The text supplements the article by S. Linder and contains information about research on the primacy effect in Poland. The subject of J. Raciborski’s analyzes were elections to national councils (local government bodies) in 1988 – the last elections before the fall of communism in Poland, elections to the Sejm in 1989 and 1991. T. Żółtak investigated the existence of the primacy effect in the elections to the Senate in 1991-2007. However, the primacy effect in the 2014 regional elections was of greatest political importance. The
strength of this effect was measured by J. Flis. Analyzes were also carried out on the effect of a candidate’s position on the party semi-open list in proportional elections. However, this is a completely different issue, as in this case the position on the list is related to the actual political weight of the candidate. In Poland, the relationship of the primacy effect with postal elections has never been studied, which results from the marginal importance of the latter, as well as the procedures used in elections, which prevent a separate analysis of the content of votes cast by post and at the polling station.

: In the second half of 2014 Poland is expected to conduct the reservation procedure of radio spectrum for commercial high-speed Internet services (LTE). Given the enormous market value of resources, for the first time in the history of the Polish elecommunications market, the allocation of frequency blocks will be determined through a multi-object MRA auction carried out by the Offi ce of Electronic Communications (UKE). Drawing on the theoretical properties of the auction format chosen by the Polish regulator, we have developed a dedicated simulator to analyze auction runs for fi ve 800 MHz blocks. We consider possible developments of LTE auction and expected revenues it brings for four most likely confi gurations of bidders.

Why do political actors pass legislation that seemingly hurts them? Lustration laws limit access to public offi ce of the ancien regime's collaborators and hurt members of post-communist parties in East-Central Europe. So why has lustration in Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria been passed when post-communist parties held parliamentary majorities? Why did the postcommunist party in Romania switch from no-lustration to pro-lustration after the 1992 elections? We explain this phenomenon by electoral timing and rules of rocedure in legislatures. Specifi cally, we develop an agenda-setter model with a finite number of parties, imperfect information, and multiple potential medians. Our main argument can be summarized as follows: Suppose that the Postcommunists do not introduce any lustration bill and then lose proposal power in elections. If Anti-communists come to power, they are sure to introduce a harsher bill, and the median of the legislature may prefer such a bill to a no-bill status quo. Post-communists can prevent such a scenario by implementing a mild bill themselves. If they manage to appease the new parliamentary median, they will block a harsher bill that would be implemented after they lose power. Additional results show how electoral perspectives and uncertainty affect and modify this typical scenario. We test our model with an exhaustive analysis of all cases from East- Central Europe that meet our assumptions that a Postcommunist party is in power and no lustration bill is already in force.

The paper presents some consequences of using semi-open lists, including the preferential vote mechanism, in parliamentary elections in Poland. The Authors discuss whose role in assigning parliamentary seats is greater: that of party organizations’ leaders, who decide on the order of candidates on electoral lists, or that of citizens who cast preferential votes. The paper focuses in the elections in the years 2001–2011, in which, according to poll data, party voting dominated over personal voting. The results of parliamentary elections in Poland show that ballot position effects are persistently present and that people tend to vote for list leaders in their constituencies. However, a simulation of a closed-list mechanism shows that in 2001–2011, ca 20 per cent of parliamentary seats were assigned as a result of the interventionist impact of the preferential vote on the
candidate lists established by parties. The ability to vote for a specifi c candidate is rather important for Poles. The Authors also point out that the candidates from the top of party lists may obtain such good results because voters resort to simple reasoning and vote for those from the top of a list, irrespective of the nature of the list itself. (However, the effect does not seem to be very signifi cant).

: Traditional studies on political consequences of electoral systems were recognising electoral formula as the most important variable responsible for the consequences generated by a given electoral system. Meanwhile, recent studies suggest that the impact of this variable is defi nitely overrated. The article shows how the number of seats won in electoral districts affects the political parties and their candidates' chances of winning both in the proportional representation voting systems as well as in the majority and plurality ones. Using the examples of Polish parliamentary elections, the present paper both examines the thesis according to which larger electoral districts always increase proportionality and identifi es the conditions under which the thesis finds its application.

In the Polish public debate, one occasionally hears voices advocating the need for a significant change in the system of elections to Sejm, the Lower Chamber of Parliament – the objective of such changes would be to strengthen larger parties. As an example to follow, proponents of these changes cite Hungary, where the changes in electoral rules allowed the party in power to retain majority in the legislative despite reduction in popular support. Opponents of this solution see it as a manifest electoral manipulation. The aim of the present paper is to analyze how the “marginal only” changes to the structure of constituencies electing members of Sejm postulated in the political arena would affect electoral results of individual political groups and what would be the broader political consequences. The author pays particular attention to expected impact of such changes on the majority bonus for the winning party, possible government coalition variants, concentration of party system at parliamentary level and proportionality of elections. Simulation of allocation of seats in Sejm based on votes cast was prepared for three possible variants of the structure of Sejm constituencies, on the basis of historical data (for the 2011 and 2015 elections) and the predicted results of 2019 elections. Comparison of the simulated outcomes with the results obtained in the system currently in place allows to answer the main question posed.

Game theory and sociology have nearly sixty years of relations. Published 54 years ago in the U.S., and this year in Poland, Thomas C. Schelling Strategies of conflict was an important step in the perception of game theory by sociologists. Despite initial signs of enthusiasm, especially in the 60s, and the publication of a number of major sociological works referring to the theory of games, in the end position of game-theoretical approach in sociology turns out to be marginal, even within rational choice sociology. Using the background of the history of the relationship between sociology and game theory, this paper analyzes factors that make game theory a potentially attractive tool for a sociologist, and the reasons why sociologists rarely use it.