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Decyzje

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Rok 12/2019 
Numer 32

Racjonalne modele rozumowania klinicznego

Wojciech Rutkiewicz
Uniwersytet Warszawski

12/2019 (32) Decyzje

DOI 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.132

Zawartość artykułu

Abstrakt

Debata dotycząca medycyny opartej na dowodach (EBM) w obecnym stanie coraz częściej skupia się na filozoficznych założeniach paradygmatu ogłoszonego w 1992 roku przez Grupę Roboczą EBM. Jednym z obszarów zainteresowania badaczy jest problem rozumowania klinicznego, prowadzącego do wydania diagnozy oraz podjęcia decyzji klinicznej. W polskiej literaturze temat ten wciąż nie doczekał się wyczerpującego zaprezentowania. W niniejszym artykule dokonuję przeglądu modeli rozumowania klinicznego. Zaczynam od debaty o pojęciu racjonalności, w której wyróżniam dwa stanowiska: melioryzm i panglozjanizm. Następnie przechodzę do omówienia trzech typów ujęcia rozumowania klinicznego w perspektywie meliorystycznej. Omówienie modeli rozumowania lekarskiego z perspektywy debaty o racjonalności daje możliwość przyjrzenia się regułom rozumowania przyświecającym decyzjom klinicznym, co może mieć ciekawe konsekwencje badawcze i edukacyjne.

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Cytowanie zasobu

APA style

Rutkiewicz, Wojciech (2019). Racjonalne modele rozumowania klinicznego. (2019). Racjonalne modele rozumowania klinicznego. Decyzje, (32), 77-102. https://doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.132 (Original work published 12/2019n.e.)

MLA style

Rutkiewicz, Wojciech. „Racjonalne Modele Rozumowania Klinicznego”. 12/2019n.e. Decyzje, nr 32, 2019, ss. 77-102.

Chicago style

Rutkiewicz, Wojciech. „Racjonalne Modele Rozumowania Klinicznego”. Decyzje, Decyzje, nr 32 (2019): 77-102. doi:10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.132.

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