This paper aims to elucidate the matter of certain knowledge pertaining to admini-strative decisions, those issued by artificial intelligence. It also clarifies the position of the administrative judiciary with regard to the adoption of this presumption and through a comparative analysis of administrative judicial applications in Jor-dan, Egypt, and Morocco. The text addresses the most significant evidence for achieving certain knowledge of an administrative decision – and thereby initiating the appeal period against the appellant. The question at hand is whether the administrative judiciary applies the traditional theory of certain knowledge to its counterpart issued by artificial intelligence systems, especially after its inclusion in Jordanian Administrative Judiciary Law No. 27 of 2014. This paper is based on a comparative descriptive analytical methodology exploring the Jordanian, Egyptian and Moroccan laws.

The subversiveness of the work is a criterion of street art according to the theory of A. Baldini. This view, undoubtedly, represents a novelty in the understanding of this category of art; as such, it remains a contribution to aesthetics. Nevertheless, within the framework of the presented theory, subversiveness is combined with legal judgment and violation of the law. These circumstances situate the theory within the field of interest of legal studies; and from this perspective, it deserves criticism. This is because the theory does not contain precise determinants of the difference between legal and aesthetic judgments, nor does it equip the constructed criterion of street art with the ability to resolve conflicts between norms relevant to subversiveness; and it is the demonstration of these gaps, as well as proposals to fill them in the context of legal science that are the subject of this article.

The intense development of nanotechnology in recent years poses the basic question about the safety of employees who work with nanomaterials. The study attempts to determine how employers should regulate health protection when working with nanoparticles. Employers should be aware of the importance of the risks associated with nanotechnology and their responsibility for worker health and safety. The study is a continuation of the author’s previous analyses of ways to regulate occupational safety and health in the use of nanomaterials. The author examines the theory of responsive regulation in the context of health and safety with nano-materials and the importance of dialogue in this regulatory process. The regulatory agencies should intervene in this area depending on the attainment of the assumed objectives of the law. The sense of responsibility for the effect could improve the quality of OH&S with nanomaterials.

In my paper, I reconstruct Jerzy Wróblewski’s theory of interpretation. My goal is to show that this theory has the characteristics of a paradigmatic theory because of the importance of the presumption of common language, which is a fundamental element of this theory. This presumption is decisive in shaping the picture of interpretation and, consequently, gives the theory in question the status of a model theory defining a postulated model of legal interpretation. In the paper, I discuss various aspects of this presumption, highlighting its importance in preserving the principle of universal access to practical (legal) discourse. At the same time, I question the views that challenge this presumption by claiming that the language of law is a code accessible only to a cognitively privileged group of professional lawyers.

In my paper, I reconstruct Jerzy Wróblewski’s theory of interpretation. My goal is to show that this theory has the characteristics of a paradigmatic theory because of the importance of the presumption of common language, which is a fundamental element of this theory. This presumption is decisive in shaping the picture of interpretation and, consequently, gives the theory in question the status of a model theory defining a postulated model of legal interpretation. In the paper, I discuss various aspects of this presumption, highlighting its importance in preserving the principle of universal access to practical (legal) discourse. At the same time, I question the views that challenge this presumption by claiming that the language of law is a code accessible only to a cognitively privileged group of professional lawyers.

This article discusses the independent state legislature theory, which has been the subject of interest of an ever-growing group of American constitutionalists in recent years. This theory deals primarily with state legislatures’ power – derived directly from the US Constitution – to regulate federal elections. According to its underlying premises, this fact results in the absence of any tools to control the law enacted in this area as to its compliance with a given state’s constitution. Neither the electoral administration nor the state courts can interfere with these laws. They would therefore be subject to federal courts’ review only. However, the Supreme Court, in applying the political questions doctrine, has excluded many election law matters – other than those concerning funding – from its jurisdiction. As a result, such an important part of state law – one concerning fundamental political rights – would remain without any supervision inherent in modern democraci

This article discusses the independent state legislature theory, which has been the subject of interest of an ever-growing group of American constitutionalists in recent years. This theory deals primarily with state legislatures’ power – derived directly from the U.S. Constitution – to regulate federal elections. According to its underlying premises, this fact results in the absence of any tools to control the law enacted in this area as to its compliance with a given state’s constitution. Neither the electoral administration nor the state courts can interfere with these laws. They would therefore be subject to federal courts’ review only. However, the Supreme Court, in applying the political questions doctrine, has excluded many election law matters – other than those concerning funding – from its jurisdiction. As a result, such an important part of state law – one concerning fundamental political rights – would remain without any supervision inherent in modern democracies.

The present paper is a reaction to Maciej Pichlak’s article "Law in the Snares of the Political: Addressing Rafał Mańko’s Critical Philosophy of Adjudication" which was published in this journal (“The Critique of Law” 2020, 12(3), pp. 109–125). The present response addresses selected issues raised in Pichlak’s critique, focusing on three aspects: law and the political, the importance of justice in the critical project, and finally the question of adjudication and ideology. On a more general note, the polemic reveals the importance of philosophical, political and ideological commitments and presuppositions of legal theorists and poses the question of the limits of the autonomy of jurisprudential debates vis-à-vis such commitments.

It is the intention of the author of this article to present the theoretical and legal views of Sigmund Freud and Emil Durkheim and to place them in the context of classical texts on political-legal theory. Both thinkers, rather associated with sociology or psychology than with law, treated law as one of the most important reference points in their social concepts. In both cases, we are dealing with the treatment of the social order as transcendent to the empirical individual, and at the same time created by society. At the same time, the law is supposed to impede the emancipation of the individual and to allow the individual to have a real influence on the creation of power structures. At the same time, despite numerous analyses of the theoretical-legal views of these thinkers in the European scientific literature, this is the first such analysis in Polish. In addition to presenting Freud’s and Durkheim’s views, it opens up the possibility of not only situating them among political-legal theories, but also points to perspectives on the operationalisation of these theories – as well as their possible social implications. To this end, the following article juxtaposes their theories with the traditions of legal positivism as represented by Hans Kelsen and Herbert L.A. Hart – two authors who were inspired by Freud and Durkheim respectively.

The workplace, a certain kind of organisation (which consists of people and, therefore, is social in nature), is crucial for perceiving labour law from the perspective of public administration. Put simply, if one wants to view the fulfilment of tasks or public functions within the realm of labour law, one always needs to bear in mind that although one might be referring to ‘the employer’, the discussion, in fact, refers to the workplace, with the employer being a certain ‘organ’ or emanation of the workplace. This reflection fills me with particular joy as a researcher because it necessitates the appreciation of the human ommunity at the workplace despite the considerable reluctance of the Polish labour law doctrine to accept the workplace as a human community and an administrative-legal construct of social organisation. I believe that the workplace must be recognised as a key institution in the theory of labour law and this is beyond any doubt. The social consequences of failing to recognise the workplace can be dramatic. Moreover, in a situation where other human communities are scarce, the importance of the community of the workplace (especially if one remembers its relative stability) turns out to be fundamental.

The article concerns judicial integrity in its basic meaning, i.e. as the consistency of actions with beliefs. Firstly, a reconstruction of the role of a judge’s beliefs was undertaken on the basis of the philosophy law, which allowed for proving that at least on the grounds of the so-called third path theory, they are treated as essential. However, acknowledging their role raises questions about the danger of instrumentalising law by the judge and of instrumentalising the judge by the law. Ronald Dworkin’s philosophy which extensively refers to the concept of integrity was interpreted as a solution to the issue. Then, it was noted that this approach is too narrow, as it limits the possibility of including the judge’s beliefs in adjudication only when they meet the requirements of so-called appropriateness tests, and are therefore already included in the content of the legal order in some way. Furthermore, integrity in this sense does not cover the judge’s behaviours besides decision-making, the status of which increasingly requires a theoretical explanation and normative classification. In consequence, it was stated that the concept of integrity is connected with paradoxes. In spite of that, an attempt was made to design a more systematic approach to judicial integrity in adjudication and behaviour, which would lead to proving that it is something that should be cared about, and consequently, its behaviour should be made the object of normative and institutional solutions. At the same time, the concept of integrity seems to have more heuristic power than normative one.

The article deals with the problem of modal inference: if some addressees are
obliged to do something, they are also obliged to realize states of affairs which
constitute a necessary condition for the main obligation. Likewise, they are obliged
to refrain from realizing states of affairs which constitute a sufficient condition for
the action contradicting the main obligation. This type of inference is called in Polish legal theory “instrumental inference”. It is argued in the article that sometimes instrumental norms in law must be fulfilled (“preparatory actions” must be undertaken) before the main obligation is fulfilled. Lawgiver helps addressees of norms by applying vacatio legis. It can lead to new paradoxical consequences – to the creation of “virtual norms” – norms which never come into force, but addressees are obliged to undertake preparatory actions. The article presents theoretical
description of this phenomenon. In conclusion one dogmatic claim is proposed:
there is a potential way (art. 4171 § 1 k.c.) of getting from public officials compensation for preparatory actions which caused burden for addressees, when the main obligation turned out to be “virtual”. In Poland this procedure should be based on the rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal.

In the paper, we deal with the issue of education of lawyers in doctoral schools in
Poland. We describe the basic solutions adopted by the Constitution for Science regarding doctoral students. Based on socio-legal theory of the neutralisation of values in the law, we point out a few basic the categories of problems resulting from the regulations and the implementation of the act. They are: a vision of a doctoral candidate, a vision of a graduate, internationalization, interdisciplinarity, structure of doctoral schools and financing of doctoral education. The article is exploratory in nature, so its primary purpose is recognising and drawing attention to the problems and research questions that should be studied in further research.

The paper presents the literary vision of „the power of medicine” as sketched by Aldous Huxley in his book Brave New World. Huxley created a futuristic image of society which reaches a state of complete organization and control of human procreation. In Huxley’s world humans are born as a result of in vitro fertilization and cloning. Human bodies, due to genetic selection, are produced for desired features of appearance and character, and the means of achieving universal happiness are appropriate pharmaceuticals. Artificial procreation as well as reproductive genetics anticipated by Huxley have become reality in the 21st century, implying several moral and legal dilemmas. In bioethical discussions questions emerge about the consequences of using new genetic technologies and the legal boundries of medical experiments on human bodies.

The article discusses Polish social welfare within the context of the economic analysis of law. Specific issues addressed in the article are: cost, time, ways of setting matters, the number of issued decisions and the beneficiaries of social welfare in Poland. Following the presentation, the obvious question arises concerning the legitimacy of the use of certain solutions, particularly in the context of their financial performance. Reflections on the social care model used in Poland are presented in the article, as well as the crisis of law as part of the broader issue of the crisis of the modern Western democratic state.

Interpretation is one of key notions on the convergence axis of law and literature. Both lawyers and literary scholars during their practices focus on interpreting complex language texts, establishing the meaning of expressions, reconstructing the sender’s intention, penetrating the influence of the text on the recipient, i.e. questions which turn out to be fundamental in both legal as well as literary texts. Analysis of the legal and literary interpretations allows us to identify differences as well as certain analogies between these two spheres of activity. They may be analysed through referring to the specificity of the entities participating in the interpretative practice, which are the sender and the recipient. The essential difference between interpretation in law and interpretation in literature consists of the rule that a legal text should be interpreted in the way that produces an unequivocal result. On the other hand, in the case of literary interpretation, it is difficult to reach a precise or unequivocal effect of reading the sense. Moreover, in literary interpretation it is not required. In a legal text and in a literary text the author-sender’s intention plays an important role. However, in the case of literary interpretation it is possible to apply a more flexible approach to the reconstruction of the author’s intention than in legal interpretation, where it is necessary to take into consideration rules and objectives of law only. The separateness of legal interpretation is justified foremost by the fact that it is specific purpose-oriented, which is establishing the meaning of the substance of applicable law.

The article discusses the differences and similarities between discretionary, judicial power and administrative authority. It indicates a possible recognition of the administrative and discretionary power. The author also considers possible risks in a democratic state governed by the rule of law, associated with the abuse of discretionary by administrative authority.

The article contains seven justified arguments formulating a new programme of research in legal science. It is a programme of research on identity of the law. The author proposes i.a.: separation of the mental identity of the law as a distinct quality from the identity of law in its „physical” dimension. The new research trend requires a new independent methodology of knowledge, which may be a harbinger of a revision of many existing ways of conceiving the law.