TEDI SUDRAJAT[1], RANI HENDRIANA[2], BAGINDA KHALID HIDAYAT JATI[3]

Countering Radicalism of The Government Officials in Indonesia: An Insider's Look Into Government Efforts[4]

Abstract

This study was focused on the increasingly widespread phenomenon of radicalism among government officials in Indonesia. The perspective adopted an evaluation of government legal policies designed to curtail the proliferation of radicalism through counter-radicalization, and deradicalization measures. These anti-radicalism policies were aimed to reintegrate government officials who had been influenced by radicalism, aligning their thinking, attitudes, and behaviour with the principles of the Indonesian Pancasila. Presently, the envisioned ideal conditions remain elusive. Therefore, this study adopted a normative approach to assessing the precision of the implementation of anti-radicalization and deradicalization policies, with a focus on comprehensive regulations and targeted methods. The proposed remedy involved a shift in legal policy, with greater emphasis placed on counter-radicalization efforts developed through a screening process that identified potential instances of radicalism in the cyber realm through early detection. Subsequently, these cases were directed to the legal process, with a deradicalization attempt, which emphasized an understanding of the ideology of Pancasila.

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[1]   Dr Tedi Sudrajat – Universitas Jenderal Soedirman (Indonesia), e-mail: tedi.sudrajat@unsoed.ac.id; ORCID: 0000-0003-2734-2820.

[2]   Rani Hendriana – Universitas Jenderal Soedirman (Indonesia), e-mail: rani.hendriana@unsoed.ac.id; ORCID: 0000-0003-1021-4558.

[3]   Baginda Khalid Hidayat Jati – Universitas Jenderal Soedirman (Indonesia), e-mail: baginda.khalid@unsoed.ac.id; ORCID: 0000-0003-4507-4719.

TEDI SUDRAJAT, RANI HENDRIANA, BAGINDA KHALID HIDAYAT JATI

Przeciwdziałanie radykalizmowi urzędników państwowych w Indonezji. Spojrzenie za kulisy działań podejmowanych przez rząd[5]

Streszczenie

W niniejszym artykule autorzy skupili się na coraz bardziej rozpowszechnionym zjawisku radykalizacji urzędników państwowych w Indonezji. Założeniem tej perspektywy była ocena rządowych polityk prawnych, które zaprojektowano z myślą o ograniczeniu rozprzestrzeniania się radykalnych postaw poprzez przeciwdziałanie im oraz zastosowanie środków deradykalizacyjnych. Owe polityki przeciw postawom radykalnym miały na celu ponowną integrację urzędników państwowych, którzy ulegli wpływowi radykalizmu, dostosowanie ich myślenia, postaw i zachowań do zasad indonezyjskiej Pancasili. W chwili obecnej przewidywane idealne warunki pozostają ulotne. Stąd w badaniu zastosowano podejście normatywne, jeśli chodzi o ocenę precyzji we wdrażaniu polityk anty- i deradykalizacyjnych. Nacisk położono na zrozumiałe przepisy prawne oraz ukierunkowane metody działania. Zaproponowane remedium na ów problem uwzględniło zmianę w polityce prawnej, z większym naciskiem na działania przeciwdziałające radykalizacji, które opracowano w ramach procesu prześwietlania służącego rozpoznaniu potencjalnych przypadków radykalizmu w przestrzeni cyfrowej przez ich wczesne wykrycie. Następnie te sprawy skierowano do procesu sądowego, z podjęciem próby deradykalizacji, która kładła nacisk na zrozumienie ideologii Pancasili.

Słowa kluczowe: urzędnicy państwowi, Pancasila, radykalizm, antyradykalizacja, deradykalizacja.

Introduction

The spread of radicalism in Indonesia is an issue that remains unresolved, giving rise to persistent challenges. This understanding often triggers social conflict, potentially leading to the disintegration of the state. While the government has implemented various legal policies, an ideal formula for resolving this issue is yet to be found. The evidence of this lies in the significant number of people exposed to these ideas, which in turn gives rise to legal issues regularly. At the heart of the matter is the way radicalism is employed. It signifies the attempt and desire of specific individuals or groups to establish their ideas and beliefs through revolutionary means. This often involves the use of violence to distort and rectify the viewpoints and attitudes of others. The perspective does not seek to legitimize acts of Mubder and suicide, as a means to uphold these concepts and ideologies. Instead, it underscores the intrinsic connection between the sociological and theological building blocks of society that are inseparable.[6]

Ahmad Nurwakhid, the Director of the National Counter-Terrorism Prevention Agency (BNPT), has highlighted concerning statistics, approximately 33 million people are exposed to radicalism in Indonesia.[7] This study also unveiled that the Radicalism Potential Index in 2022 was 10%. Projections anticipate an increase in 2023 and 2024, due to the upcoming election.[8] The index serves as a barometer for gauging the perceived prevalence of radicalism within the nation. A survey conducted by the Alvara Research Center, targeting 1,200 civil servants, reported a concerning trend, where 19.4% of these individuals disagreed with the ideology of Indonesia Pancasila. This finding simply depicts the existence of a relatively high potential for the spread of radical ideologies. It underscores the necessity to address the dissemination of radicalism, in the general populace, especially in government.

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[6] S. Harahap et al., *The Role of Islamic Higher Education Institutions in Preventing Radicalism in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand*, UINSU Press, Medan 2019, p. 10.

[7] R.A. Majid, *BNPT, 33 Juta Penduduk Indonesia Terpapar Radikalisme, Butuh Undang-Undang Pencegahan*, https://www.kompas.tv/article/311315/bnpt-33-juta-penduduk-indonesia-terpapar-radikalisme-butuh-undang-undang-pencegahan (access: 21.07.2023).

[8] BNPT, *Indeks Resiko Terorisme dan Potensi Radikalisme di 2022 Turun*, 2023. Available at: https://www.menpan.go.id/site/berita-terkini/berita-daerah/bnpt-indeks-resiko-terorisme-dan-potensi-radikalisme-di-2022-turun (access: 21.02.2023).

Based on the evolution of ideas and activities associated with radicalism, the Indonesian government, led by the Ministry of State Apparatus and Bureaucratic Reforms, has launched the No Radical State Civil Apparel application. This strategic move aims to address the mounting concern of radicalism infiltration among government officials. The initiative was a direct response to the emerging vulnerability of government officials towards adopting radical perspectives.

Considering the context discussed earlier, there are specific factors that contribute to the proliferation of radical viewpoints among government officials. These factors include:

1. Government officials who reject the Pancasila ideology and instead embrace the concept of a Khilafah state or an Islamic theocracy hold certain beliefs. These beliefs led them to abstain from participating in activities that express a sense of nationalism.
2. The idea of government officials endorsing violence and terrorism under the guise of jihad prompts deep reflection due to its intricate implications. While jihad can encompass personal struggle and broader justice pursuits, in this context, it seems to involve distorting the term to justify violent actions.
3. The ambiguous or paradoxical thinking of government officials who harbour resentment toward the current administration, becomes evident when they use social media to expose hate speech directed at the state, including the president, and government symbols.

From a normative perspective, this anticipatory effort aligns seamlessly with Indonesian Law No. 5 of 2014, which pertains to the civil state apparatus and positions them as unifiers of the nation. The law underscores the implications of public service relations (*openbare diensbetreeking*) within the government context. It mandates that government officials adhere to all regulations, remain loyal to the state ideology (Pancasila), and uphold the conception of Indonesia.[9] This principle emphasizes that government employees have a duty not to oppose or betray the foundational tenets of the state ideology, both in their thoughts and actions. The duties of civil state apparatus extend beyond the mere delivery of public services, they also inherently represent the state. Therefore, they must embody the values of Pancasila, the state-guiding ideology, and are entrusted with its protection and advancement. The situation becomes precarious when the civil state apparatus becomes vulnerable to radicalism. This is because, while the most visible threat of terrorism involves damaging vital governmental assets, its more subtle danger lies in destabilizing

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9   S. Hartini, T. Sudrajat, Hukum, Kepegawaian di Indonesia, Sinar Grafika, Jakarta 2017.

the nation to the point where its humanistic essence is eroded. A paradox emerges concerning civil state apparatus, which function as both the binding force and unifying agents of the nation, and are also public servants, inadvertently compromising societal security.

Based on this, the anti-radicalization policy assumes a crucial role within the entire strategies adopted by the government. These strategies are designed to proactively prevent and mitigate the occurrence of this criminal act by identifying and addressing areas susceptible to radical terrorism. The framework for these efforts is outlined in Indonesia Government Regulation No. 77 of 2019, which pertains to the prevention of criminal acts of terrorism and the protection of investigators, prosecutors, judges, and marketing officers. Counter-radicalization emerges as a proactive endeavour aimed at thwarting the dissemination of radical terrorism among individuals or groups who are susceptible to the influence of radical ideologies. This is accomplished through a range of approaches, including counter-narratives, propaganda, and counter-ideology initiatives, whether executed directly or indirectly. Meanwhile, deradicalization takes the form of a planned, integrated, systematic, and continuous process. It is carried out to eliminate or reduce and ultimately reverse the radical understanding of terrorism that has taken hold.

The limited effectiveness of anti-radicalization policies in Indonesia could be attributed to a variety of factors. Major challenges persist in addressing the spread of radicalism, among government employees. This study makes a distinct contribution by focusing on efforts to counter the spread of radical understanding among government officials and outlining strategies to confront this issue. Previous studies focused on addressing radicalism through various means, including the prevention of radicalism through the optimization of human rights education[10] and implementing deradicalization programmes to discourage terrorist activities.[11] These contributions underscore the need for legal certainty in addressing radical questions. Unfortunately, this study has not received significant attention from the international community. It uniquely contributes to the global discourse, by providing a tangible legal framework for deradicalization and counter-radicalization specifically focused on government officials.

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[10] O.W. Budijanto, T.Y. Rahmanto, *Prevention of Radicalism Through Optimization Human Rights Education in Indonesia*, "Journal HAM" 2021, 1, pp. 57–74.

[11] P. Maulidyawanto, H. Ras, N. Sambas, *Penanganan Radikalisme Melalui Program Deradikalisasi sebagai Upaya untuk Mencegah Tindak Pidana Terorisme di Indonesia*, "Jurnal Hukum Lex Generalis" 2023, 4(2), pp. 155–169.

Comparing counter-radicalization in various countries

A valuable method for evaluating the effectiveness of a state policy in resolving a specific problem involves the adoption of a comparative approach. It is a form of comparison between counter-radicalization and deradicalization policies implemented across different countries. This comparison method can be developed by focusing on the research question.[12] By performing these comparisons between several countries, a more comprehensive understanding can be realized. This process illuminates the distinct advantages and limitations associated with the implementation of counterterrorism measures aimed at combating radical ideologies.

The next comparative analysis is based on the situation in Indonesia, using the 2022 Global Index of Terrorism report issued by the Institute for Economics and Peace. (IEP). The estimates in the report are based on four impact indicators, namely the number of incidents, deaths, injuries, and acts of terrorism, in the past five years. Indonesia holds the 24th position out of 163 countries, achieving a score of 5.50. This composite score stems from seven documented terrorist incidents within the last five years, resulting in a total of 25 casualties, 22 wounded, and no recorded instances of hostages at the time of the report. The next country to compare is Thailand with a terrorism index score of 5.43. This is closely followed by the Philippines and Malaysia with indices of 6.33 and 1.36, respectively. The rationale behind the selection of these countries is their geographical proximity within Southeast Asia, coupled with the diverse spectrum of index scores that reflects the range of terrorist attack scenarios. It is important to recognize that these terrorist attacks are significantly shaped by the statements and actions of the governing authorities during the respective timeframes considered.

The comparison process would consider several indicators, chiefly the policies enacted by states in their efforts towards counter-radicalization. These policies core components will be scrutinized, followed by an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses inherent in the various approaches adopted by each state. This approach is in line with the principles outlined in the United Nations Security Council's Resolution No. 13723, issued on 28 September 2001. This resolution was a direct response to the terrorist attacks in the United States and called on every member state to develop policies aimed at preventing acts of terrorism. These policies encompassed a comprehensive range of actions, starting from curtailing the funding

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12   M. Adams, J. Bomhoff, *Comparing Law: Practice and Theory*, [in:] M. Adams, J. Bomhoff (eds.), *Practice and Theory in Comparative Law*, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 6.

processes associated with terrorism and extending to combating the propagation of radical ideologies.[13]

In Indonesia, a dedicated entity, the BNPT, is charged with the dual mandate of countering terrorism and mitigating the spread of radical principles. This agency undertakes several specialized missions, including the implementation of efforts to prevent the occurrence of terrorist activities, increased alertness, and the protection of various vital objects prone to potential threats. The BNPT's approach entails a collaborative synergy among various governmental institutions and society at large, its efforts are also extended globally through international cooperation aimed at bolstering transnational security.[14] However, despite its proactive initiatives, the execution of comprehensive counter-radicalization tasks by the BNPT has certain weaknesses. These shortcomings are evident in the survey conducted by the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology in 2018. The survey illuminated the presence of propaganda content across diverse social media platforms, with a documented count of 5,526 instances recorded as of 26 June 2018. This situation has triggered inconsistencies within societal layers, particularly in terms of aligning with Pancasila.[15]

To face these challenges, the BNPT has implemented a series of strategies. These strategies encompass a comprehensive approach, involving the identification and mitigation of extremist propaganda dissemination. A pivotal aspect is the creation of counter-narratives aimed at bolstering public resilience. This multifaceted endeavour executed both digitally and physically, is facilitated by the establishment of the Peace Media Center. Furthermore, this organization plays a pivotal role in disseminating positive news to counterbalance negative influences. These endeavours are forged through collaborative efforts, with a strong emphasis on cross-agency cooperation. The partners include the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology as well as the Cyber and State Code Agency. These cooperative measures align harmoniously with the policy framework issued by the Department of Political, Legal, and Security Coordinator of Indonesia No. 42 of 2018 concerning coordination between ministries and institutions implementing the counter-terrorism programme.[16]

Thailand has implemented significant public policies aimed at countering radicalization. One significant policy is the Terrorism and Proliferation of Weapons

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[13]   United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1373, adopted by the Security Council at its 4382th meeting (28 September 2001).

[14]   BNPT, *Indeks Resiko Terorisme dan…*

[15]   B. Sadarusalam et al., *Counter-Propaganda Strategy of National Agency of Counterterrorism in the Handling of Contemporary Radicalism Development in Indonesia*, "Jurnal Prodi Perang Asimetris" 2018, 3, p. 44.

[16]   Ibidem.

of Mass Destruction Financing Act, B.E. 2559. This legislation serves as a preventative measure against the financing of terrorist activities. After its enactment, the Thai government, successfully seized assets and properties associated with terrorist financing, amounting to 2,631,839.92 baht.[17] Thailand has proactively implemented steps to mitigate the spread of radical ideologies. The National Security Policy and Plan (2017–2022) constitutes a significant measure in this situation. At present, Thailand remains committed to enacting new regulations with a specific focus on preventing extreme actions. It does not have specialized agencies such as the BNPT found in Indonesia. Instead, the responsibilities for counter-terrorism and counter--radicalization are distributed across various entities, including the Royal Thai Police and the Department of Special Investigation. These agencies work in collaboration with other cooperative bodies to address these challenges.

Radicalism in Thailand typically arises from domestic sources rather than external factors such as global terrorism. It is often associated with separatist ideologies that are deeply intertwined with the spirit of jihad. This trend is particularly prominent in the southern region of Thailand, which has a majority Muslim population. A comparative study highlights the interconnections between language, religion, and ethno-nationalism, offering insights into the genesis of the radical movement. Religion plays a pivotal role in these societies, which often face discrimination due to government policies. These policies focus on linguistic and cultural diversity, thereby impacting the Muslim community in Southern Thailand, particularly those of Malay Patani ethnicity. The situation contrasts with the experiences of other minority groups in Thailand, such as Chinese immigrants, as well as the Lao and Khmer communities in the northern region.[18] An exploration of these complex interplays provides a deeper comprehension of the origin of the radical movement, underscored by the influences of religion, language, and ethno-nationalism.

The Thai government initiated a formal peace dialogue in response to the ongoing conflict in 2013. As of 11 January 2021, this conflict has taken a significant toll, resulting in 7,200 lives lost and 13,000 wounded, with the majority being civilians.[19] To counter extremist narratives, the Thai government collaborated with Muslim scholars to foster a more moderate Islamic perspective that aligns with the governance of the nation. Despite these efforts, online radicalism continues to persist, fuelling the spirit of Neo-Jihadism, particularly among the younger generation

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[17] The Office of Legal Affairs Of The United Nations, *Thailand's Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism*, 2020, https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/75/int_terrorism/thailand_e.pdf (access: 5.04.2021).

[18] Ch. Joll, *Contextualizing Discrimination of Religious and Linguistic Minorities in South Thailand*, "Muslim World Journal of Human Rights" 2021, 18.

[19] R. Chalermsripinyorat, *Islam and the BRN's Armed Separatist Movement in Southern Thailand*, "Small Wars and Insurgencies" 2021, 32(6).

of Muslims in Thailand.[20] In order to address this challenge, the Thai government enacted the Computer-Related Crimes Act in 2007. This legislation has facilitated the imposition of sanctions and the blocking of access to websites containing harmful contents, aimed at maintaining the stability of the country as well as countering explicit materials. However, effectively managing large platforms such as YouTube and other social media remains an intricate task, primarily due to the focus of the government on monitoring contents related to preserving the dignity of the kingdom (*lèse-majesté*).[21]

In contrast to the other three countries used for comparison in the counter-radicalization process, the score assigned to Malaysia remains comparatively lower. The Malaysian government has introduced a series of policies, including the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) in 2015 and the National Security Act (NSCA) in 2016. In order to combat the dissemination of radical ideologies and extreme violence, Malaysia has adopted a long-term approach, particularly in schools. This approach emphasizes on education and aims to foster tolerance and inclusivity. UNESCO recognizes this strategy as an effective counter-radicalization method. The successful implementation of various processes aimed at curbing the spread of radicalism by the Malaysian government contributed to the stability of the country.[22] This educational emphasis is considered as a significant step toward countering radical perceptions and promoting a climate of moderation and mutual understanding.

The Malaysian government has implemented a range of preventive measures. One significant initiative was the enactment of a national policy pioneered by Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi (from 2003 to 2008), known as Islam Hadhari. This policy aimed to foster collaboration between diverse non-Muslim parties to promote social harmony and coherence. Another crucial strategy is the establishment of the E8 Anti-Terror Detachment Unit within the Royal Malaysian Police. This unit adopts a dual approach, incorporating both repressive and preventive measures. It proactively collects information related to the various parties potentially trapped in radical conspiracy, subsequently undertaking necessary measures to thwart these actions.[23]

The application of the preventive policy under the POTA in Malaysia has encountered certain hurdles. Criticism primarily centred on potential human rights violations

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[20] V. Andre, *Neojihadism' and YouTube: Patani Militant Propaganda Dissemination and Radicalization*, "Asian Security" 2012, 8(1), p. 24.

[21] Ibidem.

[22] M. Jani, *Countering Violent Extremism in Malaysia: Past Experience and Future Prospects*, "Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis" 2017, 9(6), pp. 3–5.

[23] M. Saidin, K. Khalid, *Combating Daesh: Insights into Malaysia's Counter-Terrorism Experience and the Deradicalization of Former Detainees*, "Religions" 2023, 14, pp. 2–10.

linked to individuals suspected of harbouring radical beliefs tend to emerge. This concern precisely revolves around the procedure of preventive detention by the Federal Constitution in accordance with Article 149 of the POTA, which draws parallels to provisions initially present in the abolished Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA). The repeal of the ISA in 2012 was driven by public discontent. However, with the implementation of the POTA, the practices of preventive detention were reintroduced.

In the Philippines, the prevention of radicalization is pursued through a variety of avenues, specifically by introducing policies that emphasize community involvement. This commitment is exemplified by initiatives such as the Integrated Community Action against Radicalization and Extremism (I CARE) and the Whole-of-Community Approach (WOCA). Launched in 2017 by the Philippine security authority, the Department of Interior and Local Government, the WOCA is a proactive movement aimed at fostering unity. This approach represents a joint endeavour involving both the Philippine government and local communities at the grass root level. Its purpose extends beyond countering radicalism and extremism, as this approach also addresses the challenge of drug trafficking.[24]

The programme embodies the tangible realization of the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism from 2017 to 2022. This preventive effort entails a comprehensive collaboration between governmental and community components, culminating in the establishment of the Barangay Information Network (BIN). The network assumes a pivotal role in combating radicalism, by extending the influence of investigations conducted on the field, comprising various public officials at the barangay or rural level, alongside law enforcement personnel. Their collective responsibility is to closely monitor individuals and activities associated with radicalism and extremism. Further enriching the programme is the inclusion of the Barangay Peace and Order Council (BPOC), which functions as the Brain. This regional-level policymaking body, composed of important figures including the District Head, the Chief of the Philippine National Police, various governmental representatives, and community members, specifically those engaged in education and religious assembly forums. To complete this framework, the programme incorporates the Barangay Peacekeeping Action Team (BPAT), which acts as the Fist. This specialized team serves as a quick response unit, effectively implementing various policies issued by the BPOC.[25]

The challenges faced in the Philippines stem from the accumulation of injustices and discrimination that Muslim communities in the southern Mindanao region

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24   R. Leon et al., *Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in the Philippines: Grassroots Empowerment and Development of Homeland Security Framework*, "Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses" 2018, 10(8), p. 13.
25   Ibidem.

have experienced. This situation, coupled with the weakness of the law enforcement system in the region, has created fertile ground for the growth of radical organizations. The country confronts persistent threats of radicalism, spanning from communist uprisings to Moro separatism, and various groups affiliated with the Islamic State Autonomous Region. In the southern part of the Philippines, which is predominantly dominated by Muslims in Mindanao, entities such as the Abu Sayyaf and Maute groups, among others, are active. However, a turning point occurred in July 2018, when the then-President Rodrigo Duterte approved the Bangsamoro Organic Law draft of the peace agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front since 2014. This endorsement led to the establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, signifying a significant stride towards addressing historical grievances and fostering stability within the region.[26]

Table 1. Comparison of Counter-Radicalization Policies in ASEAN Countries (Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines)

Country	Policy Approach	Strengths	Weakness
Indonesia	Establishment of a special agency focused on the prevention of radicalism by fostering cooperation among various agencies and elements within societies.	Some institutions possess the ability to directly anticipate and create corresponding narratives.	The wide territorial and population coverage of Indonesia is linked to a less-than-optimal prevention of radical misconceptions on the internet.
Thailand	A precautionary approach has been implemented through a number of national security policies accompanied by inter-agency collaboration.	Preventive procedures have effectively garnered numerous citations from a range of activities that show indications of having radical elements.	Countering the infiltration of radical content through social media platforms like YouTube remains challenging, as the Thai government primarily emphasizes suppressing contents that disrespects the monarchy.
Malaysia	Malaysia has implemented policies specifically focused on counter-radicalization, such as the POTA (2015).	Similar to Indonesia, Malaysia also maintains a dedicated anti-terrorism unit and actively collaborates with various stakeholders.	There are indications of human rights violations occurring during the process of preventing radicalism in Malaysia.
Philippines	The Philippines has also implemented specific counter-radicalization policies, such as the Integrated Community Action against Radicalization and Extremism approach.	There is a relatively well-structured collaboration between the government, the public, as well as other stakeholders in the bid to prevent the spread of radicalism.	The lack of effective law enforcement in certain regions of the Philippines has facilitated the growth of radicalism.

Source: own elaboration.

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[26] Ibidem.

Based on the information in Table 1, there are common trends in how each country approaches the counter-radicalization process. Beyond the significance of policy measures, effective coordination between governments and various societal sectors is required to efficiently mitigate the spread of diverse radical ideologies.

Policy review: have the efforts made been appropriate?

Implementation effort

The concept of radicalism is not entirely challenging, especially when confined in the ideological minds of its adherents. However, when radicalism evolves into active radical movements, it starts to give rise to challenges. This becomes specifically pronounced when these movements encounter opposition from other political forces that obstruct their aspirations for fundamentalism. In these cases, radicalism is frequently intertwined with the use of violence.[27] This observation is consistent with the study by Bjelopera, that individuals or groups inclined towards radicalism seek to bring about change through extreme means. The term extreme violence is used to describe acts of violence rooted in radical or extremist beliefs. In other words, when a person is convinced to accept violence, there emerges the potential for that individual to become a terrorist.[28]

Radicalism is the origin of terrorism because there are factors that cause an individual to become radical. It often serves as a breeding ground for extremist ideologies that can subsequently lead to acts of terrorism. Various factors contribute to this process, including cultural influences on the exposure of government officials to radical ideas. Cultural factors play a significant role in shaping individuals' susceptibility to radicalization. For instance, cultural practices such as the Hijrah phenomenon popular among Indonesian Muslims can be exploited by radical groups seeking to recruit new members, including government officials. These practices tend to impact the identity and beliefs of individuals, providing fertile ground for the adoption of extreme ideologies. Another phenomenon is that the internet and social media amplify the spread of radical ideas. Government officials exposed to radical content online become deeply immersed in extremist narratives, transitioning from moderate viewpoints to radical ones. The online accessibility of these contents accelerates the dissemination of radical ideologies and recruitment strategies. Internal factors also contribute to radicalization. When government

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[27]   E. Turmudi, R. Sihbudi, *Islam dan Radikalisme di Indonesia*, Jakarta, LIPI, 2005, p. 5.

[28]   J.P. Bjelopera, *American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat" in Domestic Terrorism*, 2012, pp. 67, 200.

officials feel disillusioned due to a perceived lack of justice in the system, they become more receptive to alternative ideologies promising change and fairness through radical means. This sense of disillusionment encompasses both sociological and ideological or theological dimensions.[29]

When considering the participation of government officials in grasping radicalism through the analysis of the theory of social identity, the process of its dissemination can be understood to unfold with respect to three discernible stages, namely[30]:

1. Categorization. This stage occurs when government officials view content on the internet. In this circumstance, officials find congruence between the ideologies, propaganda, and doctrines disseminated by radical groups online and their cognitive frameworks. This alignment prompts these individuals to adopt a parallel understanding, considering the propagated doctrines as unquestionably valid (out-group). The manifestation of this process was the emergence of government officials who rejected the Pancasila state and endorsed the Khilafah concept (theocracy).
2. Identification. During the identification stage, government officials embark on the process of associating themselves with a particular group that reflects their convictions. This stage yields a significant result, namely the gradual alignment of individual government officials with those of pro-radical groups. The alignment becomes evident through various actions, including posting content on personal social media accounts and sharing statements within socio-religious forums that espouse pro-radical viewpoints or ideologies.
3. Comparison. In the comparison stage, government officials engage in assessing both in and out-groups, often attributing a sense of superiority to the preferred one. This stage can result in officials adopting more extreme stances, showcasing increased intolerance, embracing the acceptance of violence, and potentially endorsing or supporting acts of terrorism.

Based on the progressive stages that individuals undergo, the potential for radicalization emerges, influenced by an interplay of internal and external factors. Internally, the sense of social, economic, and political injustice plays a pivotal role, complemented by external dynamics, such as disillusionment with established state and religious institutions. This sentiment arises from the perception of governmental entities being sluggish or ineffective in tackling societal issues and upholding

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[29] E.S. Utomo, *Strategi Pencegahan Radikalisme Aparatur Sipil Negara (ASN) di Indonesia*, Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta 2022.
[30] Ibidem.

religious values.[31] As a result, there are aggressive and offensive acts against parties perceived as conflicting with their religious values and teachings or hindering the movement from achieving its great purpose. The erosion of trust in what they deem unsatisfactory conditions can trigger a rebellion that garners support from diverse quarters, including government officials who have embraced radical ideologies. In 2020, the National Security Agency and the Ministry of State Apparatus Disclosure and Bureaucratic Reforms reported that numerous government officials were exposed to radical and terrorist activities every month. Consequently, some officials faced legal consequences of varying degrees, ranging from mild to severe sanctions.[32] Therefore, the approach adopted by the government extends beyond the deployment of security forces, such as the Police and Densus 88. It encompasses the formulation and enactment of regulations and policies crafted to address these challenges promptly and comprehensively.

The forms of intervention already undertaken by the government are divided into two types, namely general and special efforts. These efforts involve regulations that apply to the broader population of the Indonesian citizens. On the other hand, special efforts are designed to address specific subsets or groups, often defined by particular characteristics, such as the profession of government officials.

a. General effort
    Law No. 5 of 2018 is a resolute commitment by the state to safeguard all its citizens and preserve the unity of the nation. In respect to the criminal acts of terrorism, the preventive aspects must be carried out in a planned and integrated manner. Preventive measures involved the relevant ministries, agencies, and the entire nation. This is realized through national preparedness, counter-radicalization, and deradicalization efforts. These endeavours are primarily executed by the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT). For the optimal prevention of terrorist activities, there is a fortification of institutional functions, with a particular emphasis on enhancing coordination, meticulously managed by the BNPT.

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[31] M. Mahmuddin, *Budaya Kekerasan dalam Gerakan Islam: Studi tentang Penegakan Doktrin Amar Makruf Nahi Mungkar pada Ormas Front Pembela Islam (FPI) Kota Makassar*, "Jurnal Diskursus Islam" 2013, 1, p. 87; A. Mbai, *Urgensi Penguatan Undang-Undang Terorisme*, speech presented at the Seminar of Empowerment of State Institutions in Handling Terrorism in Indonesia, Sekolah Tinggi Hukum Militer "AHM-PTHM," Jakarta, March 8, 2016, p. 5.; E. Turmudi, R. Sihbudi, op. cit., p. 2; F.M. Yunus, *Konflik Agama di Indonesia Problem dan Solusi Pemecahannya*, "Substantia: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Ushuluddin" 2014, 16(2), p. 217.

[32] P. Kurniati, *Puluhan ASN Terpapar Radikalisme Tiap Bulan, Menpan RB Ancam Pemecatan*, 2020, https://regional.kompas.com/read/2020/12/17/10063261/puluhan-asn-terpaparradikalisme-tiap-bulan-menpan-rb-ancam-pemecatan?page=all (access: 5.04.2021).

The strategy used by the BNPT is focused on prevention with a proactive approach or law enforcement. Precautionary measures are taken to prevent acts of radicalism that lead to terrorism. This proactive stance aims to mitigate the impact on innocent individuals and empowers legal interventions in cases related to radicalism and terrorism. To effectively curb these threats, a combination of both material and formal criminal law mechanisms are employed.[33]

Practically, the prevention of radicalism is executed through two distinct avenues, namely hard and soft approaches. The hard approach involves the application of laws and punitive measures against individuals involved in terrorist activities, ensuring their prosecution is in line with existing legal frameworks. Meanwhile, the soft approach takes a constructive approach towards the general public, aiming to pre-empt potential radicalism. This approach also extends to initiatives focused on deradicalizing current and former terrorist inmates, addressing both the social and individual aspects. It also entails monitoring and tracking the financial transactions linked to terrorists.

b. Special efforts for government officials

In 2019, the government issued a policy through the Joint Decision (SKB), involving 11 ministers and non-ministerial government institutions. This policy was designed to address the treatment of radicalism in the framework of strengthening national awareness on the civil apparatus of the state.[34] Within this policy framework, there are 10 distinct types of violations outlined. These encompass various actions, including expressing hateful opinions verbally or in writing on social media platforms against Pancasila and the government. Similar prohibitions extend to expressing opinions or creating content that harbours animosity towards tribes, religions, races, and intergroups. The scope of these violations encompassed the act of distributing radical contents (uploading, sharing, broadcasting, retweeting, reposting etc.) and endorsing it with reactions (including likes, dislikes, love emoji, retweeting, or commenting). The policy further emphasized that government officials may face consequences assuming they are found to be disseminating misleading or irresponsible information. Engaging in activities

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[33] A. Jazuli, *Strategi Pencegahan Radikalisme Dalam Rangka Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Terorisme*, "Jurnal Ilmiah Kebijakan Hukum" 2016, 10, pp. 197–209.

[34] T. Sudrajat et al., *Kebijakan Anti Radikalisme Melalui Kontra Radikalisasi Terhadap Pegawai Aparatur Sipil Negara Di Indonesia*, Proceeding National Seminar and Call for Papers *Pengembangan Sumber Daya Perdesaan dan Kearifan Lokal Berkelanjutan XI*, 2022, LPPM Universitas Jenderal Soedirman Indonesia, pp. 208–213.

that incite hatred, insult, provoke, or display contempt towards Pancasila, the Constitution, and the government is explicitly prohibited. The use of attributes contrary to Pancasila is unacceptable, including the misuse of national symbols, whether through direct means or on social media platforms. As part of the initiative, 11 ministers and institutions launched the website aduanasn.id.[35] The Deputy Department of Human Capital of the Ministry of State Apparatus Disclosure and Bureaucratic Reforms clarified that this move was taken to proactively address the potential emergence of radicalism among government officials. The Minister of Communication and Information, Johnny G. Plate, stated that this complaint portal served as a means to uphold nationalism values among government officials in Indonesia.[36] Aligning with this stance, Mudzakir, Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of State Appliances Disclosure and Bureaucratic Reforms, reaffirmed that it was aimed at protecting these civil servants from exposure to radicalism or extreme ideologies that jeopardize national integration.

This concrete step of the SKB involves the establishment of a complaint portal for government officials who are allegedly exposed to these dangerous ideologies.[37] The reporting procedure necessitates the inclusion of supporting evidence, such as videos, texts, photos, or screenshots. Following this, a team of investigators will engage the accused government officials for a comprehensive examination, allowing them to provide self-defence against the charges. Empirically, as of the end of 2019, the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology had received 94 complaints. Among these, 33 were associated with intolerance, 5 were connected to anti-Pancasila sentiments, 25 concerned opposition to Indonesia, and 19 revolved around neutrality, hate speech, hoaxes, and similar concerns.[38]

Bela Ulung Hapsara, the National Commissioner on Human Rights, stated that the 11th minister's office was necessary because government officials served as political instruments of the state and should be open to criticism. Although certain parties expressed concerns about these mechanisms, because they were scared of potential radicalism, Novi Savarianti emphasized the need for a verification and clarification mechanism. This

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[35]   M. Cahya, *SKB 11 Menteri soal Radikalisme Berlebihan*, 2019, https://mediaindonesia.com/politik-dan-hukum/273796/skb-11-menteri-soal-radikalisme-berlebihan (access:15.08.2023).

[36]   CNN Indonesia, *12 Kementerian dan Lembaga Teken SKB Tangani Radikalisme ASN*, 2019,https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20191112135242-20-447639/12-kementerian-dan-lembaga-teken-skb-tangani-radikalisme-asn (access: 15.08.2023).

[37]   R. Puspita, *Kemenpan-RB: SKB 11 Menteri Lindungi ASN Dari Radikalisme*, 2019, https://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/q2akt6428/kemenpanrb-skb-11-menteri-lindungiasn-dari-radikalisme (access: 5.04.2021).

[38]   Ibidem.

approach would enable authorities to address allegations of radicalism with solid evidence, whether in the form of videos, audio recordings, or images.

What needs to be evaluated

Based on the comparison between 4 (four) countries in ASEAN concerning with anti-radicalization and deradicalization policies of the government, it can be identified that the most obvious weakness is the wide territorial and population coverage of Indonesia which is linked to a less-than-optimal prevention of radical misconceptions on the internet. When we look at the efforts that already made by the government, it was also can be identified that the potential of officials being exposed to radicalism is affected by two aspects. Firstly, the level of legal awareness encompasses the understanding, knowledge, attitudes, and behaviours of these officials regarding prevailing radicalism concepts. Secondly, there is the issue of incomplete monitoring concerning the conduct of government officials and staff who might have been influenced by radicalization.

In relation to the supervisory function, two primary agencies come into focus, the state authority responsible for overseeing the management of government officials and the body entrusted with training its staff who could potentially face radical influences. Moreover, the BNPT plays a pivotal role by formulating policies and implementing measures to prevent and counteract the proliferation of radical ideologies among these officials.

Based on the points discussed earlier, there are several issues that the government needs to address to improve the quality of its anti-radicalization and deradicalization policies:

1. The enacted legal policies are not yet effectively integrated into efforts to prevent the dissemination of radicalism and implement counter-radicalization within the government environment.
2. The lack of attention by the government to the spread of radicalism in the cyber world is evident. While it has been attentive to identifying and categorizing the potential spread of radical ideologies in the physical administrative setting, the formulation of anti-radicalization policies has not been adequately adapted to address the cyber domain. This results in a lack of an optimized screening process for potential online influences.

Given the aforementioned factors, there is a pressing need for inter-regulatory integration in law enforcement actions against individuals involved in the propagation of radicalism. This integration should centre around an assessment process

designed to evaluate the degree of radical tendencies. The process would then facilitate clear decision-making. Those responsible for spreading radical ideologies on social media would undergo an evaluation to discern the extent of their exposure to radicalism. This evaluation would determine whether they should engage in deradicalization efforts or be subject to the criminal justice system.

Assessing individuals suspected of spreading radicalism involves the expertise of professionals. Experts from fields such as psychology and sociology provide insights into the factors driving radicalization. The process of assessment aims to find out how radical a person is, as well as help to understand the motivations, beliefs, and potential risks. Categorizing radicalism levels, such as hardcore, activist, newcomer, supporter, or sympathizer, offers a nuanced understanding of the individual involvement. This categorization guides the development of targeted deradicalization strategies. Designing deradicalization efforts based on assessed levels is crucial. Various individuals require different approaches, ranging from education and counselling to community engagement. Therefore, the law is used explicitly to bring the perpetrators of radicalism to book. By countering radicalism, terrorism is also bound to be suppressed, stabilizing security efforts.

Effective counter-radicalization strategies can be formulated by proactively screening for the potential propagation of radical ideologies in the digital world. In this endeavour, close collaboration between BNPT and the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology becomes relevant. To carry out this mission, it is imperative to establish a dedicated division within the Ministry that specializes in countering digital-based radicalism and focuses primarily on early detection. This specialized division needs to identify both the content creators of radical materials and individuals who consume such contents. By adopting this comprehensive approach, regions susceptible to radical influences can be systematically identified and analysed. This report needs to be analysed by the BNPT to determine the extent of radicalism in the content. Armed with this understanding, the BNPT can craft well-targeted counter-radicalization programs tailored to the specific regions in question. This is achieved in cooperation with local government institutions in the affected areas. Furthermore, the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology must play an active role in the removal of radical content from online platforms.

It is important to consider deradicalization of individuals undergoing the criminal justice process. This involves a form of socialization aimed at reshaping their thoughts to align with more positive and constructive perspectives. The objective is to prevent them from engaging in similar activities when released. A gentle approach is equally essential when dealing with counter-terrorism initiatives. The government must prioritize the reformation of officials who might have been exposed

to radical ideologies. This restorative process aims to strengthen their comprehension of the nation core ideology, Pancasila.

According to Franz Magnis Suseno,[39] Pancasila has two basic characteristics for Indonesians. Firstly, it is rooted in the unique Indonesian brand of nationalism. Secondly, it is a response to the diverse nature of the Indonesian nation. Unlike countries defined by a singular language (like Germany) or a specific region (like Korea), Indonesia is based on shared ethical experiences that foster a collective vision for the future. This diversity is extensive, spanning cultural, linguistic, geographical, and religious differences. That is why Pancasila become the foundation of the state, the ideology of the nation, and the philosophy, and the way of life of the nation which contains the basic values, instrumental values, and values of praxis.[40] It is also intrinsic to Indonesian identity, which requires intentional nurturing. Supposing the Indonesian identity is to be genuinely pluralistic, unity becomes strongest when all factions actively decide to come together and collaborate. This is precisely where the reinforcement of the ideological foundation of Pancasila becomes imperative. It must transcend mere theory and be ingrained in the views and behaviour of government officials. This active assimilation of Pancasila is what guarantees national unity and coherence.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the policy against radicalization and deradicalization was pursued through two distinct efforts. Firstly, a preventive effort involved the development of an anti-radicalization policy. This policy encompassed four crucial aspects, namely law enforcement agencies, binding regulations, cultural considerations, and ethical implementation. Secondly, a repressive approach was employed to identify those responsible for propagating radicalism through their activities. However, government officials had to fully address the needed reinforcement in the systematic identification of widespread radical content in the cyber world. This was the importance of an assessment process designed to identify and evaluate potentially radical actions. In countering the proliferation of digital-based radicalism, early detection proved indispensable. This included identifying creators and individuals who accessed the contents. These efforts enabled the mapping of regions that were currently or potentially at risk of radicalization, extending even to government offi-

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[39] F.M. Suseno, *Etika Politik Prinsip-Prinsip Moral Dasar Kenegaraan Modern*, Gramedia, Jakarta 2003.

[40] T. Sudrajat, *Harmonization of Regulation Based on Pancasila Values Through the Constitutional Court of Indonesia*, "Constitutional Review" 2018, 4(2), p. 315.

cials. The results of this identification process were subsequently analysed by the BNPT to determine the extent of the radical content present. This analysis provided valuable insights for the BNPT in shaping effective counter-radicalization programmes. Therefore, seamless coordination between the BNPT and the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology was deemed essential, particularly in the execution of content takedown. This coordination extended to the government's involvement in imposing sanctions on employees found to be influenced by radical ideologies.

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