Excess of Rationality?; about Rationality, Emotion and Creativity. A Contribution to the Philosophy of Management and Organization

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ABSTRACT

Organizations are sometimes said to be overly rational, and it is argued that more attention should be given to the soft side, including feelings and emotions. In the same vain it is said that creativity and rationality do not match. On the other hand however, one can trace the idea of organizations being less rational than supposed. This paper explores the view that 'excess of …' can only be evaluated on the basis of a nuanced view of rationality and an adequate insight into the relationship of rationality, emotions/feeling and creativity. A philosophical perspective is helpful in this. It will be argued that various forms of rationality are to be distinguished.

Keywords: rationality, emotion/feeling, emotional labor, creativity, power, philosophy.

1. Introduction

Browsing the Internet recently, I came across an article for sale, *Successful Business Strategies: Creativity and Intuition Rather Than Rationality* (http://www.universitip.com; visited 12-2-08). According to the title, it is saying that organizations are often too rational, a particular kind of organizational excess, putting creativity under pressure. As a general evaluation, this presupposes a particular meaning of both concepts. However, thinking it too pricy for an 8 page text ($ 79,60) – exercising economic rationality - , I did not buy it and will therefore remain uncertain about this meaning.

The text just mentioned is about business. Besides, the concept of rationality functions in various contexts (see for instance Etzioni 1988), such as philosophy, psychology, general economics, organization and management (M&O) studies, as well as in daily life.

In philosophy, the concept of rationality is part of, among others, logic, epistemology, metaphysics and anthropology. It has been involved in articulating human self-images, and related philosophies of education, some thinkers arguing that a 'rationalist' interpretation of the meaning of rationality has detrimental consequences for both (see for example Dewey 1916, 1929). In all this, views of rationality influence those of other human phenomena such as feeling and emotion.

As far as M&O is concerned, the concept of rationality is used, for instance, in order to understand, explain, management action and organizational matters, such as structure. At the same time we see authors saying that rationality has a limited scope, contrasting it, for instance, with 'intuition' and 'emotion', giving a kind of empirical critique of the scope of application of the concept. Designing organizations and thinking about the tasks of management often refers positively to the concept of rationality. If so, then rationality gets a normative emphasis - explaining being a more descriptive task - and it is related to other normative notions, such as 'efficiency'. However, giving evaluations can also be more negative, as presumably is the case with the article mentioned at the beginning.

It can be said that the concept of bounded rationality, developed by Simon (1983) especially tries to do justice to empirical facts concerning human decision making and nothing else. Also a normative use comes into focus: it is advisable to look for the most satisfying one amongst the few available alternative courses of action. Another example is Henry Mintzberg, using the, at first sight contradictory, expression "irrational form of "rationality"" (Mintzberg, 1990 p. 342). These words indicate that there are rational and irrational forms of rationality. At the same time it is suggested that a damaging excess will result if 'irrational rationality' is enthroned. On the other hand, however, it also suggests that a, preferable, 'rational form' of rationality is possible. Brunsson (2000) distinguishes "decision" and "action" rationality, and the latter can be irrational from the perspective of the former[36]. Collins&Porras speak of the ""Tyranny of the Or" – the rational view that cannot easily accept paradox" (Collins&Porras 1997, p. 43), making a rather strong normative statement.

The normative becomes rather heavy when a plea for or deep criticism of rational management and rational organization is at issue. Critical positions often refer to processes of 'rationalization', i.e. control of the wider social and organization reality through rationality. This process, being blamed for causing 'excess of rationality', is said to involve effects like: abuse of power, inhuman manipulation of emotions and feelings, suppressing work enjoyment, de-skilling, alienation, oppressing creativity, authenticity[37], authentic emotional commitment, etc.. During the 80-ties developments took place which Martin

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[36] Weber distinguishes, among others, "Zweckrationalität" (instrumental rationality) and "Wertrationalität" (value rationality), the latter bing irrational from the perspective of the former (Schipper 1996)

[37] Chapter 9 of Arlie Hochschild (1983) book on emotional labor is about authenticity. Authenticity is also a concept used and thought about in philosophy, see Taylor (1991).

Albrow called the "de-rationalization of the organization" (Albrow 1992, p. 323).

This paper is intended as a contribution to the Philosophy of Management and Organization (PMO). As such is does not result from empirical studies, although these can be highly relevant for doing PMO. A crucial issue is what a sound, defendable view of rationality would be. In what comes next, I will first pursue this question, seeking an answer in terms of a nuanced approach (chapter 2). Next, emotion and feeling and their connection with rationality will be taken into account (chapter 3). After this, attention will be given to creativity (chapter 4) and the relationship between rationality and creativity (chapter 5), followed by a summarizing conclusion referring to organizational excess.

2. Rationality

Human beings have been thinking about rationality, sometimes also the term 'reason' is being used, for quite some time, trying to grasp and explicating it, criticizing it, etc. and this until the present day.

In a broad sense, rationality (reason) can be considered as "wisely" (Etzioni 1988, p. 138) and "intelligent" (Rescher 1988, p. 2) accounting for thinking and acting, finding good warrants for both, "[promoting] the art of life" (Whitehead 1958, p. 4). The 'accounting for' has two aspects, i) the first concerning an agent's own deliberations, ii) the second his or her giving account to others. Both can be done pro-active or after the fact. Of course, the latter might open the door to un-sincere 'rationalizations'. If so, then the 'accounting for' is *pseudo*, not real and straight, not serving the art of life.

Now, in order to get a nuanced and more elaborate understanding, I think it suitable to distinguish various options of being rational. Doing so, several ideal type *models* and *modes* of rationality come into view. In actual situations they can all be present to different degrees. A

'model of rationality' underlines the way matters are ordered and decisions are being made[38]. I speak of a 'mode of rationality' when the focus lies on types of content (Schipper 1996). This cannot be the whole story, however. In order to prevent models and modes staying unrelated and static, they *will have to be* embedded in, what can be called, 'reflective rationality', which covers ways of ordering and content as well (Schipper 2001, 2003). In what comes next 'models', 'modes' and 'reflection', taken altogether, will be designated as 'forms' of rationality. It is by these forms that the intelligent and wise accounting for comes nearer; it is through them that the art of life might be cultivated. It should be clear, however, that saying this is indeed expressing a normative view.

2.1. Models of rationality

It does make sense to distinguish two models, i.e. 'algorithmic' and 'judgmental' rationality.

- *Algorithmic rationality* (**AR**) depends on strict rules (logic, formal procedures, protocols, decision trees, etc.). Many different examples could be given: mathematical algorithms, logic of propositions, decision trees used in order to decide whether somebody need to pay tax, judicial rules and procedures, promotion rules, systems of artificial intelligence, etc. In specific cases, the particular rules in use constitute the concrete 'content' **AR** has. It is required that rules are strict and consistent. If so, then a sort of 'internal' rationality is created. As such, **AR** is objective, in the sense that it is indifferent who is involved in using the rules, general in its workings, the same input resulting in the same output. Input data may vary, though, which is a rather limited way of accounting for the uniqueness of a situation. The rules in use often only know a limited kind and number of variables. Dependent on the input, these

rules mostly fully determine the outcome. In this sense, **AR** makes tight control possible. Because of these qualities it has been considered as an ideal (see the philosophers' dream of a universal calculus). However, although rules create their own, 'internal', rationality, from an external point of view they might be considered as useless, inadequate, flawed, or even as irrational. An example would be rules for ranking schools, based on quantified performance indicators. When serious doubts about the validity of the indicators arise, the **AR** involved might become useless or considered as 'irrational'. In philosophy, especially in phenomenology, it is sometimes argued that quantification, and rules involved, might get you to know something while, at the same time, inducing a 'forgetting' about other matters. The organizational paradigm of **AR** is rule based bureaucracy.

- *Judgmental rationality* (**JR**) depends on the availability of general maxims, criteria (Brown 1990; Vickers 1983). Of these maxims many examples can be given, depending of the professional practice/field involved (empirical adequacy, beauty, elegance, (mathematical) simplicity, independence, justice, the right person in the right place, fairness, loyalty, honesty, etc.). As such, these maxims only co-determine the results of decision making and evaluation. Contrary to **AR**, the exercise of **JR** is always personal (not subjective). People can, for instance, come to somewhat different decisions with good reasons. **JR** also allows more focusing on unique situations compared to **AR**. These are all positive qualities. Like **AR**, **JR** has an internal rationality, constituted by the maxims, which, considered from a wider perspective, need not be that rational at all. This might, for example, be the case when the contextual suitability of current maxims, and their interpretation, is doubtful. Take the maxim of being 'loyal to the organization' in case of whistle blowers. Often, it is used deciding in favor of punitive measures aimed at disciplining the person involved. So-called Professional Service Firms are examples of organizations in which **JR** will likely be prominent.

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[38] If done after the fact, it will be a kind of reconstruction

2.2. Modes of rationality

The modes I like to distinguish are *means-end rationality* and *relational rationality.*

- *Means-end rationality* (**MER**) is often considered as the only real rationality available (Simon 1983). **MER** focuses on choosing means for attaining particular ends. **MER** is also known as *instrumental rationality*, especially in philosophy this expression is often used. Strictly speaking, **MER** depends on the following conditions: the ends are exogenous; they must be clear and precise enough to make informed decisions about the means. The informed decisions require knowledge of causal relationships, of potential side effects. The ends being exogenous, means that choosing goals is beyond **MER**. However, this does not exclude a particular end functioning as a means for attaining a higher order goal. The criteria involved by **MER** are *effectiveness*, pointing to causal relationships, and *efficiency*. Most definitions of 'efficiency' are rather formal (e.g. "maximum output with minimum input"). The 'input' can also be considered as what is to be sacrificed in order to have the realized output, which brings in the notion of 'costs'. However, the actual use of 'efficiency' is always based on some, often implicit, ideas about which kind of costs are reckoned with. Although (cultural) habits often are involved, from a wider, philosophical, it is arguable that every application of the concept of efficiency requires a non-instrumental decision concerning the kinds of costs which one is willing to recognize for being efficient (Schipper 1998). It is, for example, interesting to see that already more than 20 years ago, Arlie Hochschild was asking attention for the "personal costs" of emotional labor (Hochschild 1983. p, 12, 17, 197). So, while actual use of **MER** is limited to the conditions mentioned above, it is also not self-sufficient in another sense.

- *Relational rationality* (**RR**) is thinking and acting in terms of relations which involve values. Relations can be of two kinds, functional ones, $y=f(x)$, and normative ones, involving particular values (f.e. friendship, care, customer relation, audit relation, teaching relation (education), relation with the environment, etc.)[39]. In these, the relata can be of many kinds: people, organizations, the environment, etc. Among other things, **RR** can be helpful in deciding non-instrumentally about goals, answering the question what would be worthwhile doing in a particular situation, thereby partly overcoming the insufficiency of **MER**. **RR** can also play a role in deciding about the kinds of costs. Hybrid cars, for example, can, while being more energy efficient than usual ones, said to contribute to a 'harmonious relationship' with the environment. Looking at the values involved, we will have to recognize, however, that they produce less noise, which (especially) in cities creates a safety risk (with possible human costs), that also has to be taken into account. So, 'harmony with the environment', should also urge us to look at this. Germs of **RR** are present in Vickers (1983) and Parker Follett (1940). So-called 'communicative rationality' (Habermas) is one of the many possible manifestations of **RR**, in this case concerning a normative relationship between partners in communication. The criteria of **RR** are based on values involved in the relationship at issue. By definition, exercising **RR**, therefore, requires an understanding, interpretation of these values, often including an explication of them in terms of norms. However, it is always possible that a particular understanding and explication are not really proper, adequate, while being one-sided, too narrow/wide or even flawed. Not so long ago, for example, it became en vogue to look at patients as customers. The reason for this was the intention to de-paternalize the relationship between doctors and their patients, and perhaps rightly so. At the same time however, the question can be raised whether the relationship of physician and patient is indeed identical with the one of customer and supplier (Schipper 1999). Nowadays, it is customary to talk about organizations and their stakeholders. Although part of their relationship is functional,

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[39] Knowledge of functional relations is crucial for **MER**

values are involved too. If so, then **RR** is present. Meanings given to the values are, among other things, dependent on ideas of stakeholdership as such (Vanderkerckhove 2007).

2.3. Reflective rationality (RER)

The philosopher John Locke once said that in reflection the mind "turns its view inward upon itself [...] [observing] its own actions" (Locke 1976, p. 107). Reflection is indeed a kind of 'bending back'. It is a meta-activity in which human beings regard their own actions, conceptualizations, ideas, etc. In organizational learning theory references to reflection are also present, for example, Argyris&Schön's double loop learning (Argyris&Schön 1978, 1996), Weick's view of sense-making (Weick 1979) and Peter Senge's fifths discipline (Senge 1990). Argyris&Schön focus on cognitive matters, reflection being involved in preparing new organizational learning theories. Weick considers reflection in connection with retrospective sense-making of experiences and with a plea for richer languages for doing this. In Senge's approach, applications of a particular systems theory will have to be the outcome of reflective learning. In my view, they all seem to limit reflection too much.

Four modes of reflection, i.e. the empirical, the wondering, the critical and the systematising one, can be distinguished, each having its own focus on the subject matter at issue. In *empirical* reflection one is looking which ideas, views or opinions, values are really in use, what actually is done, personally, as a professional, or at the level of organizations[40]. *Wondering* reflection 'asks' what is are left out of consideration, not really seen or reckoned with, while being absolved in action/thought coloured by the

actual, values, norms, etc. Such reflection, therefore, requires distanciation and openness. Wondering reflection also has a creative potential. Reflection becomes *critical*, when, for example, questions are being asked like: "is it good that so-and-so is indeed left out of consideration?"; "is it acceptable that the actual purpose of the organization we are working for is indeed 'so-and-so'?" It should be noticed, however, that critical reflection as such does not require a preliminary wondering one. It just depends on behalf of '***what***' one is critical. Finally, reflection is *systematising* when existing ideas are being improved, better ordered, or when ideas, norms, values, etc., tentatively embraced as a result of a particular wondering and critical reflection, are further elaborated. I think that this more differentiated view of reflection can be helpful for a better understanding and balancing of what we are doing when we reflect. **RER** requires open-mindedness and attention for, what I like to call, *borderline experiences* (Schipper 2003). A borderline experience involves acquaintance with limitations of particular thought and action (practice)[41]. In some situations **RER** can include **AR**, i.e. logical reasoning. Also **JR** can be present, for example, when a borderline experience is considered as being crucial.

Distinctions made thus far imply that all possibilities of rationality are important, not any one of them should be left out. As far as modes of rationality are concerned, recognizing only **MER** (Simon 1983) or emphasizing **AR**, as is done in some philosophies, is detrimental to the practice of rationality.

As argued, preventing models and modes of rationality staying unrelated is important. For example, the rules constituting **AR** do not come out of the blue and designing them requires, among other things, **JR**. Balancing the exercise

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[40] The well known distinction between 'espoused theory' and 'theory in use' is relevant here. One could also think of the view of Karl Weick who distinguishes between what humans intend to do and what they actually are doing. Empirical studies can be relevant here too.

[41] Sometimes, these borderline experiences are very intense as was the case with child labor. Sometimes, thought and imagination are mainly involved. Moreover, sociological and psychological studies of organizational reality can offer material which is relevant. Katryn Waddington (2005, p. 42), considers the experience with the dark side of gossip in nursing as a trigger for reflection.

of models and modes or rationality, taking their strengths and weaknesses into account, is relevant. Being conscious of the potential flaws/limitations of actual **AR**, **JR, MER** and **RR** is essential; several of these have been mentioned earlier. This means that, eventually, the exercise of whatever rationality requires embeddedness in reflection. That is why **RER** is basic. When **RER** is lacking, the people and their organization can be said to be not rational enough; a normative statement, indeed. **RER** becomes active, for example, when looking at the actual rules or maxims of resp. **AR** and **JR.** Cost-definitions, basic for **MER** (Schipper 1998), and particular value-explications in use in **RR** can be also a subject matter of **RER**.

The reader might ask whether **RER** itself also faces potential limitations, pitfalls, flaws etc. This is not an easy question. A potential risk is that, for instance, one kind of reflection, say, the empirical or the critical one sketched above, is taken to make up the whole of it. If so, then actual reflection may miss the real issues. It is also possible that reflection is floating away, un-necessarily creating confusion ("analysis, paralysis"; "reflection, perplection").

Earlier I mentioned Brunson's idea of action rationality. It requires commitment to a particular organizational, what he calls, and "objective ideology" (Brunsson 2000, p. 28), and this fits in with Collins & Porras' idea of "core ideology". The latter consists of core values + core purpose, in which people working for an organization (company0 have to be "molded", "indoctrinated" (Collins& Porras 1997, p. 51, 73, 122, 131, 138). Core ideologies, they say, "need no rational or external justification" (*op. cit.*, p. 75). Now this implies that any **RER** exercised in finding one is irrelevant. One of the examples the authors are mentioning is Nike. Its core purpose is "to experience the emotion of competition, winning and crushing competitors" (*op. cit.*, p. 225). During the 90-ties Nike came into trouble, however, because of the involvement in sweatshops. Activist' protests, student

boycotts of Nike products, law suits, etc. constituted a borderline experience, eventually making Nike coming with a new vision on their business and the whole apparel industry (Schipper & Boje 2008). Without reflection, seeking a justification of their business, this would not have been possible at all.

In the introduction, certain matters (abuse of power, manipulation of emotions and feelings, suppressing work enjoyment, alienation) have been mentioned, sometimes ascribed to an 'over-rationalization' of reality, including the organizational one. Having the above arguments concerning a nuanced view of rationality in mind, it can, for instance, be asked whether this boils down to, say, **AR** and **MER** taking the lead at the cost of other forms of rationality.

3. Rationality, feeling and emotion.

Blaisse Pascal's often quoted saying, that the "heart has its reasons which reason does not know", seems[42] to fit in with a long tradition of seeing rationality and feeling/emotion as uneasy bedfellows. In the context of management, its influence is illustrated by the fact that an author like Henri Mintzberg, despite his criticism of analytical rationality, uses phrases like the "bias […] of emotion" (Mintzberg 1990, p. 70). Other lines of thought sketching a more nuanced view can also be noticed, however (Solomon 1998).

3.1. Rationality vs. emotion and feeling

As said above, there is an approach considering rationality and feeling-emotion as an unhappy combination. In works of diverse thinkers such as John Stuart Mill and Georg Wilhelm Friederich Hegel illustrative statements can be found: "let feeling no more encroach the province of reason, than reason upon the province of feeling" (Mill 1825/1988, p. 306); "when somebody says: 'I feel it', then he has secluded himself" (Hegel 1830/1955, p. 44; my

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[42] Whether this really is the case with Pascal will not be discussed in this paper.

translation)[43]. However, also explicit critical comments can be noticed. For example, John Dewey denouncing the "current opposition [...] between the intellect and the emotions" for which "the intellect is a pure light; the emotions are a disturbing heat" (Dewey 1916, p. 345). More recently, Etzioni mentions efforts to connect rationality with the affective, in which the latter functions in regard of preferences and constraints. Also the idea of "emotional costs" is referred to by him (Etzioni 1988, p.158). These ideas fit in with the growing interest in the meaning of feelings and emotions and their relationship with rationality which took place in the later part the 20-th century (De Sousa 1987). Dimasio (1999, p. 41) says that emotion probably assist reason, especially when it comes to "personal and social matters involving risk and conflict". Nowadays widely used notion of "emotional intelligence" (Fineman 2006) and expressions like "affective computing" are indications that this development is still going on.

3.2. Meaning of feeling and emotion

Feelings and emotions are many: concern, surprise, joy, remorse, pain, shame, fear, anger, sorrow, embarrassment, disgust, (un-)integrity feelings, compassion, happiness, etc. Mostly they do not appear out of the blue. In terms of causal mechanisms one can, for instance, try to relate them to neuron-physiological processes. From a more cognitive perspective, however, it is also possible to consider them as a kind of 'judgment' triggered by a situation[44]. In connection with the latter, looking at rationality, three aspects are relevant:

- a relation to (a presupposed) reality[45]

- an evaluation of something

- an anticipation or urgency to act

Emotions often imply an urgency to act; feelings involve more an anticipation of potential action. Sometimes it is even said that without emotions and feelings human beings would not act at all. Feelings and emotions refer to something in regard of which they arise, a situation, an act of somebody else, etc. So, the quotation from Hegel just seems to miss a crucial point. The evaluative aspect is central too. Fear, for example, is letting us 'know' that danger is involved and that quick action is unavoidable. The feeling of surprise implies that what it is about might really be important; further notice, action, can result from this. Many other examples could be given.

3.3. Two-sided relation with rationality

The view of rationality presented in this paper does not exclude emotions and feelings having a role to play. Looking in terms of rationality, feelings and emotions can, as indicated above, be viewed as implicit 'judgments'. Considering rationality's relation to emotion and feeling in terms of some kind of exclusion is, therefore, not very acceptable. Take a scientist confronted with two theories, both of which fit the empirical data equally well, might, for instance, judging in favor of one of them because of the aesthetic feeling of beauty induced by it, which is not unreasonable (McAllister 1996).

The connection of emotion/feeling and rationality is rather subtle and cannot be reduced to simple prescriptions. The various possibilities of rationality will make this clear.

In **AR** emotions and feelings are (and should be) absent, otherwise it would not be **AR**.

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[43] It is not argued that these statements contain the whole of resp. Mill and Hegel. The latter, for example, defended also the view that nothing great can be done without passion (Solomon 1998, p. 285).

[44] In actual cases both perspectives can be taken, and which one will be most adequate just depends on the specific circumstances.

[45] Later on I will call this the reality presupposition (**RP**). Jon Elster states something similar, pointing out that emotions are "directed towards an intentional object" (Elster 2000, p. 27). See also Solomon (1998) and De Sousa (1987). The latter is saying that emotions provide us with information about ourselves and the world (*op. cit.*, p. 107).

Hence, if **AR** is considered as paradigmatic of rationality, then, by implication, emotion and feeling belong to another province indeed.

JR is different, however. As such, feelings and emotions can co-determine or give content to **JR.** The scientist, mentioned above, judges theories looking at empirical adequacy and elegance, and the feeling of beauty especially evaluates them referring to the latter. However, and this is the second side, feelings and emotions can be the subject matter of judgment too. For instance, if asked whether the presupposed reality is indeed actually present.

In the exercise of **MER** as such, except perhaps as constraints in terms of emotional costs, there is no role for them. There is another side, however. In some situations, feelings and emotions function as material to be taken into account seeking effective means; they can also be part of the end to be achieved, foe example, inducing happy feelings in workers. Besides this kind of control, also emotional labor, i.e. smiling at customers and having accompanying feelings, is to be mentioned here (Hochschild 1983; Fineman 2006).

Worth noticing too, is that **AR** and **MER** can arouse certain (unintended) emotions and feelings (f.e. sorrow, un-easiness, guilt, shame, or anger) concerning rules, use of means or ends involved. As such, these feelings and emotions may induce **RR** in combination with, at a more abstract level, even **RER.** An example would be the guilt a manager is feeling in case of down-sizing because of 'efficiency reasons'.

Granting that most emotions and feelings involve a reality presupposition (**RP**), the following, indeed reflective, questions can be relevant:

- "is **RP** fulfilled ?";
- "what does **RP** say about the view of reality involved by a particular use of

  AR, **JR**, **MER** and **RR**, if such a view exists?".
- concerning the evaluative aspect of a feeling it might be asked: "is adequate, suitable? For instance, *"schadenfreude"* can hardly be considered as an appropriate feeling (Waddington 2005).
- is the emotion perhaps an overreaction in the light of the maxims (**JR**) and values (**RR**) in use?"[46]. Is the emotion, is including **RP,** due to stress factors on the side of the emoter? (see note 8).

As suggested above, emotions and feelings can indeed relate negatively to **AR**, maxims in use (**JR**), or the actual content given to values (**RR**). In his interesting approach, Naud van der Ven (2006) gives an interpretation of shame, management sometimes has over its own exercise of rationality[47], in terms of the philosophy of Levinas. Emotions can, at a meta-level, also concern actual feeling rules (see note 11) involved in **JR** and **RR,** thereby giving a strong inducement towards **RER**. However, saying that especially authorities are keeping feeling rules, noticing that such rules are applied differently to men and women (Hochschild 1983, p. 75, 173), can be a general invitation to **RER** without reference to particular meta-emotions.

In summary, a nuanced view of rationality implies a subtle relationship with emotions and feelings. We saw that especially JR, RR and RER have twofold link with them. They can function either as i) a stimulating heuristic in the exercise of these forms of rationality, even giving content to them, or ii) become their subject matter, having their RP, adequacy and suitability to be evaluated. As far as MER is concerned, feelings

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[46] In connection with the last questions, the notion of "*feeling rule*", a key in studies of emotional labour, is worth mentioning. These rules are "standards used [...] to determine what is rightly and owing in the currency of feeling", discriminating ""what I do feel" and "what I should feel"" (Hochschild 1983, p. 18, 57). These rules can, therefore, give content to actual **JR** and **RR.**

[47] He does so, though, without distinguishing different models and modes of rationality. In case of downsizing, for instance, protected managers can suffer from negative feelings (Fineman 2006, p. 683).

and emotions can function as material to be taken into account. On the other hand, however, a particular exercise can induce them at a meta-level, which then can be related to i) or ii). Especially i) has the potential for seeking change, and this brings me to the notion of creativity.

4. Creativity

During the last century 'creativity' became in use as a concept, grasping activities in fields like art, science, business, management and politics, resulting in things new and valuable. At the background of this attention were practical as well as of more philosophical reasons. The first relate, for instance, to the Cold War. It was believed that psychological research could result in ways enhancing creativity in a controlled way. Later on, there were impulses from developments in artificial intelligence. Also M&O, with a focus on entrepreneurship, learning organizations and innovation, made creativity a matter of practical concern. The philosophical, on the average older, reasons refer to matters of human self-image, the question of what kind of society is preferable (e.g. Dewey's creative democracy, Parker Follet's creative experience in governance), and metaphysical-ontological themes concerning creativity and reality.

4.1. Creativity and rationality

In connection with the theme of this paper it is interesting to notice that in M&O one comes across the idea that rationality and creativity do not match. The already quoted Collins&Porras, for example, speak of the "genius of the And" breaking the ""Tyranny of the Or" - the rational view that cannot easily accept paradox". The Tyranny of the 'Or' should be overcome, because creativity is essential for the process of setting the envisioned future (Collins & Porras 1997, pp 43, 217, 242, 247). A statement like "all progress does depend on the unreasonable man" (Handy 1998, p. 270) is in alignment with this. Something analogous is said, when creativity

is valued as a means for becoming "disorganized", opposing the rationalist view of business theory: "being reasonable does not win the day" (Clegg & Birch 1998, p. 7). So, it is proposed that being creative means leaving rationality behind. At the beginning of chapter 2 rationality was identified as wise and intelligent (accounting for) thinking and acting, promoting the art of life. When creativity requires that we forget about this, what would be the point?

4.2. Rationality and creativity

An important issue is the relationship between rationality and novelty. Looking at the models we see that with **AR** newness is confined to variations in the value of input data, the type of which is determined by the kind of rules. Compared to **AR**, **JR** has more room for newness. Besides variations within a certain type of data, it also admits new kinds of them. The only condition is that they fall within the scope of the general maxims constituting the very **JR** involved. Take financial auditing. This is ruled by maxims, such as independence, freedom from outside constraints on investigating and reporting, and objectivity. Guided by them, auditors used to look at financial data themselves, often - because of the costs involved - by random tests. Nowadays, they focus more on control systems used by the audited organizations. Hence, inspectors start searching for a *new kind* of data (EDP-auditing), still using the old maxims. **RR** can give content to **JR**, being tolerant to newness in so far as **JR** is. **MER** is also worth mentioning here. As such, it is indeed not intolerant for newness. **RER**, finally, is the most tolerant concerning novelty. When rules and maxims used thus far are examined reflectively, this can lead to different results, such as i) reconfirming/specifying, or ii) abandoning, going beyond them. An example of the first is the specification of the *Principle of the Economy of Thought* in terms of mathematical simplicity. An example of ii) the new football rule which permits a keeper to catch a return ball or touch it by hand only when it is headed to him. This rule was invented not for its own sake, but in order to increase the vivacity of the game.

So far, it is clear that only **AR** does exclude real newness. Therefore, when this type of rationality is preferred, creativity and rationality indeed seem to exclude each other.

4.3. Types of creativity

Creativity is studied from different perspectives. In psychology, for example, the following questions are being asked:

a) "do creative processes always involve major leaps?"; b) "is knowledge stimulating or hindering creativity?"; c) "show creative reasoning always a particular pattern?"; d) "does IQ indicate creativity?"; e) "are there environmental factors which facilitate creativity?". Answers be summarized as follows: a) no and yes; b) yes and no; c) no and yes; d) no; e) yes and no (Sternberg 1988).

The 'yes and no' answers are not accidental. As I see it, they depend on the fact that two ideal type kinds of creativity can be distinguished, i.e. the explorative and transcendentive one.

- *Explorative creativity*. Seeks new outcomes within an already existing framework, such as a particular esthetic 'mould', e.g. a sonnet or a symphony, a scientific paradigm, research tradition, a kind of product, e.g. a bicycle, a cultural practice, business model, etc. Improvisation mostly includes explorative creativity as is often the case with using a familiar metaphor. A well-known example from the field of M&O, which one can already find in the works of Henri Fayol, is the organization viewed as an organism. Seeking an interesting organizational analogue of DNA would, if successful, be an instance of explorative creativity.

- *transcendentive creativity*. With this, usual frameworks are left behind. A new concept or metaphor can both be instances of transcendentive creativity. The concept of an organization as a moral agent, allowing also notions like 'organizational integrity', can count, at the time of its introduction, as an example. The same obtains for introduction of

12-tone music almost hundred years ago by, among others, Arnold Schönberg. Nowadays, it is a *kind* of music which, having its own standards, can be creatively explored. New artifacts, such as the transistor, can also be mentioned here.

Let's consider some of the above questions. Take question a). The "no" answer is valid when we speak in terms of explorative creativity. The same applies to the "yes" concerning b) and c). The "yes" to a) and the "no" to b), especially depend on transcendentive creativity. The answer to c) can be "yes" when 'transcending' can be shown to be patterned. Mentioning patterns of reasoning, involved by creativity, refers to heuristics, i.e. non-algorithmic procedures, mostly in connection with problem solving. A particular heuristic reduces the, so-called, problem solving maze (Newell, Shaw & Simon 1962). As such, heuristics help explorative creativity. Transcendentive creativity is another story, while it requires novel problem setting, also constituting a new, different, problem solving maze.

5. Rationality and creativity

In what comes next two issues will be discussed, i.e. the question whether rationality excludes creativity and positive/negative contextual factors.

5.1. Can rationality favor creativity?

The strength of **AR** (objectivity, high control) is, when it comes to creativity, its major weakness, however. If indeed only **AR** is involved in a particular situation, then creativity is excluded. As argued, variations in values of input data are possible, but this will result in nothing but calculated 'newness'. This is also the reason why rule-based bureaucratic organizations are not creative.

JR and **RER** are different, however. Both have a role in explorative and transcendentive creativity. As argued earlier, **JR** allows new kinds *of* data, which can involve explorative creativity. However, making judgments can be rather routinely without loosing their character of

judgments. Hence, **JR** allows explorative creativity without necessarily favoring it. In order to make explorative creativity more likely, **RER** may be helpful. Yet, assessing the value of what is new in light of the maxims remains basic. Tax solicitors, for example, are continuously searching the law and jurisprudence for possibilities to serve their clients, creatively exploring the 'law-space'. If they also keep an eye on major maxims like fairness and justice, then a particular **RR** would be involved too. As far as **MER** is concerned, it is clear that it serves creativity because, lead by theoretical-practical deliberations and skills, it contributes to producing anything at all. This mode of rationality being instrumental for exogenous ends, it is not by itself creatively seeking new goals. The latter might result from **RR** and **RER**, however.

Whereas explorative creativity may profit from **RER**, there is an intrinsic relation with transcendentive creativity. As such, **RER** goes beyond what is reflected upon. Hence, this kind of rationality indeed involves a transcending act. Although this act does not guarantee that something novel and valuable comes out, is essential for transcendentive creativity[48]. Hofstadter (1986, p. 531-533) mentions the role of self-watching. Self-watching, which is a kind of reflection, reveals actions to be patterned. According to Hofstadter this triggers creativity because people are supposed to be intolerant for patterned behavior.

Summarizing, the question formulated in the subtitle of this section can be answered in the positive. Indeed, rationality can foster creativity on the condition that **JR, RER, RR** and **MER** are active. Only **AR** has no creativity potential, and the same applies to **MER** to a certain extend. So, views defended in the context of M&O that creativity and rationality do not match make sense only in connection with both of these.

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[48] It might even be the case that criteria for what is of value are also novel, becoming constituted during the creative process.

5.2. Creativity and rationality in context

In this section I like to supplement the conceptual analysis given thus far, by commenting on a few factors influencing creativity. Next, some remarks will be made on the role of power.

5.2.1. Factors in creative processes

Among the many positive factors are: playfulness, the availability of visual images, tolerance for ambiguity, freedom, commitment and dedication, a will to change, knowledge, recognition by others, trust, consciousness of the relativity of conceptual representations and attentiveness. Starting with the role of visual images, I will say a few words regarding some of them.

Visual images can stimulate creativity, because they are beyond any particular, clear cut conceptualization (Kim 1990). Sometimes, they even 'tell' us more than 'thousand words'. As such, visual images challenge people to see clues in problem solving not considered before, looking at not yet conceptualized aspects of what is present, etc. Visual images have this potential because they present us with many different features of a situation at the same time. Conceptualizations focus attention. Wertheimer (1959) even claims that only structured wholes like visual images make real understanding possible; doing without them in problem solving will make us stumble and find solutions only accidentally. Visual images can also contribute to overcoming a blind use of recipes and algorithms.

Playfulness helps "with doing things for which [there is] no good reason" (March 1984, p. 233). It goes beyond **AR,** and even indeed **JR, RR,** and **MER** in so far as they only function routinely. It has the potential to evoke unsearched experiences, bringing new content. In this sense, it can stimulate explorative and transcendentive creativity. Playful people need an environment allowing them to behave this way, giving

recognition and offering a fostering atmosphere[49].

Tolerance for ambiguity can exist in different degrees, endurance of un-clarity being a main issue. Ambiguity contrasts with the clarity offered by **AR** or the 'safety' of the framework involved by **JR**. Therefore, tolerance for ambiguity, i.e. being able to live with uncertainties and un-clarities, is especially favorable for transcendentive creativity. Ambiguities can exist in different kinds of fields. An example from physics is the wave-particle duality, which was really puzzling at the beginning of quantum mechanics. We must realize, however, that in creativity things are never straightforward and simple. This obtains also for tolerance of ambiguity. What I have in mind is that sometimes also distrust of ambiguity was helpful finding new ways. Einstein's discovery of special relativity could probably count as an example.

Attentiveness is an important creativity factor too (Brodbeck 1999). It can accompany everything a person does, thinks, feels, sees, hears, etc., supporting the other creativity factors, keeping focus or function as a 'searchlight'. In keeping focus, people concentrate on their goals, lead by their passions, feelings and emotions, concepts in use, etc. This kind of attentiveness can relate to explorative creativity, while keeping an eye on frameworks involved. The second function makes them attentive for new possibilities, ways of thinking and acting. Essential for this kind of attentiveness is the capability and willingness of people to see through their own regular conceptualizations, feelings, emotions, perceptions and realities involved. As such, it can foster transcendentive creativity. In both functions, however, attentiveness is the opposite of nonchalance; reflective rationality is also involved, be it in different ways.

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[49]However, this does not seem always to be the case. Sometimes it is even said that un-pleasant stimuli are important for the awakening of creativity (Sternberg & Lubart 1995, p. 256). See also Fong (2006).

Many of the factors interrelate. Commitment, for example, is often welcomed because it prevents people doing unnecessary things, indeed an aspect of freedom. Yet, negative influences are equally possible: commitments binding people, making them narrow-minded, un-free to consider new ways, etc. Commitment and freedom stimulate creativity each in their own way. Transcendentive creativity, though, requires substantial freedom, its role being more basic than is the case with explorative creativity. As far as the latter is concerned, commitment to frameworks and maxims involved is important, pushing them to their limits and making the best out of it. At the same time, this kind of commitment limits possibilities of transcendentive creativity. Because of such interrelatedness, simplifications should be avoided in studying actual cases.

It is also worthwhile to connect what is just said with the affective side of human life. Tolerance for ambiguity, for instance, gives space to emotional ambivalence, the simultaneous experience of positive and negative emotions, which recent empirical research has found relevant for creativity (Fong 2006). Moreover, what has been argued in part 3 about types of rationality, in section 4.2 concerning their relationship with feeling and emotion, and in section 5.1 about rationality and creativity, can be combined to obtain insight into the potential connection of these affects and human creativity. Indeed, all feeling and emotion challenging **AR,** habitual **JR, MER** and **RR,** unfreezing them, undoing closure, can stimulate explorative creativity. Moreover, in so far as they trigger **RER** they can be favorable of transcendentive creativity too.

5.2.2. Creativity, Rationality and Power

I will close this section by making some comments on power and its relation to rationality and creativity.

Empirical studies show us that *real* rationality, i.e. the one active in actual practice, often involves myopic concerns, selfishness and the exercise of power (e.g. Flyvbjerk 1998). This is remarkable.

During the Enlightenment period, rationality was considered to be the opposite of power; the light of reason evaporating dark privileges, uncontrolled political influences, unjustifiable knowledge and authority claims etc. In front of how things actually are, this philosophical view of rationality might seem rather utopian.

Having said this, how about kinds of rationality and types of creativity discussed thus far? In what way can they become linked with power? Take **AR** and **JR.** They are always relative to the respective rules and maxims/framework involved. So, the simple fact that these are in use, does not exclude them being effectuated by force[50]. The ways of power, in establishing particular mindsets, for instance, can have their own hidden subtleties. This means that mere judgmental rationality does not oppose power in general. Likewise, explorative creativity too might function within the context of an imposed system, without people even being conscious of the fact. The limited freedom required for explorative creativity is in alignment with this.

Full-sense reflective rationality and transcendentive creativity make another story, however. They do not really tolerate force from without. Yet, in a particular sense power is not absent. Think, for example, of the kind of power which enables creative people to liberate themselves from usual ways of acting and thinking, the power to cross borders, etc. Organizations, in which such authenticity is not really welcomed and all noses are supposed to point in the same direction, are not expected to show much transcendentive creativity. Only when some people, assisted by creativity factors as discussed above, are able to overcome what is (to be) held for sure, be it knowledge paradigms, power-full efficiencies, feeling rules, organizational procedures for dealing with customers, aesthetic moulds or whatever,

transcendentive creativity might follow. It says "might", because there are no guarantees. Taken altogether, we can, therefore, say that rationality, differentiated as it can be, and power, in the twofold sense of the power to impose and the power to resist and act, have a rather complex relationship with creativity.

6. Concluding Remarks

Doing philosophy is, among other things, making and evaluating distinctions that matter, exploring possibilities of thinking and acting that might be valuable. I did so concerning rationality, emotion, creativity and power, and the results can be used discussing the issue of 'rationality excess'. The approach presented in this paper makes it possible to say that on this occasion, a particular excess can go hand in hand with shortage at the same time. It just depends on which kind of rationality is at issue. In light of this, I want to argue that it would be wise to give all forms of rationality their due, respecting and allowing other aspects of human existence, such as emotions and feelings, to have their place in what is done and to be accounted for. Regarding all this, reflective rationality, at the personal level as well as within organizations, should never be absent. Even the decision to abstain from or postpone it for a particular period of time involves, at least, some reflective rationality.

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[50] This gives the possibility to make a connection with empirical studies of human in organizational context, for example, those in which collective mental maps/shared meanings are studied in connection with power.

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