One of the fundamental dilemmas in judicial application of the law is to respect the principle of the rule of law and not only the principle of legalism. The principle of legalism as enshrined in Article 7 of the Constitution insufficiently protects the constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms of the individual, and therefore judicial activism is required, i.e. a correction of the established law in the process of interpretation and application of the law in order to give the law such content that is consistent with the constitutionally defined values underlying the axiology of the Polish Constitution. The correction of the legislated law involves going beyond the content of the principle of legalism and referring to such values as – equity, justice, goodness, human rights and freedoms.
The judge, due to the fact that under the Constitution he is first and foremost subject to its provisions, and secondarily to the laws, may – if he is able to justify it – reject the content of the statutory provisions and base his decision exclusively on the provisions of the Constitution. This is justified when the Constitution protects individual rights and freedoms to a greater extent than the law. A judge may not invoke the rule dura lex sed lex in the process of interpretation, as it destroys the standards of legal culture. The correction of statute law in the process of its inter-pretation relates to judicial independence and responsibility for the issued decision.

Everyone’s personal dignity guarantees freedoms and rights regardless of age, which means these freedoms and rights are also granted to children. Children’s rights highlight children’s subjectivity and draw attention to their special status, which is, in fact, determined by the child’s dependence on adults, but is still not passive or submissive. This emphasis on the child’s rights sort of equalises the child’s legal situation which is results from their physical and mental immaturity and dependence. However, every human being – including a child – has duties in addition to rights, which remain in relative balance. Thus, they contribute to the formation of the child’s personality in a balanced manner. Focusing solely on the enjoyment of rights and simultaneously neglecting duties distorts this balance and contributes to the development of attitude of taking everything for granted, laziness, and choosing to live at the expense of others. It seems therefore necessary to restore the balance between the focus on children’s rights and the marginalisation of their responsibilities.

Everyone’s personal dignity guarantees freedoms and rights irrespective of age, which means that they also apply to the child. The rights of the child emphasise his or her subjectivity and draw attention to his or her special status determined, admittedly, by dependence on adults, but not without freedom. Emphasising the rights of the child is a kind of compensation for the child’s legal situation due to his/her physical and mental immaturity and dependence. However, every human being, including the child, has duties in addition to rights, which remain in relative balance. In this way, they contribute to the formation of the child’s personality in a balanced way. Limiting oneself exclusively to rights and at the same time margi-nalising duties leads to a disturbance of this balance, the formation of attitudes of entitlement towards others, teaches laziness and lives at the expense of others. As it seems, it is therefore necessary to restore the balance between highlighting children’s rights and depreciating their duties.

The purpose of the article is the legal and comparative analysis of how the principle of the proportional restriction of the rights and freedoms of an individual is understood by the Constitutional Tribunal and the European Court of Human Rights. The author made a comparative profile of selected statements of the indicated judicial bodies, which refer to the essence, theoretical basis, structure and the practical application of the concept of proportionality, which allowed for distinguishing the basic similarities and differences between how proportionality is perceived by the CT and how it is viewed by the ECHR. The main thesis of the paper assumes that the most important and the most far-reaching differences concern the proportionality test structure as presented by both judicial bodies, as well as some practical aspects of the application of the test in the circumstances of specific actual states, however, the essence itself and its axiological basis remain similar in both cases.

The ambiguity of understanding and use of the term “human rights” reduces the effectiveness of the law-making and law enforcement activities of state and inter-national bodies, creates negative conditions for the formation of the unified worl-dview and legal position of future lawyers and representatives of other humanities. This article aims to define, formulate the content and describe the legal essence of the term “human rights,” and to substantiate the thesis about the harmfulness of the legal science, law-making and law enforcement use of this term with different meanings. The leading method of research is the method of analysis, which allows one to study the subject, imaginatively dividing it into constituent elements, and to consider each of the selected elements separately within a single whole. This article presents the argumentation of the need for a single wording, understanding, and use of the legal term “human rights.” The materials of the article have practical value for the effective implementation of the law-making and law enforcement activities of state and international bodies, for the formation of the unified worldview and legal position of future lawyers and representatives of other humanities, as well as for a correct and clear explanation of problems with the implemen-tation and protection of human rights.