The present research investigated the perception of the fl ood threat and willingness of inhabitants of regions experiencing regular severe floods to take preventive actions.
Residents of two type of regions were compared: those living in a region protected by flood levees vs. residents living unprotected regions. Inhabitants of the area protected by the levees resulting in the rare experience of fl ood, perceived probability of flood as lower and reported higher willingness to take preventive actions than inhabitants of the area unprotected by levees. Similarly as in many previous studies personal experience and social norms turned out to be crucial factors in determining self-protective behavior. On the other hand unlike in other studies, we found no relationship between decision makers’ willingness to take preventive actions and factors related to threat appraisal, such as the
perceived magnitude of loss and the perceived probability of damage. Finally, we found that the impact of a given factor on willingness to protect oneself against a hazard may depend on the kind of measure of the protective behavior.

People often face choices where outcomes are both delayed and uncertain. Numerous studies of delayed gains and losses show the hyperbolalike discounting process of delayed payoffs. We assumed that when evaluating a delayed lottery people act according to the prospect theory model, where payoffs are discounted according to a hyperbolic function. The problem that we addressed is whether the a parameter of the value function v( ) and the g parameter of the probability weighting function w( ) differ for evaluations of delayed and instant lotteries. We found that when people compare delayed certain payoffs with delayed risky payoffs they are more risk prone than in situations where both certain payoffs and risky payoffs are instant. However, when people compare
present certain payoffs with delayed risky payoffs they are less risk prone than in situations where both certain payoffs and risky payoffs are instant. Additionally, the probability weighting curves were more linear for delayed lotteries than for instant lotteries (people were more sensitive to changes of probability).

In this article we attempt to summarize the fi ndings from a number of studies on the asymmetric dominance effect (attraction effect, decoy effect). This is a phenomenon where popularity of one of the decision alternatives increases when accompanied by a similar but inferior (dominated) option. Scientifi c research and numerous observational studies show that the attraction effect occurs in various fi elds, incl. the economy, politics, law or medicine. In the literature there are many ambiguities and contradictory theories about, for example, its determinants in the light of the dual-systems theory. It is not ntirely clear whether the phenomenon of asymmetric domination is the result of a refl ective, deliberative way of information processing or of quick and intuitive thinking. There is also no unequivocal answer to the question whether this effect is a manifestation of human irrationality or whether it is an adaptive and effective decision-making strategy in conditions of uncertainty and information noise. The article contains a broad overview of research on the effect of asymmetric dominance among people and animals. The hanges in the susceptibility to this effect across the lifespan are analysed. Finally, the paper discusses using the asymmetric dominance effect to achieve socially desirable goals as described in the theory of libertarian paternalism.

This paper presents a set of typical fallacies that accompany us in everyday decision-making. One of them is the pre-decisional distortion of information which consists in a tendency to increase the difference between attractiveness of the chosen and rejected alternatives. Another well-known bias is the influence of judgments made in one attribute on judgments in other attributes. This phenomenon is known as the halo effect. An equally common cognitive biasis the primacy effect which refers to overestimating information that appears first and underestimating data presented later in the serial position. The evaluation of choice alternatives is also influenced by other, less known phenomena: the context effect and the framing effect. The former is  esponsible in particular for to tendencies: (2) avoiding extreme choice options and (2) the effect of asymmetric dominance. The latter describes a situation where the evaluation and choice may depend on whether the same result is presented in one or another way. Overcoming cognitive biases of judgment is not easy. The best way seems to be to arrange evaluation conditions in such a way that will prevent fallacies from occurring.