In the article the Author analyses an interaction between critics of law and the critics of theory of law. He studies a problem of the style of law theory and the influence of culture on that style. The Author proposes research the types of legal polemics. He claims, that the role of specific and abstract polemics in critics of law is significant and until now not sufficiently investigated.

The age of a human being is a common research topic in many branches. This topic is also addressed by the legal theory. Age categories also functioned in Roman law, determining the legal position of a person. In this article, the non-judicial sources which concerned the division of human life are analyzed. Consequently, it has been possible to determine that in ancient Rome, there were several theories concerning this matter. The division of life into three, four, five, six or seven stages was very popular. Each theory has different justifications and various arguments. Among those, we can distinguish medical, psychological, numerical and also military-administrative arguments.

The article is based on an assumption that constitutionalism has a Janus face. A constitution is both a legal and a political act. So far, the public domain has been dominated by legal constitutionalism (constitutional dogmatics), which excludes the constitution from the public sphere, subjecting it to the authority of lawyers-experts. The contemporary political phenomena such as: new populism, illiberal democracy or new constitutionalism should shift the interest of researchers to the political aspect of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is, therefore, a multidimensional social practice. A political game featuring many actors. And the constitutionalism of lawyers is only one of its possible interpretations. Citizens also have their own constitutionalisms, and different perspectives on constitutionalism, reflecting opposing interests, may lead to conflicts. The constitutional law dogmatics applied to resolve such conflicts would argue for the existence of a transcendental framework for their resolution. A more political approach denies the existence of such a framework. In other words, the dogmatics in question requires democracy to adapt to constitutionalism, while the political approach requires constitutionalism to adapt to democracy. The text is an introduction to a part of a volume featuring articles by authors affiliated with the Centre for Legal Education and Social Theory of the University of Wrocław.

The recent pandemic has forced us in 2020 to rethink the priority of access to medical care. The purpose of this article is to offer a brief account of how two countries – Sweden and the US – have reacted to the pandemic. The authors wish to show how the functions of the regulations and guidelines applied by hospitals and institutions during the COVID-19 pandemic differ from the objectives of health policies based on the principles of the distributive justice theory. The article will thus risk a preliminary assessment of the role of law in a crisis. A short summary of the main points of the distributive justice theory will be followed by an analysis of two cases: the guidelines issued by local authorities in Sweden and the American models applied during the COVID-19 pandemic. The conducted analysis results in a thesis that the objective of the justice theory differs from the regulations actually applied. In the case of Sweden, the recommendations seem to clearly prioritise the life of young people over the life of the elderly, even if there is no shortage of resources. In the case of the United States, we can see more objectives of distributive justice implemented in the analysed triages, but they are still not free from discrimination. The authors therefore call for an improvement of mobility of medical care resources in order to mitigate crises. The cognitive value has an international quality, and is aimed at Polish audiences dealing with the problems in question, be it at the level of a hospital or legislation.

The subject of this article is the analysis of reasons and results of determining as well as changing tax residence in the light of Polish personal income tax. This topic underlies a broad concept of migration, especially that of profit-driven character. The author presents this research issue on the basis of the current legislation, doctrine as well as practice of applying the law by the judiciary and the tax autho-rities. The analysis of the valid regulations of tax law leads to the conclusion that the fiscal situation of migrants is so diversified as well as complicated from the legal point of view that it raises justified practical doubts. It is assumed that tax residence is dynamic and thus may change as a result of both intended and unin-tended taxpayers’ actions which may have specific tax law effects. They are reflected not only in tax preferences but also in obligations concerning tax settlements. Apart from ordinary tax consequences of determining or changing tax residence, the author relates also to particular legal solutions such as: exit tax, taxation of foreign controlled companies or appliance of the provisions of Multilateral Convention (MLI). The described issues are significant for both theory and practice of tax law application.

The paper aims at reconstruction and critical discussion with the main tenets of political theory of adjudication, as presented by Rafał Mańko in his book, W stronę krytycznej filozofii orzekania. Polityczność, etyka, legitymizacja [Towards a Critical Philosophy of Adjudication. The Political, Ethics, Legitimacy]. In the paper, I demonstrate: that the interpretation of the concept crucial for the entire theory – which is the concept of political – has been chosen by Mańko in an ideological and a priori manner; that the choice above effectively prevents the realisation of the main objective of the book, which is to legitimise adjudication; that the adoption of the ethics of adjudication advocated in the book is – in the light of the basic assumptions of that very publication – both improbable and hardly acceptable. Finally, I claim that Mańko’s theory, due to its totality, can distinguish neither between legitimate law and violence, nor between justified and unjustified adjudication. As a result, it loses its critical force. All these problems are not peculiar to Mańko’s theory, but they are general weaknesses of various versions of critical jurisprudence.

The aim of the present paper is to operationalise the concept of the political in
order to make it available as an analytical category for the critical study of judicial
decisions (case law). The concept of the political is understood here, following, in
particular, Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic theory, whereby it is a dimension of a social
antagonism. Such an antagonism can be played out not only in the process of
legislation (creation of abstract and general legal norms), but also in the process of
adjudication (the so-called ‘application of law’, which, however, always has a creative
element to it). As an analytical category, the political can be operationalised
in order to subject judicial decisions to a critique which goes beyond the question
of the ‘correct’ interpretation and ‘application’ of law in a given case, but puts in the
spotlight real social, political and economic conflicts that are at stake. The analytical
framework is exemplified by judicial decisions of the European Court of Justice.

The article attempts to analyse the status of the theory of legal interpretation that
emerges from the contributions of one of the representatives of critical legal studies
(CLS). Legal interpretation is analysed by using concepts drawn from hermeneutic
universalism and the post-structural philosophy of politics. The concepts of Duncan
Kennedy, an American philosopher of law, are subjected to analysis, and his
concept of adjudication, the indeterminacy thesis and the hermeneutic of suspicion
is addressed. The paper puts forward the thesis that the political nature of law – alongside
factors closely related to social structure – is also determined by factors which
pertain to the cognitive subject. This fact has crucial importance for determining
the status of the theory of legal interpretation.

In the article, I contrast the contemporary legal dogma with the challenges underlying the political nature of law and judicial practice. Both the Continental jurisprudence and the judicial decisions issued by European courts are dominated by the dogmatic current – and treated as politically neutral acts. My intention is to carefully verify this quite common belief in this paper. Making use of H. Berman’s views, I assume that the present shape of jurisprudence and the judicial practice based thereon have been established as a result of political conflicts and that the legal dogma is capable of neutralising and solving modern-day political conflicts precisely because of the qualities of the said shape. It is therefore both a political and an apolitical activity. But this paradox is only apparent. In its strive to keep its paradigm alive, the dogma should be flexible in reacting to the challenges occurring in its political environment. It can – and should – modify the “buffer” of the theory upon which it is set in order to retain its core. In the article, I try to answer the question about the boundaries of the possible adaptation of jurisprudence and juridical practice with respect to claims raised by the domain of politics – claims currently articulated as the strongest by the so-called critical theories of adjudication. The final part of the paper is an attempt – based on the example of theses formulated in monograph
by R. Mańko, W stronę krytycznej filozofii orzekania – to outline the said boundaries.

Theoretical foundations of the animal protection law remain in statu nascendi. The lack of an established dogmatic systematization of this domain makes studies focused primarily on a comprehensive discussion of its practical aspects, also contributing to the development of theoretical and dogmatic bases of reasoning aiming to solve the practical issues of animal law. For this reason, the Animal Rights. Practical Guide by Karolina Kuszlewicz is a particularly valuable book. The author addresses various problems of the legal protection of animals in a competent and interesting manner.
Many of her interventions inspire further inquiries or critical comments. At the same time, the book illustrates how the dialogue between theoretical concepts and challenges of legal practice can co-create animal law as an emerging branch of the legal system together with an accompanying realm of jurisprudential research.

The purpose of the article is to indicate the selected potential and desired consequences of establishing doctoral schools to educate doctoral students in the field of legal sciences, with a special consideration of the interdisciplinary nature of such schools. The paper addresses the Polish legal framework. The article proposes a thesis that doctoral schools have a chance to benefit the education of future doctors of law, especially thanks to their interdisciplinary nature, which involves
educating doctoral students of law together with representatives of other scientific disciplines. Other issues raised include also the opportunities and risks involved in the new form of doctoral education – including those resulting from some higher education institutions adopting only apparently interdisciplinary solutions. The article is an original work, the subject matter has not been covered in other academic papers, and concerns a new legal form of educating doctoral students – meaning
doctoral schools, which have been operating since the 2019/2020 academic year. The theses proposed in the article may be significant to both the theory and practice of educating doctors of law at Polish higher education institutions and research centres.

As we are nearing the end of the first 25 years of the 21st century. What is increasingly noticeable is the growing dysfunction and pathology of big systems and of their elements, including – given the omnipresent interrelations and interdependencies – entire masses of smaller entities, together with micro- and family businesses. The author asks a question of whether it could be reasonable to consider returning to some of the assumptions, instruments, and methods adopted within the framework of the systems approach from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, which was originally
conceived and created to treat big systems. Do the achievements made in the field of research in recent decades make it possible to bridge the cognitive gaps that determined the failure of the systems approach in the past century? These gaps are mainly the social mechanisms of functioning of organised systems. There is absolutely no doubt that we have seen huge progress in this domain, mostly thanks to interdisciplinary research and research conducted in recently-emergent “hybrid” disciplines like economic or organisational sociology and psychology, sociology and psychology
of management, behavioural economics, behavioural finance, contemporary political
economics, but also hybrid legal sciences such as: economics, sociology, and politics of law, political sciences and strategic analyses. The author argues that we need an attempt of a certain reactivation of the systems approach in the context of diagnostics and treatment, meaning a redesign of entire organisational systems– or dynamic connections in a networked structure, actually. It is necessary to modify the classical procedure of systems analysis and adapt it to the specific nature
of the changeable networked structures of the 21st century.

The article is based on an assumption that constitutionalism has a Janus face. A constitution is both a legal and a political act. So far, the public domain has been dominated by legal constitutionalism (constitutional dogmatics), which excludes the constitution from the public sphere, subjecting it to the authority of lawyers-experts. The contemporary political phenomena such as: new populism, illiberal democracy or new constitutionalism should shift the interest of researchers to the political aspect of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism is, therefore, a multidimensional social practice. A political game featuring many actors. And the constitutionalism of lawyers is only one of its possible interpretations. Citizens also have their own constitutionalisms, and different perspectives on constitutionalism, reflecting opposing interests, may lead to conflicts. The constitutional law dogmatics applied to resolve such conflicts would argue for the existence of a transcendental framework for their resolution. A more political approach denies the existence of such a framework. In other words, the dogmatics in question requires democracy to adapt to constitutionalism, while the political approach requires constitutionalism to adapt to democracy. The text is an introduction to a part of a volume featuring articles by authors affiliated with the Centre for Legal Education and Social
Theory of the University of Wrocław.

The subject of this article is the analysis of reasons and results of determining as well as changing tax residence in the light of Polish personal income tax. This topic underlies a broad concept of migration, especially that of profit-driven character. The author presents this research issue on the basis of the current legislation, doctrine as well as practice of applying the law by the judiciary and the tax autho-rities. The analysis of the valid regulations of tax law leads to the conclusion that the fiscal situation of migrants is so diversified as well as complicated from the legal point of view that it raises justified practical doubts. It is assumed that tax residence is dynamic and thus may change as a result of both intended and unin-tended taxpayers’ actions which may have specific tax law effects. They are reflected not only in tax preferences but also in obligations concerning tax settlements. Apart from ordinary tax consequences of determining or changing tax residence, the author relates also to particular legal solutions such as: exit tax, taxation of foreign controlled companies or appliance of the provisions of Multilateral Convention (MLI). The described issues are significant for both theory and practice of tax law application.

The main aim of this paper is to consider the acceptability of application of Article 58 § 2 of the Polish Civil Code in the social security law in the regard to employment contract with pregnant women from the point of theory of justice. I argue that application of Article 58 § 2 of the Polish Civil Code resulting in exclusion of pregnant women from social security system not only might be doubtful from the constitutional law perspective, but it is also problematic from the point of view of the concept of justice realized by social security law. In the first part I recall in short basic typologies and definitions of justice. This leads to the observation, that although in philosophy there is no one understanding of justice, this notion has a long and established tradition. In following parts I ana- lyze which concepts of justice are being realized by constitutional law, civil law and social security law. I argue that as constitutional law and social security law deal mostly with distributive justice, civil law realizes mostly commutative justice, which also concerns Article 58 § 2 of the Polish Civil Code. In the last part I demonstrate consequences of applying Article 58 § 2 of the Polish Civil Code in the social security law on the example of pregnant women being excluded from the social security system. This is followed by the final conclusion that although also for lawyers notion of justice has a long tradition, it is often im- posed in spite of "locally" realized types of justice, which leads to unwelcome and unforeseeable consequences.

The subject of the work is an attempt to analyse the notion of dignity in legal sciences, especially in legal theory and philosophy of law. The author distinguishes autonomous and heteronomous version of the notion in question. The first way of conceiving human dignity, assumes that dignity, i.e. the worth of human life, is fully independent of social conditions in which people live their lives. This way of conceiving dignity epitomises Kant’s philosophy of moral autonomy as immanent trait of every human being. The second way of conceiving human dignity assumes that the worth of human life is fully dependent of social conditions in which people live their lives. Consequently, it is taken for granted that there are social conditions in which people can lose dignity as contingent trait of human being. In this case, in order to get back lost dignity, people ought to change social conditions by way of social revolution. This way of conceiving dignity epitomises Marxist philosophy of alienation. The author tends to point out, that a different way of conceiving dignity is followed by serious legal consequences.

The article raises an important problem of legal education in Poland. After covering the changes in legal education in the world, the paper moves on to focus on the role of academic and practical legal education. The authors point to the specific role of the hidden dimension of legal education, which tends to be unseen, but plays a key part in educating lawyers in Poland. The final part of the article discusses the possible changes to be made in the system of legal education.

This article has originated from observations of the current Polish political and legal disputes over the Constitution. In pursuing the reasons for the different lines of the argumentation presented, we have brought the issue of education in constitutional law to attention. We have covered the issue in two stages. The first stage involves a discussion of education models as expounded in social theory. Our starting point was the structural-functional model and its criticism along the lines of conflict, interpretative, and critical theories. This is followed by a presentation of the evolution of administrative-law institutions in the light of the conflict between the expected openness to ethical and political dimensions and the claims for integrity and coherence. To this end, we followed the proposals of Nonet and Selznick. The second stage includes a review of three conceptions of the constitution and constitutionalism. The views of Kelsen, Schmitt as well as the American judicial review doctrine served as model examples. These proposals can be presented as the cornerstones of three visions of constitutional-law education. We did not content ourselves with presenting a set of models of education and covering a reconstruction of the vision of constitutional education. We have also attempted to demonstrate, bearing in mind the nature of the Polish debate over the Constitution, that the judicial review doctrine opens up a promising sphere for a revaluation of both the theory and practice of constitutional law.