One of the fundamental dilemmas in judicial application of the law is to respect the principle of the rule of law and not only the principle of legalism. The principle of legalism as enshrined in Article 7 of the Constitution insufficiently protects the constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms of the individual, and therefore judicial activism is required, i.e. a correction of the established law in the process of interpretation and application of the law in order to give the law such content that is consistent with the constitutionally defined values underlying the axiology of the Polish Constitution. The correction of the legislated law involves going beyond the content of the principle of legalism and referring to such values as – equity, justice, goodness, human rights and freedoms.
The judge, due to the fact that under the Constitution he is first and foremost subject to its provisions, and secondarily to the laws, may – if he is able to justify it – reject the content of the statutory provisions and base his decision exclusively on the provisions of the Constitution. This is justified when the Constitution protects individual rights and freedoms to a greater extent than the law. A judge may not invoke the rule dura lex sed lex in the process of interpretation, as it destroys the standards of legal culture. The correction of statute law in the process of its inter-pretation relates to judicial independence and responsibility for the issued decision.

This article examines the jurisdictional status of the internet. Because of the underly-ing nature of technology, nations cannot effectively monitor online transactions that originate or conclude within their borders. Governments can seek to enforce their laws within the constraints of their physical, geographical, and political domains as defined by an atlas, but a borderless cyberworld regulated by fast--expanding technology has a variety of challenges. This study sheds light on those challenges, the jurisdiction for parties to suit, the remedies accessible to them, and the territorial concerns discussed in various domestic courts. It also focuses on the pressures on stakeholders to act, as well as the economic, human rights, and techno-logical infrastructure implications of jurisdictional concerns. In general, jurisdictional issues on the internet have resulted in haphazard and unrestricted jurisdictional implementations, and this article emphasizes the territorial difficulties of internet administration and its direct influence on many nations and elements.

The purpose of the article is to propose a concept of the collective right to food which may turn out to be essential in fighting hunger and malnutrition on a global scale. International agreements, including Pacts on Human Rights, overlook the rights of indigenous peoples by corresponding to the individualistic, state-centric, consumeristic and commercial vision of the right to food. An approach, which is based on the objectives of critical studies on law, to the official dogma of the right to food (developed within expert and intergovernmental bodies in the form of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) allows for claiming that the dogma is less legitimized than the collective right to food (defined in the Decla-ration of Atitlán) resulting from the indigenous peoples’ practice. This is why, remaining in the sphere of the official, Grotian international legal order, it should be acknowledged that the indigenous peoples’ right to food defined in the article is a part of third-generation rights (next to the second-generation individualistic right to food) while remaining strictly connected to the right to self-determination and the right to development. It is a result of the long-term practice of those peoples. The above-mentioned proposal of the third-generation right to food has not been applied to the legal doctrine so far. Its value is the opportunity to develop and study the concept of food sovereignty that allows one to more effectively combat hunger and malnutrition on a global scale as compared to the previous actions of international communities.

The ambiguity of understanding and use of the term “human rights” reduces the effectiveness of the law-making and law enforcement activities of state and inter-national bodies, creates negative conditions for the formation of the unified worl-dview and legal position of future lawyers and representatives of other humanities. This article aims to define, formulate the content and describe the legal essence of the term “human rights,” and to substantiate the thesis about the harmfulness of the legal science, law-making and law enforcement use of this term with different meanings. The leading method of research is the method of analysis, which allows one to study the subject, imaginatively dividing it into constituent elements, and to consider each of the selected elements separately within a single whole. This article presents the argumentation of the need for a single wording, understanding, and use of the legal term “human rights.” The materials of the article have practical value for the effective implementation of the law-making and law enforcement activities of state and international bodies, for the formation of the unified worldview and legal position of future lawyers and representatives of other humanities, as well as for a correct and clear explanation of problems with the implemen-tation and protection of human rights.

The article is devoted to the study of the correct application of the evaluative concepts contained in the norms of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Attention is drawn to certain difficulties in the application of the evaluative norms in the Convention: despite their objective necessity and usefulness, they create a room for the law enforcement entity’s own discretion up to subjectivism in resolving specific cases; they serve as an objective obstacle to the unification of the case law of the ECtHR and this creates preconditions for unequal implementation of ECtHR judgments in the national legal order; they cause the risk of errors in the application of the provisions of the Convention by the competent authorities of the Contracting States. It is established that the application of legal norms containing evaluative concepts is challenging not only owing to the specific properties of the evaluative concepts themselves, but also due to the peculiarities of adjudication by the ECtHR when applying the evaluative norms. The relevant case law of the ECtHR as well as examples of national legislation are analysed in support of these theoretical conclusions. Since the lack of uniform application of the evaluative norms of the Convention causes divergent use of the ECtHR’s judgments in the domestic judicial system, it is advised to follow a number of rules for reasoning of decisions by the domestic court. These rules will serve as a certain guarantee against ambiguous implementation of ECtHR judgments at the national level.

The right to the city is a solution that can be considered in terms of third-generation human rights. The right to the city also serves as a tool for the effective fulfilment and respect of human rights agreed at the international level as well as the Sustainable Development Goals expressed in the 2030 Agenda. This is undoubtedly a new paradigm for urban development, which provides an alternative framework for rethinking cities and urbanisation. It aims to address the main challenges in cities and human settlements. The purpose of the article is to present an understanding of the right to the city by the analysis of its structure and the answer to the question of whether it is in fact a third-generation human right.

Franz Kafka’s novel The process is a timeless novel, still valid and alive. It is a description of the state of consciousness of a certain age, a certain view of the world of the author, of the enslavement of man by binding law, because the authorities decide on life and the fate of the human being. „The process” is a novel about a man, who is lost in his own life. The message of the thesis is that the man is born and condemned to live or to die without any explanation. Moreover he is subordinated to the top-down established rights. The judgment, which is death, falls on us without notice. The man is liable for everything that happens in his life and the world around him.

Women’s rights are an inseparable part of the human rights, and human rights are an integrated part of women’s rights. The Swedish Government has adopted a concept of feminist foreign policy, aiming at strengthening these rights on a global level. Women’s rights are continued to be violated as much as ever, hindering democracy, peace, rule of law, sustainable development and economic growth – the overarching aims of international policy. Women’s rights to education, financial resources and access to the labour market are crucial in defending human rights and having a policy for 100 per cent of the world’s population. A priority task of the feminist foreign policy is supporting women’s inclusion in all decision-making structures, both on national and multilateral level. This in order to achieve wider foreign, development and security policy objectives through a new approach, different way of thinking and different solutions.

The current system of human rights protection has a multifaceted nature. There are three standards of the protection (universal, regional and national). It’s difficult to create the relationship between those standards. Each of those system relates the different ranges of application. The aim of article is to answer the question whether it is possible to create
a uniform standard of protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

The research objective of this paper is to determine the impact that the repressive nature of the European Commission’s amendments to Directive 2008/115 will likely have on the two basic values of the return policy, that is, its fairness and effectiveness. The basic thesis of this study is that the direction of the directive’s recast, assuming – inter alia – an extension of the list of circumstances for applying the entry ban and detention, is contrary to the declared fairness of the migration policy towards third-country nationals. At the same time, the effectiveness of the planned changes is already questionable at the stage of draft legislation. These considerations are based on a juxtaposition of the proposed changes with currently binding legislation, the Commission’s soft law and the case law of the CJEU. The final effect of these analyses is the finding that the solutions proposed by the Commission will lead to an inevitable increase in the use of coercive measures against irregular immigrants in a way that stands in fundamental contradiction to the declared fairness and proportionality of EU actions. In this context, the effectiveness of the return policy should not be identified with a percentage of returns, but rather with the recognised necessity of overall and perfect control over irregular migrants. At the same time, the Recast Return Directive will contribute to the development of an already existing tendency to treat migration law as an instrument of security and public order, and to use administrative law measures so that they function in a manner equivalent to that of a criminal sanction.

Even though the proportionality principle is well-established for judicial review in matters pertaining to human rights in modern constitutional law in numerous jurisdictions, it has recently become subject to a growing tide of criticism. The article aims to describe and critically analyze the main arguments raised by the opponents of using proportionality as the tool for adjudicating conflicts of fundamental rights. After briefly describing the typical and the most common structure of the proportionality test as it is used in constitutional law, the author would present – and then dismiss – the three most significant allegations towards the proportionality analysis, namely: the problem of incommensurability, the alleged proportionality’s moral neutrality as well as the scope of judicial discretion that is claimed to be too wide according to some of proportionality’s opponents.

The article aims to help realize that to understand the changes which take place in space policy and space law, it is necessary to abandon the old course of thought and think the other way. The author exposes thesis that force to take a look at the law in a different way. He states that: all sources of international law (specified in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ) and EU law are in force in the Polish legal order, with the exception of international agreements, which only apply if they are ratified by the Republic of Poland and published in the Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland. The legal policy (conducted by the competent authorities in each forum based on the specific procedures) is the ius reflex, which inspires the development of lex and vice versa. The law applies beyond the borders of states’ jurisdictions (res communis) in the maritime and outer space and becomes a constitutional element of the new civilization (market and culture), which gradually affects the law within the jurisdiction of states (sovereignty and sovereign rights). The power of law ceases to guarantee the resolution of international conflicts, which forces the application of the law of force. The sine qua non condition to survive the new civilization is to protect humanity and to share resources fairly in the process of transformation.