This study was focused on the increasingly widespread phenomenon of radicalism among government officials in Indonesia. The perspective adopted an evaluation of government legal policies designed to curtail the proliferation of radicalism through counter­radicalization, and deradicalization measures. These anti­radica­lism policies were aimed to reintegrate government officials who had been influ­enced by radicalism, aligning their thinking, attitudes, and behaviour with the principles of the Indonesian Pancasila. Presently, the envisioned ideal conditions remain elusive. Therefore, this study adopted a normative approach to assessing the precision of the implementation of anti­radicalization and deradicalization policies, with a focus on comprehensive regulations and targeted methods. The proposed remedy involved a shift in legal policy, with greater emphasis placed on counter­radicalization efforts developed through a screening process that iden­tified potential instances of radicalism in the cyber realm through early detection. Subsequently, these cases were directed to the legal process, with a deradicalization attempt, which emphasized an understanding of the ideology of Pancasila.

The study based on archival, published historical documents and other available information sources highlights the activity of sickness funds that functioned in Ukraine on the territory of modern Prykarpattia during the period of Polish rule in 1919–1939 (the Second Polish Republic, in Polish: II Rzeczpospolita Polska) as a prototype of health insurance. The analysis of these documents allows to deter-mine the peculiarities of the activity of these institutions in relations with society and the state, methods of financing, rights and obligations of the members of these organizations, specific features of the decision-making management, insurance cases and ways of compensation. The retrospective approach used in this study makes it possible to recreate the picture of the past in the field of health care in general and health insurance in particular, even with the lack of historical and legal sources of a certain historical period. Seeing the present through a peculiar prism of the past helps to dive into the inner life of the society with all its manife-stations and ideas contributing to better understanding of modern social processes. In other words, the longer you look back, the further you see ahead.

The subversiveness of the work is a criterion of street art according to the theory of A. Baldini. This view, undoubtedly, represents a novelty in the understanding of this category of art; as such, it remains a contribution to aesthetics. Nevertheless, within the framework of the presented theory, subversiveness is combined with legal judgment and violation of the law. These circumstances situate the theory within the field of interest of legal studies; and from this perspective, it deserves criticism. This is because the theory does not contain precise determinants of the difference between legal and aesthetic judgments, nor does it equip the constructed criterion of street art with the ability to resolve conflicts between norms relevant to subversiveness; and it is the demonstration of these gaps, as well as proposals to fill them in the context of legal science that are the subject of this article.

The issue of the rule of law as a criterion for the action of public administration bodies has not yet been the subject of wider doctrinal reflection. The reason for this state of affairs is probably the rather sparing reference by public administration bodies to the rule of law as a basis for their decisions. Meanwhile, the obligation imposed on the authorities in Article 7 of the Code of Administrative Procedure should be treated as one of their fundamental duties in ongoing administrative proceedings. The present study focuses on signalling only some of the problems related to the notion of the rule of law on the grounds of general administrative procedure, indicating the ambiguity of this phrase and the related various understandings of it. The conclusions should be regarded as an invitation to discuss this undoubtedly complex issue.

The main thesis of the article concerns the pluralism of expert legal language. Such an assumption contradicts the tradition of development of legal dogmatics, which, especially in its conservative approach, assumes monism of legal language. New trends in social sciences introduce post-positivist approaches that suggest a multiplicity of research perspectives. This multiplicity is also translated into modifications of the conceptual grid. The Eurocentric vision of law is one of many parallel narratives, and the reception of European models has nowadays an increasingly conscious and functionally justified character.
The various narratives which condition the understanding of law in many contexts related to who interprets a given norm. This is not strictly related only to the legal family itself, or to the particular system of law in which the interpreted norm is anchored. It is rather about pluralism connected with diversity of perception resulting directly from conditions connected with the researcher-interpreter himself. It may be an expert in law connected with an academic centre, or a judge, whose education, cultural environment he comes from, mother tongue he speaks, or specific professional experience influence his understanding of the world and his understanding of law. In this case, there is a multiplicity of narratives and a plurality of legal language.

The article deals with the normative patterns of communication of judges in a theoretical perspective. Their identification is thus taken as a universal problem, occurring in all legal cultures and regardless of current disputes concerning them. It is assumed that normative patterns of communication among judges are built on the understanding of the role of the judge and the place of the judiciary within checks and balances. Based on the assumption that the role of judges and the status of the judiciary have evolved, three successive historical models of judicial communication were proposed, i.e. the first model – impersonal, the second – self restrained, and the third – accurate communication. The thesis was also put forward that the last of the models may prove to be inadequate in the face of contemporary challenges, resulting primarily from cultural changes driven by the development of new communication technologies.

The aim of the article is first of all an attempt to organize the ways of understanding the “form (of conventional actions in law)” and the contexts of the use of this term in detailed legal sciences. The author also considers the issue of performing conventional actions in law by non-linguistic actions and omissions, as well as the issue of significance of form ecognition in the context of identifying conventional actions in law. The results of the research presented in the paper (apart from their cognitive value) are to serve the development of the theoretical concept of conventional actions in law and, as far as possible, to put in order the dogmatic-legal discussion concerning the title issue.

The ambiguity of understanding and use of the term “human rights” reduces the effectiveness of the law-making and law enforcement activities of state and inter-national bodies, creates negative conditions for the formation of the unified worl-dview and legal position of future lawyers and representatives of other humanities. This article aims to define, formulate the content and describe the legal essence of the term “human rights,” and to substantiate the thesis about the harmfulness of the legal science, law-making and law enforcement use of this term with different meanings. The leading method of research is the method of analysis, which allows one to study the subject, imaginatively dividing it into constituent elements, and to consider each of the selected elements separately within a single whole. This article presents the argumentation of the need for a single wording, understanding, and use of the legal term “human rights.” The materials of the article have practical value for the effective implementation of the law-making and law enforcement activities of state and international bodies, for the formation of the unified worldview and legal position of future lawyers and representatives of other humanities, as well as for a correct and clear explanation of problems with the implemen-tation and protection of human rights.

The purpose of the article is to accomplish several complementary research tasks. First, the issue of sources of the content of conventional acts in law is discussed. Then, detailed issues regarding the content of conventional acts in law are presented against the background of dogmatic and legal reflections as well as problems related to the identification of conventional acts. Additionally, the author makes an attempt to determine the ways of understanding ‘the content (of conventional acts in law)’ in particular legal sciences. The research results presented in the article (apart from their cognitive value) are supposed to serve the development of the general theoretical concept of conventional acts in law, as well as to organise the dogmatic and legal discussion on the titular issue as much as possible.

The right to the city is a solution that can be considered in terms of third-generation human rights. The right to the city also serves as a tool for the effective fulfilment and respect of human rights agreed at the international level as well as the Sustainable Development Goals expressed in the 2030 Agenda. This is undoubtedly a new paradigm for urban development, which provides an alternative framework for rethinking cities and urbanisation. It aims to address the main challenges in cities and human settlements. The purpose of the article is to present an understanding of the right to the city by the analysis of its structure and the answer to the question of whether it is in fact a third-generation human right.

: According to Article 15(1) of the UDHR, ‘everyone has the right to a nationality’. Although the quoted provision looks deceptively straightforward, the determination of its content is not an easy task. Past research has been mainly focused on the problem of statelessness which was the historical reason for the introduction of the right in question. In this paper, I argue that holding the status of a formal national is not enough to have the right to a nationality secured. To show this, first, I analyse the difference between the concepts of ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ with special attention paid to the cultural component of national identity. Second, I investigate the understanding of a nationality as ‘the right to have rights’. On the basis of the research on the statelessness I ask what challenges are faced by people without the formal nationality of any state and I show that being a national of certain states is equivalent to being stateless with respect to certain fundamental rights of an individual. Thus, the right to a nationality is indeed ‘the right to have rights’, but only if it is a right to a right nationality. In consequence, I suggest that (1) any state which recognises the right guaranteed in Article 15 of the UDHR should embrace its full content by readiness to accept as nationals those whose original nationality does not guarantee the protection of their first-order rights or is based on values clearly contradictory to their own; (2) peoples from failed states should be able to acquire new citizenship in a country of maximal cultural affinity, with regard to the economic effectiveness of the latter; (3) the obtaining of new citizenship may legitimately be conditioned by demand on compliance with the system of values of the nationality granted.

This paper presents the issue of a lawyer’s integrity from the perspective of the assumptions underlying the original concept of a holistic approach to law and legal practice. In the course of the discussion, the basic principles of legal holism, the assumed understanding of lawyer’s integrity and their personal qualities forming the lawyer personality, and the problem of integrity in the context of the formula (model) shaping the lawyer-client relationship will be introduced. Legal holism recognises a lawyer’s self-knowledge, their conscious choice of professional role(s), the ways in which they are performed and the formula for working with clients and parties to disputes as crucial issues for the practice of law. It emphasises their complexity and possible impact on the postulated observance by a lawyer of the integrity of attitudes and actions in professional and private life. The author represents a research approach related to the concept of ontological and methodological multidimensionality of legal phenomena and the postulate of the so-called external integration of jurisprudence with the achievements of other sciences, including branches other than social (e.g. psychology or sociology).

The author of the article draws attention to certain semantic contradictions appearing in contexts where the word „fact” is used in the language of legal acts and the language of legal practitioners. These contradictions pertain, in particular, to the possibility of attributing some logically exclusiv predicates, especially such as „true” & „untrue” and „existing” & „non-existing” to „fact”. This word is also key to an understanding of the legal notion of „truth”. The semantic collocation of „fact”, atypical for the expressions in general language, and the aforementioned predicates, suggests a specific and different meaning of the word „fact” in the language of legal acts and legal practitioners. „Fact” has been traditionally defined in Polish legal doctrine as a „fragment of reality”, so the stress was put on an ontological semantic component of the word. The author argues that such a notion of „fact”, in particular in the light of the legislator’s statements, may lead to language phenomena which are named by linguists as semantically „absurd” or „nonsense”. The pointlessness of expressions such as „untrue fact” or „non-existent fact” in the context of the general language consists of an inability to understand the meanings of these expressions. The author considers the possibility of regarding them as socalled semantic paradox, and the word „fact” itself as a „quasi-individual” name [nazwa quasi indywiduowa] or a hypostasis. He draws attention to the point, generally ignored in the literature by legal practitioners, that the word „fact”, as corresponding to a certain situation, is always expressible in the form of a meaningful sentence. Moreover, the language of legal practitioners, especially the language of judicial decisions, always associates an approving assertion to the notion of „fact”.

A large number of opinions have been expressed about the decision C-131/12. Initially, Google’s defeat has been widely welcomed as the giant had suffered a bitter defeat. After a first joy about the containment of Google’s arrogance it became clear that the excessive claim for right to be forgotten will dry out our sources of information. Can privacy be seen as a fear for diversity of opinion? It may be due to the tension between data and reputation protection on the one hand and the possibility to protect against lies and fraud on the other hand. It is not just Google’s freedom of expression, which is in the centre of our interests. We want to find informations and Google is helping us in this regard. Forcing Google to suppress the information flow can not hinder Google to earn money. If we go through the opinion of the Advocate General and compare it with the reasoning of
the ECJ, then we come to the conclusion, that the ECJ had to decide in this a way on the grounds of the current legal status. The ECJ was standing with the back to the wall, because it has to apply the current law and this left no option open. Thus, the ECJ could not follow the opinion of the Advocate General. In the following I will shortly summarize the Spanish Data Protection Authority (SDPA) decision, before moving to the Advocate General opinion and the judgment of the ECJ and finally provide an outlook on possible
future development in this regard.

The article concerns the safety needs and the private security sector. Its content is focused on three questions: 1) what are safety needs; 2) what distinguishes safety needs; and 3) what results from the knowledge about safety needs? These three questions concern relationship between safety needs and the private security sector. Their content shows the way of understanding needs, particularly safety needs, their functioning and examples. It also indicates the features safety needs that decide their differences from other needs. The article ends conclusions that concern the private security sector.

Hans-Georg Gadamer claims that there are two keys to a proper understanding of the humanities. The first is the concept of Bildung, and the other – legal hermeneutics. This article is an attempt to apply Gadamer’s claim in the field of legal education. This application leads to three conclusions: a) the need to involve practice to legal education, b) the need for humanization of legal education, c) the need for an individualized approach to law studies.

The article deals with the issue concerning the place of the of sustainbale development
in the Polish Constitution. It will present the problem of sustainable development legal nature and its consequences. Obligations of public authorities regarding the implementation of sustainable development included in Article 5 of the Constitution, will also be considered with the background of the provisions contained in art. 74 section 1, 68 and 86 of the Constitution. The article will also contain references to contemporary understanding of sustainable development, which results from the acts of international law, including the Rio+20 Declaration and Agenda 2030. The aim of the above analysis is to indicate what shape it should be given today and how currently sustainable development should be understood. That should be the same an indication for public authorities what actions should be taken in order to respond the current understanding of sustainable development.

The paper tries to conceptualize the social and structural change that self-governments underwent during systemic transformation in Poland. First, the situation of professional self-governments before the systemic transformation is discussed, including their liquidation at the onset of communist rule in Poland as well as the beginnings of their revival at the end of it, which was described as the first wave of development of professional self-governments. Both the reasons for liquidation, as well as revival of professional-self-governments are described. After this we discuss the second wave of this development, covering the first years after the fall of communism up to the adoption of the Polish Constitution of 1997, which regulated the status of professional self-government in the “social constitution”. Next we analyse the third wave of development of professional self-governments, which lasted until 2001 and was a portent of the conflict discussed at the end of the article between two ways of understanding what professional self-governments are and what role they should play (one focused on social constitution and other on efficiency). It is argued that from 2001 onwards professional self-governments have been treated more like a tool of effective governance (and very often – as something that hinders this governance) rather than an expression of civic society.