The rule of law does not govern all human interactions. There are times when the state bypasses legal constraints, as documented by the World Justice Project. Other times, jurisdictions may be mutually unfriendly and refuse to enforce foreign laws. Blockchains create trust between contracting parties at the individual level, enabling them to transact freely and increase consumer welfare. Blockchains can only supple-ment antitrust if the legal constraints do not impede their development. The law should thus support the decentralization of blockchains so that blockchain-based mechanisms may take over (even if imperfectly) where the law does not apply. With that in mind, we justify the attractiveness of that approach by showing that blockchain causes an increase in the number of transactions by creating trust (Part 1), and that it may overall increase the decentralization of economic transactions (Part 2). The law should take into account where it applies (Part 3). We conclude afterward (Part 4).

The ambiguity of understanding and use of the term “human rights” reduces the effectiveness of the law-making and law enforcement activities of state and inter-national bodies, creates negative conditions for the formation of the unified worl-dview and legal position of future lawyers and representatives of other humanities. This article aims to define, formulate the content and describe the legal essence of the term “human rights,” and to substantiate the thesis about the harmfulness of the legal science, law-making and law enforcement use of this term with different meanings. The leading method of research is the method of analysis, which allows one to study the subject, imaginatively dividing it into constituent elements, and to consider each of the selected elements separately within a single whole. This article presents the argumentation of the need for a single wording, understanding, and use of the legal term “human rights.” The materials of the article have practical value for the effective implementation of the law-making and law enforcement activities of state and international bodies, for the formation of the unified worldview and legal position of future lawyers and representatives of other humanities, as well as for a correct and clear explanation of problems with the implemen-tation and protection of human rights.

The necessity of providing healthcare to citizens is one of the basic principles of every state, regulated by provisions of national, EU or international law and comple-mented by soft law. Civilisational changes and technological advancement make it possible to develop new healthcare tools and services (i.a. telemonitoring, telecon-sulting, telerehabilitation and electronic medical documentation). The COVID-19 pandemic greatly emphasised the need to provide such services. The wide use of e-health, however, which may be a remedy for numerous problems that the health-care sector is wrestling with, requires securing the rights of those who are not digitally included, especially the elderly. The prevalence of various degrees of digital exclusion, not only among the elderly, makes these issues socially significant and they should be solved by law. The purpose of the article is an initial analysis of the validity of developing e-health services in the ageing society in Poland and a presentation of proposals for adjusting legal solutions as regards the use of digital tools in healthcare to the changing reality.

The author offers an analysis of the controversial Israeli Nation-State Law of 2018 and B. Netanyahu’s involvement in its adoption. He claims that its ideas manifest Netanyahu’s desire to depart from the state-centred, social democratic, and liberal views advocated by Ben Gurion. This desire stems from his strong disagreement with Israel’s founder’s claim and belief that secularism is a guarantee that Israel does not fall into the same trap as the leaders of the bicentennial Crusades – which ultimately failed. The author of the paper makes an insightful comparison of this law with the contents of Point 13 of Thomas Woodrow Wilson’s 1918 plan – a docu-ment from exactly 100 years before, designed to shape Europe after victory in the war against Russia, Prussia, and Austria-Hungary, on whose lands an independent Polish state was to be established.

The author offers an analysis of the controversial Israeli Nation-State Law of 2018 and B. Netanyahu’s involvement in its adoption. He claims that its ideas manifest Netanyahu’s desire to depart from the state-centred, social democratic, and liberal views advocated by Ben Gurion. This desire stems from his strong disagreement with Israel’s founder’s claim and belief that secularism is a guarantee that Israel does not fall into the same trap as the leaders of the bicentennial Crusades – which ultimately failed. The author of the paper makes an insightful comparison of this law with the contents of Point 13 of Thomas Woodrow Wilson’s 1918 plan – a docu-ment from exactly 100 years before, designed to shape Europe after victory in the war against Russia, Prussia, and Austria-Hungary, on whose lands an independent Polish state was to be established.

The article is devoted to the study of the correct application of the evaluative concepts contained in the norms of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Attention is drawn to certain difficulties in the application of the evaluative norms in the Convention: despite their objective necessity and usefulness, they create a room for the law enforcement entity’s own discretion up to subjectivism in resolving specific cases; they serve as an objective obstacle to the unification of the case law of the ECtHR and this creates preconditions for unequal implementation of ECtHR judgments in the national legal order; they cause the risk of errors in the application of the provisions of the Convention by the competent authorities of the Contracting States. It is established that the application of legal norms containing evaluative concepts is challenging not only owing to the specific properties of the evaluative concepts themselves, but also due to the peculiarities of adjudication by the ECtHR when applying the evaluative norms. The relevant case law of the ECtHR as well as examples of national legislation are analysed in support of these theoretical conclusions. Since the lack of uniform application of the evaluative norms of the Convention causes divergent use of the ECtHR’s judgments in the domestic judicial system, it is advised to follow a number of rules for reasoning of decisions by the domestic court. These rules will serve as a certain guarantee against ambiguous implementation of ECtHR judgments at the national level.

The publication examines the legal nature of wars, looks into the law of war genesis, reviews its conventions, as well as identifies the aim, objectives, causes together with the consequences of Russia’s military aggression on February 24, 2022; it provides a testimony on the war of aggression against Ukraine and identifies its threats to post-war international law and order. The aim of the article is to determine the background, nature, fundamentals and nature of the war the Russian Federation launched on February 24, 2022 against Ukraine within the context of confrontation with the values of Western democracy. Historical-legal dialectical, comparative-legal and system-structural methods, as well as methods of formal logic (induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis, abstraction and concretization, etc.) were used to study the issues. The application of these research methods entails a cross-sectoral scientific nature.
Wars have accompanied the entire history of mankind. Since the 17th century the theoretical foundations of the law of war have been laid, which enshrined in international laws and customs of warfare (Geneva Conventions, Hague Convention, etc.) since the 19th century, thus forming the international humanitarian law. After World War II, violations of the latter by the belligerent party are viewed by the world community no less harshly than the mere war. The paper questions the purpose, reasons, conditions and intermediate consequences of the war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. Obviously, the military aggression and the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022 marked the beginning of the de facto war, under a specific formal definition by a Russian official as a “special military operation” instead of naming it an attempt to avoid legal responsibility for war crimes committed in Ukraine. The article analyses the aggressive nature of this war on the part of the Russian Federation, demonstrates numerous violations of international law conventions by the Russian armed forces during the military invasion and temporary occupied territories in Ukraine. It emphasizes that the law of war has always been replaced by signing a peace treaty and relevant international agreements, which entails the obligation to severe the political, economic, and legal responsibility of the state violating international humanitarian law. The paper reviews the key institutions and legal tools for bringing the Russian Federation authorities to justice for the war crimes committed in Ukraine. So far, the President of Ukraine, the Supreme Council of Ukraine, and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine have managed to apply legitimate international legal
mechanisms, primarily the International Criminal Court and the UN Security Council, to prosecute Russia for violating the international humanitarian law and committing war crimes in Ukraine. At the same time, on the Ukrainian territories currently liberated from the Russian army’s occupation (Bucha, Gostomel, Irpin, etc.), it is already possible to implement a special mechanism of justice, which consists in the collaboration between national and international experts: specialists, investigators, prosecutors, and judges to collect objective and impartial evidence of gross violations of international law and war conventions in Ukraine. It is obvious that for Ukraine today both the victory and just punishment for the committed and continuing committed war crimes on its territory are important. The aftermath of World War II’s “Never Again” now requires, as never before, its effective guarantee and protection

The present article addresses the issue, whether in international law there exists pre-contractual responsibility (culpa in contrahendo). If such a responsibility indeed exists it will play a significant role not only in State-to-State relations, but also in the relations between States and private investors, given the fact that currently, on the virtue of investment treaties, private entities have rights to lodge claims against states before arbitration tribunals, which employ international law in their judgements. Hence, determination whether responsibility for culpa in contrahendo exists in international law, will allow to establish, whether private entities may base the claims on that ground, and if such course of action is advantageous. The proposed analysis will be based upon sources of international law, such as treaties, custom, general principles of law, as well as judicial and scientific authorities – and additionally also relevant practice in chosen States’ legal practice.

Corruption has been the centre of attention on a global scale. Almost all studies concentrate on corruptive effects on the governance, economics or politics. This paper investigates the citizens’ perceptions towards corruption and anti-corruption in Vietnam. This is a new look contributing to the panoramic picture of anti-corrup-tion. The study employed a descriptive approach with a researcher-made ques-tionnaire for 385 respondents selected by a stratified random sampling method based on Cochran’s formula. It was found out that preventive measures and corrup tion laws are not severe enough to admonish corruption offenders. Transpa-rency is not highly promoted for people to access information, so citizens’ super-vision is not very effective. There is a mismatch between citizens’ perceptions and external organisations’ assessment. It is necessary to implement anti-corruption law strictly and renovate people’s right to get corruptive information. Moreover, the government should recheck and adjust preventive anti-corruption laws to match each specific type of corruption. Urgently, the operation of the state appa-ratus ought to cooperate and join hands to combat corruption. It is advisable for the government to collaborate with external organisations to exchange experience in curbing corruption

The subject of this paper focuses on issues concerning criminal liability for a crime committed while inebriated or intoxicated. These issues, whose social significance is indisputable, continue to be controversial from the perspective of criminal law. One reason for this is the shortcomings of Article 31 § 3 of the Criminal Code, which serves as the basis to hold an offender who was in said state tempore criminis criminally liable. The purpose of this paper, however, is not so much to criticise the current legal solution as to offer a proposition de lege ferenda concerning a change in the wording of the said provision on the grounds of the reservations raised. The conclusions that lead to it are derived both from the dogmatic-legal analysis of the cited provision and from the empirical approach motivated by the psychopathological view of the state of intoxication, or the problem of (in)sanity of the perpetrator of a prohibited act. These issues are ingrained in the regulation contained in § 3 of Article 31 of the Criminal Code. It is the will of the criminal legislator for the scope of Article 31 of the Criminal Code to encompass a variety of states which may seem similar from a psychopathological point of view they, but actually require a different legal approach with regard to criminal-legal aspects and criminal policy, which this study aims to present.

The article concerns judicial integrity in its basic meaning, i.e. as the consistency of actions with beliefs. Firstly, a reconstruction of the role of a judge’s beliefs was undertaken on the basis of the philosophy law, which allowed for proving that at least on the grounds of the so-called third path theory, they are treated as essential. However, acknowledging their role raises questions about the danger of instrumentalising law by the judge and of instrumentalising the judge by the law. Ronald Dworkin’s philosophy which extensively refers to the concept of integrity was interpreted as a solution to the issue. Then, it was noted that this approach is too narrow, as it limits the possibility of including the judge’s beliefs in adjudication only when they meet the requirements of so-called appropriateness tests, and are therefore already included in the content of the legal order in some way. Furthermore, integrity in this sense does not cover the judge’s behaviours besides decision-making, the status of which increasingly requires a theoretical explanation and normative classification. In consequence, it was stated that the concept of integrity is connected with paradoxes. In spite of that, an attempt was made to design a more systematic approach to judicial integrity in adjudication and behaviour, which would lead to proving that it is something that should be cared about, and consequently, its behaviour should be made the object of normative and institutional solutions. At the same time, the concept of integrity seems to have more heuristic power than normative one.

The main purpose of the presented research project is to prepare an initiating answer to the present state of judicial integrity recognised as the top of legal professions and the legal system as such. The method comes mainly from the Oxford analytical jurisprudence, nevertheless, the historical and interdisciplinary approaches, as well as a legal practice, were taken seriously into consideration. The main theses and their scientific standpoints are: (i) at present, we are facing the disintegration of integrity; (ii) one of the sources of it lies in the very grounds of major jurisprudential terms, understood as parts of the Hartian internal point of view and that there are fundamental analytical paradoxes of integrity, generating practical dysfunctionalities; (iii) it is possible to solve main problems through a completely new approach: an ontological turn in the philosophy of law causing the idea of law as a concept and a new concept of integrity, namely ‘negative integrity’. It could be easily and effectively treated as practical support for firstly improving judicial integrity and secondly legal practice in general.

The purpose of the article is to study the sources and analyse the effects of one way of manipulating information on law in the media, i.e. the phenomenon of bullshitting’ (saying nonsense, sharing pseudo-information) on law and its work. A linguistic statement that involves ‘bullshitting’ is an eristic technique in written or oral communication, expressed by the sender in a specific environment with the purpose of convincing the addressee (audience) that things are so and so and making an impression of being professional and masking the fact that the sender does not care what the truth is. The ‘bullshitter’ does not make attempts to make their input into the conversation factual; they say anything, without any conviction of the truth; they say what they do not have sufficient grounds to claim. This phenomenon is an important factor that makes building the prestige of law (also in Poland) more difficult. Without taking care of the organisation of professional communication about law from professionals to citizens, manipulating information on law will cause permanent damage to legal awareness. The author compares this eristic technique with statements with include lies, provides examples of ‘bullshitting’ on law by politicians and journalists, and deals with the circumstances and effects of the phenomenon.

The purpose of the article is to study the sources and analyse the effects of one way of manipulating information on law in the media, i.e. the phenomenon of ‘bullshitting’ (saying nonsense, sharing pseudo-information) on law and its work. A linguistic statement that involves ‘bullshitting’ is an eristic technique in written or oral
communication, expressed by the sender in a specific environment with the purpose of convincing the addressee (audience) that things are so and so and making an impression of being professional and masking the fact that the sender does not care what the truth is. The ‘bullshitter’ does not make attempts to make their input into the conversation factual; they say anything, without any conviction of the truth; they say what they do not have sufficient grounds to claim. This phenomenon is an important factor that makes building the prestige of law (also in Poland) more difficult. Without taking care of the organisation of professional communication about law from professionals to citizens, manipulating information on law
will cause permanent damage to legal awareness. The author compares this eristic
technique with statements with include lies, provides examples of ‘bullshitting’
on law by politicians and journalists, and deals with the circumstances and effects
of the phenomenon.

The article deals with the problem of modal inference: if some addressees are
obliged to do something, they are also obliged to realize states of affairs which
constitute a necessary condition for the main obligation. Likewise, they are obliged
to refrain from realizing states of affairs which constitute a sufficient condition for
the action contradicting the main obligation. This type of inference is called in Polish legal theory “instrumental inference”. It is argued in the article that sometimes instrumental norms in law must be fulfilled (“preparatory actions” must be undertaken) before the main obligation is fulfilled. Lawgiver helps addressees of norms by applying vacatio legis. It can lead to new paradoxical consequences – to the creation of “virtual norms” – norms which never come into force, but addressees are obliged to undertake preparatory actions. The article presents theoretical
description of this phenomenon. In conclusion one dogmatic claim is proposed:
there is a potential way (art. 4171 § 1 k.c.) of getting from public officials compensation for preparatory actions which caused burden for addressees, when the main obligation turned out to be “virtual”. In Poland this procedure should be based on the rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal.

The aim of the research was to identify conditions and forms of international and cross-border cooperation of Polish higher education institutions (HEIs). In order to achieve the goal, the formal-dogmatic method was applied, analyzing the literature on the subject, the law (mainly Polish law), as well as various statements and press releases. A request for public information was also used. The article was divided into three parts. The first one concerns the conditions of international and cross-border cooperation of Polish HEIs. The next part covers the forms of cooperation identified by the author, and the last one refers to the formula of the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation as a form of international and cross-border cooperation of HEIs. The results of the research show that international and cross--border cooperation of Polish HEIs is based primarily on national law, which, however, is characterized by high variability, which does not favour building stable relations. The cooperation of HEIs takes various forms, from non-institutionalised to quasi institutionalised and institutionalised. Polish HEIs are trying to join the internationalization process, and the availability of external funding is conducive to gradual institutionalization of international and cross-border cooperation
of HEIs. There is a scarcity of studies on the subject, therefore the article may be
of great cognitive value to legal science, especially in Poland, but also abroad (for
scholars conducting comparative research).

The aim of the article is to analyze the EU regulations regarding the leniency program in competition law and its impact on cartel detection. First of all the purpose and substance of the leniency program have been analysed, moreover the article analyses EU regulations on partial and full leniency as well as differences with American competition law. The article uses the formal-dogmatic and legal-comparative resarch methods – mainly American solutions were used for comparision with EU law. The thesis of the article is the statement that the leniency program should not be considered as the main legal instrument for detecting cartels but it should complement other instruments. The research results can be used for further research on legal regulations which are used for detecting cartels

Fixed establishment (FE) is one of the institutions of the EU value added tax system; its structure is essential to correctly determine the right tax jurisdiction of an EU Member State for the purpose of VAT settlement in situations of cross-border provision of services. However, the legal structure of a FE adopted by the EU legislator (and, consequently, adapted to national legislation of the Member States) causes uncertainty when it comes to its interpretation. In the absence of unambiguously defined conditions in EU law to consider a specific presence and activity of an enterprise to be a FE, interpretation rules contained in judicial decisions
issued by the Court of Justice of the EU play an important role. Among attempts
made by the CJEU to clarify the ‘blur areas’ resulting from the dynamics of modern
business processes, one of the most interesting ones is the possibility of considering
a subsidiary to be a fixed establishment for a parent company. The purpose of this
paper is to analyse legal and economic factors, the fulfilment of which may constitute a condition for considering a subsidiary to be a fixed establishment for
a parent company, with particular emphasis on the ruling of the Court of Justice
of 7 May 2020 in the Dong Yang case (C-547/18).