The article analyses CJEU judgments passed as a result of preliminary rulings and their impact on the judicial decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court. Admini­strative courts are highly committed to and keen on referring preliminary rulings to the CJEU, which is a noteworthy fact. In assessing the implementation of the right legal instruments, the CJEU, by way of its judgments, often grants protection to taxable persons. These judgments have often resulted in legislative changes or changes in the interpretation of legal provisions. In some cases, the previous line of judicial decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court is legitimised and proven as correct.
What deserves particular attention is the CJEU’s existing judicial practice of dealing with tax law abuse cases, which is used by the SAC when examining cases involving tax carousels.

The judicial review of administrative courts covers the legality of acts and actions of public administration bodies. The oversight over the activities of bodies of other authorities is, therefore, excluded from this review. However, there are cases in which administrative courts, invoking the so-called pro-constitutional interpre-tation, attempt to extend their jurisdiction also to be able to review the acts, actions or inactions of legislative and judicial authorities. Despite the fact that according to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the executive power (equated by legal scholars, commentators, and practitioners with the exercise of public administra-tion) is exercised by the President of the Republic of Poland and the Council of Ministers, the dominant judicial practice is that the acts of the President, which constitute the exercise of his prerogatives, are not subject to the jurisdiction of administrative courts. The author argues against this practice.
The discussion addresses also the demands and proposals made in the litera-ture dealing with the subject for entrusting administrative courts with the review of decisions issued in social insurance cases, as well as the establishment of a separate judiciary in tax or – more broadly – financial cases. The author strongly opposes these demands and proposals as well.

One of the fundamental dilemmas in judicial application of the law is to respect the principle of the rule of law and not only the principle of legalism. The principle of legalism as enshrined in Article 7 of the Constitution insufficiently protects the constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms of the individual, and therefore judicial activism is required, i.e. a correction of the established law in the process of interpretation and application of the law in order to give the law such content that is consistent with the constitutionally defined values underlying the axiology of the Polish Constitution. The correction of the legislated law involves going beyond the content of the principle of legalism and referring to such values as – equity, justice, goodness, human rights and freedoms.
The judge, due to the fact that under the Constitution he is first and foremost subject to its provisions, and secondarily to the laws, may – if he is able to justify it – reject the content of the statutory provisions and base his decision exclusively on the provisions of the Constitution. This is justified when the Constitution protects individual rights and freedoms to a greater extent than the law. A judge may not invoke the rule dura lex sed lex in the process of interpretation, as it destroys the standards of legal culture. The correction of statute law in the process of its inter-pretation relates to judicial independence and responsibility for the issued decision.

Legal certainty is one of the fundamental values of a democratic state governed by the rule of law, and striving to achieve it at the highest possible level is highly desirable. An essential factor influencing the degree of legal certainty is the predic­tability of judicial decisions. This is particularly significant for taxpayers, as it reduces the level of legal uncertainty. It is also relevant from a macroeconomic perspective, as a lack of legal certainty hampers a country’s potential for growth.
This paper analyses the state of Polish administrative courts’ practice of inter­preting tax law, which the authors consider unsatisfactory. It also offers a critical review of selected scholarly views on specific issues related to the core subject addressed.

Originalism – as one of the main approaches to the interpretation of the U.S. federal Constitution – has been increasingly viewed as an instrument of political struggle in the hands of the judiciary. This article offers a discussion of the effects of origi-nalist interpretation, which enable legal orders with different axiology to exist in a federal state. The above situation raises the question of the legitimacy of accepting legal relativism and consent to the creation of parallel juridical realities when the degree of polarisation makes it impossible to seek compromise. The purpose of the article is to highlight that, paradoxically, originalism can strengthen the stabilising and organising role of law in line with the concept of E pluribus unum.

In my paper, I reconstruct Jerzy Wróblewski’s theory of interpretation. My goal is to show that this theory has the characteristics of a paradigmatic theory because of the importance of the presumption of common language, which is a fundamental element of this theory. This presumption is decisive in shaping the picture of interpretation and, consequently, gives the theory in question the status of a model theory defining a postulated model of legal interpretation. In the paper, I discuss various aspects of this presumption, highlighting its importance in preserving the principle of universal access to practical (legal) discourse. At the same time, I question the views that challenge this presumption by claiming that the language of law is a code accessible only to a cognitively privileged group of professional lawyers.

In my paper, I reconstruct Jerzy Wróblewski’s theory of interpretation. My goal is to show that this theory has the characteristics of a paradigmatic theory because of the importance of the presumption of common language, which is a fundamental element of this theory. This presumption is decisive in shaping the picture of interpretation and, consequently, gives the theory in question the status of a model theory defining a postulated model of legal interpretation. In the paper, I discuss various aspects of this presumption, highlighting its importance in preserving the principle of universal access to practical (legal) discourse. At the same time, I question the views that challenge this presumption by claiming that the language of law is a code accessible only to a cognitively privileged group of professional lawyers.

The article of a review character undertakes a polemic with the authors of the book edited by M. Nowak entitled The Role of the Law in the Spatial Management System on spatial planning and development presented from the perspective of the law. The authors undertook to present the role of law in the spatial management system, but they did so taking into account the fact that in spatial planning, apart from lawyers, there are also such participants as urban planners, city and landscape architects, officials and the public. In the book there are not only material legal accents embedded in the themes of environment, cultural landscape and monuments, but also procedural threads. There are issues of a general nature, concerning the role and interpretation of the law, interdisciplinary issues, reach ing into other sciences (economics, urban planning), specific issues (fee) and issues of a changing and dynamic nature (COVID-19 and spatial policy). The work strongly emphasises the axiological dimension with references to phrases such as public interest or common good. In good conscience, I recommend reading the book to all those interested in ‘planning law’ in the broadest sense of the term, and to those who prefer the intersection of legal and non-legal sciences. The book will also appeal to the academic community and the legal profession.

The present paper is a reaction to Maciej Pichlak’s article "Law in the Snares of the Political: Addressing Rafał Mańko’s Critical Philosophy of Adjudication" which was published in this journal (“The Critique of Law” 2020, 12(3), pp. 109–125). The present response addresses selected issues raised in Pichlak’s critique, focusing on three aspects: law and the political, the importance of justice in the critical project, and finally the question of adjudication and ideology. On a more general note, the polemic reveals the importance of philosophical, political and ideological commitments and presuppositions of legal theorists and poses the question of the limits of the autonomy of jurisprudential debates vis-à-vis such commitments.

The purpose of this study is to investigate how the environmental authority proceeds when they receive a freedom of information request and when such a request pertains to a waste collection licence. This objective is closely accompanied by the research problem worded as follows:
1) Is an authority allowed to share information about a waste collection licence as requested under the freedom of information principle even though it is information about the environment and its protection?
2) Which pieces of information included in a waste collection licence are shared as public information and which as information about the environment and its protection?
The achievement of the research objective and solving the scientific problem served to put forward a research hypothesis that information on a waste collection licence is shared under the Environmental Law. Nevertheless, certain elements of information in waste collection licences are public information. The method of interpretation of the law in force was employed in this paper to achieve the above-mentioned scientific outputs

This paper discusses judicial duty of improving the law on epistemic grounds and claims in that regarding this obligation, it is possible to give a place to free speech from an epistemic point of view. As a requirement of having epistemic agency, judges like other human beings have epistemological responsibility. Different from the others’ responsibility, judges’ responsibility is connected to their duty of improving the law, which is required by their job as well as the idea of the rule of law and judicial professional principles. Judges should improve the law’s capacity to guide the conduct of its citizens, who are obligated to obey the law. Improving the law also improves the delivery of justice. The ways of legal interpretation and justification are important to improve it. While applying the law, judges can find the law unclear or they may encounter some norm conflicts. In these cases, they
should resolve them to keep the law ‘legally in good shape’, which should meet epistemological requirements. When fulfilling this obligation, judicial free speech on epistemic grounds should not be limited.

In this article, the Polish institution of administrative entry to the area in order to carry out repair, maintenance or removal of failures of transmission equipment will be presented. It entitles to public-law interference in the constitutionally protected property right, under the condition that the determinants of its application have been met. The aim of the analysis is to indicate that the expropriation nature of this regulation, which is a specific form of expropriation, requires a strict interpretation of the premises leading to the restriction of the ownership for purposes related to transmission activity. An attempt will be made to demonstrate that the restriction of the ownership made on the basis of an administrative decision meets the expropriation standards applicable in the Polish legal system. The presented issues are not only of purely theoretical importance, but will also be used in the application of legal regulations by both public administration authorities and transmission companies applying for a permission.

This article provides only a small contribution to the inevitable scholarly discussion on whether excluding the primacy of the literal rule in favour of the priority of a pro-EU teleological interpretation in the judicial and administrative applications of Polish tax law is really reasonable. Firstly, this article sets out to discuss the stages of the transposition of the concept of a household from EU legislation into the provisions of the Excise Duty Act. Secondly, it presents the evolution in the lines of the interpretation of this term as used by tax authorities and national courts. Thirdly, it demonstrates the negative legal and fiscal consequences that are caused in practice by the definition of this term as framed by the Polish legislator.

The interest in the profession of a mediator increased with the popularisation of mediation in Poland. The tendency was supported by the legislator’s liberal defini-tion of requirements for performing this professional function. In the article, we raise issues related to the principles of entering in the register of permanent mediators in Poland. We present the currently applicable legal regulations and we analyse them, focusing on the requirement to have knowledge of mediation and to be skilled in it. This requirement is interpreted in different ways by individual authorities that enter candidates’ names in the register of permanent mediators (presidents of district courts), and its interpretation is also evaluated differently in both Polish literature and case law.
The purpose of the article is to show the areas of legal regulations that require changes and unification, on the basis of analysing the results of statistical research conducted by the authors. It is significant particularly from the perspective of the ongoing discussion on the professionalisation of mediators in Poland, especially in the context of the planned changes and the introduction of the National Register of Mediators. The accomplishment of the task undertaken by the authors is primarily served by the formal and dogmatic method as well as the comparative method used in the statistical research. The purpose of that method was to show discrepancies in interpreting the regulations concerning mediation.

The role of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in the management of cases and disputes in Nigeria and across the globe cannot be overemphasized. The judicial arm of the government is the arm responsible for interpretation of laws in Nigeria and the judiciary’s role in preserving the rights of citizens across Nigeria also cannot be overemphasized. It ensures that the society is stable in the face of insta-bility and ensures that lawlessness is not maintained. The judiciary ensures that laws made by the legislature are obeyed by ensuring that those who violate the provisions of any established laws are punished. In doing all these, it has been established that the system of administering justice in our courts in Nigeria is extremely slow. Considering the foregoing, alternative dispute resolution as a means of settling disputes has been of tremendous help in easing the hardship of getting cases resolved through the court system. This paper examines ways through which alternative dispute resolution has assisted the Nigerian judicial system and the need to use alternative dispute resolution the more in order to ensure that number of cases handled by courts are drastically reduced. Recommendations are made at the end of the research.

The article attempts to present the identity of the judge through the metaphor of the role as an interactive ritual. The framework of this ritual can be described by means of both intersubjective factors (e.g. legal rules) and individual factors (the subjectivity of the role performer). I apply this conception to the iconic symbol of justice in public space, which is usually associated with the figure of a woman whose eyes are covered with a blindfold, holding the scales of justice in one hand and a sword in the other. It is a visual symbol of the judge; one that is comprehensible to both lawyers and the public.
In carrying out this task, I refer to sociological and anthropological research in the field of visual culture. This perspective determines not only the subject matter covered by the theses formulated in the article but also the research method. It is assumed that visual representation constitutes a communication channel that has a great impact on individual and social memory. For this reason, the presentation of the role of the image and the methods of its interpretation is important for the debate about the role of the judge and the image of the judge in public space. This approach to the subject, which consists in shifting the emphasis from text to image, also rehabilitates the significance of visual representation in jurisprudence, a field traditionally dominated by the view that law is a linguistic phenomenon.

Fixed establishment (FE) is one of the institutions of the EU value added tax system; its structure is essential to correctly determine the right tax jurisdiction of an EU Member State for the purpose of VAT settlement in situations of cross-border provision of services. However, the legal structure of a FE adopted by the EU legislator (and, consequently, adapted to national legislation of the Member States) causes uncertainty when it comes to its interpretation. In the absence of unambiguously defined conditions in EU law to consider a specific presence and activity of an enterprise to be a FE, interpretation rules contained in judicial decisions
issued by the Court of Justice of the EU play an important role. Among attempts
made by the CJEU to clarify the ‘blur areas’ resulting from the dynamics of modern
business processes, one of the most interesting ones is the possibility of considering
a subsidiary to be a fixed establishment for a parent company. The purpose of this
paper is to analyse legal and economic factors, the fulfilment of which may constitute a condition for considering a subsidiary to be a fixed establishment for
a parent company, with particular emphasis on the ruling of the Court of Justice
of 7 May 2020 in the Dong Yang case (C-547/18).

Interpretation is one of key notions on the convergence axis of law and literature. Both lawyers and literary scholars during their practices focus on interpreting complex language texts, establishing the meaning of expressions, reconstructing the sender’s intention, penetrating the influence of the text on the recipient, i.e. questions which turn out to be fundamental in both legal as well as literary texts. Analysis of the legal and literary interpretations allows us to identify differences as well as certain analogies between these two spheres of activity. They may be analysed through referring to the specificity of the entities participating in the interpretative practice, which are the sender and the recipient. The essential difference between interpretation in law and interpretation in literature consists of the rule that a legal text should be interpreted in the way that produces an unequivocal result. On the other hand, in the case of literary interpretation, it is difficult to reach a precise or unequivocal effect of reading the sense. Moreover, in literary interpretation it is not required. In a legal text and in a literary text the author-sender’s intention plays an important role. However, in the case of literary interpretation it is possible to apply a more flexible approach to the reconstruction of the author’s intention than in legal interpretation, where it is necessary to take into consideration rules and objectives of law only. The separateness of legal interpretation is justified foremost by the fact that it is specific purpose-oriented, which is establishing the meaning of the substance of applicable law.