (32) Decyzje

DOI 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.129

Article contents

Abstract

We propose a simple yet new formula for estimating national seat shares and quantifying seat biases in elections employing the Jefferson-D’Hondt (JDH) method for seat allocation. It is based solely on the national vote shares and fi xed parameters of the given electoral system. The proposed formula clarifi es the relationship between seat bias on the one hand, and the number of parties and the number of districts on the other. We demonstrate that the formula provides a good estimate of seat allocations in real-life elections even in the case of minor violations of the underlying assumptions. With that aim in mind, we have tested it for all nine EU countries that employ the JDH method in
parliamentary elections. Moreover, we discuss the applications of the formula for modeling the effects of vote swings, coalition formation and breakup, spoiler effects, electoral engineering, artifi cial thresholds and political gerrymandering. By not requiring district-level vote shares, our formula simplifi es electoral simulations using the JDH method.

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APA style

Flis, Jarosław & Słomczyński, Wojciech (2019). Pot and Ladle: A Formula for Estimating the Distribution Of Seats Under the Jefferson-D’hondt Method. (2019). Pot and Ladle: A Formula for Estimating the Distribution Of Seats Under the Jefferson-D’hondt Method. Decyzje, (32), 5-40. https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.129 (Original work published 12/2019AD)

MLA style

Flis, Jarosław and Słomczyński, Wojciech. “Pot And Ladle: A Formula For Estimating The Distribution Of Seats Under The Jefferson-D’Hondt Method”. 12/2019AD. Decyzje, no. 32, 2019, pp. 5-40.

Chicago style

Flis, Jarosław and Słomczyński, Wojciech. “Pot And Ladle: A Formula For Estimating The Distribution Of Seats Under The Jefferson-D’Hondt Method”. Decyzje, Decyzje, no. 32 (2019): 5-40. doi:10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.129.

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