Purpose: The aim of this paper is to examine shareholders’ reaction to the decision of the supervisory board to appoint a CEO in companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange.

Methodology: An event study and the mean-adjusted model were applied. The abnormal returns were measured as the CAAR in the entire (-60, + 60) window and selected sub-windows.

Findings: The obtained values of abnormal returns indicate the shareholder’s negative reaction. Throughout the observation window, they oscillate slightly below zero, and in the window (0, +20) they are negative at -1.566%. Irrespective of the observation window, negative abnormal returns were obtained for over half of the observation (52–57%). Therefore, preliminary results indicate the predominance of the information effect over the real one. The decrease in market value as a result of the event may result from an increase in investors’ uncertainty as to the effects of changes in strategy and skills of the new CEO.

Originality: The research is a unique one. To date, no one has carried out research into shareholders’ reaction to a CEO appointment in either the Polish or Central and Eastern European capital markets. They primarily bring the value of cognition of shareholders’ behaviour in the analysed event, which is reflected in share prices. They extend the literature on the signalization instruments, i.e. the activities that boards can undertake due to the new information transmitted to the capital market participants and stakeholders. The market reaction to a CEO appointment will without a doubt interest investors; the institutions responsible for supervision (which in the case of Poland is the Financial Oversight Commission) and the legislator in charge of regulations that prevent insider trading while promoting corporate disclosure transparency.

Purpose: The aim of this paper is to present the regulatory obligations imposed by the President of the Office of Electronic Communications (hereafter: President of UKE) on telecom enterprises with significant market power in the retail and wholesale telecommunications markets.

Methodology: The decisions addressed to TP Group entities were analyzed as well as the financial statements presenting the economic volume achieved for the period 2006–2013.

Findings: In the analyzed period for entities of the TP Group were applied a range of regulatory obligations, that should result in disabling the use of their monopoly position and transfer their position between telecommunications markets. Regulatory obligations imposed by the President of UKE on TP Group entities did not affect to a signifi cant extent the situation of the group. Fluctuations of analyzed fi nancial fi gures seem to be primarily
the result of internal management decisions rather than a comprehensive range of sector-specifi c regulation in telecommunications. These researches indicate the need for a deeper analysis of the perception of the effects of regulatory actions by stakeholders in the telecommunications sector.

Originality: The text provides an interdisciplinary approach to the issue of regulation of infrastructure markets.

Purpose: The aim of the paper is to answer the questions (1) whether the reforms of the regulations in the banking sector were effective and (2) which mechanisms discipline the behavior of banks. Moreover, we also raise a question how the behavior of banks depends on the institutional environment.

Methodology: To achieve the objectives, the article uses probit analysis on panel data covering the years: 1995–2006 for the entire period, and for years: 1999–2004 and 2004–2006 for 350 banks from OECD countries.

Findings: The quantitative results clearly argue for banking regulation, rather than leaving the supervision of the banking sector market discipline. However, the survey results also show that the behavior of banks depends largely on the institutional environment. Therefore, we questioned whether the currently proposed regulatory reforms that are homogeneous in nature will be effective in disciplining banks.

Practical implications: Among many reforms that are proposed the most important concerns are ones on banking regulation. Some believe that regulation of the banking sector should not be such useful, others believe that regulations are needed, which showed the fi nancial crisis in 2007–2011.

Purpose: Analysis of reasons, correlations and consequences following from the impact that financial investors have on commodity markets – both before and after the crisis.

Methodology: The research on the tremendous impact that the financial sector exerts on price formation in commodity markets, defined as the financialization of commodity markets, was based on a narrative approach. This approach makes use of available historical documents and attempts to reconstruct factors causing structural changes in commodity markets. As a result of these factors, commodity and financial markets (and particularly
capital market) have become similar to a great extent.

Findings: Drawing upon the research, it can be stated that the global financial crisis has contributed not only to a major change in the involvement of investors in commodity markets, but also to a structural change of this involvement, which is accompanied by a number of negative consequences.

Originality: The research enables to draw certain conclusions, e.g. that the financialization of commodity markets is reflected in a radical price fluctuation in these markets due to which the prices are isolated from fair value. Structural changes are also discussed. They entail the attempt to counteract such negative consequences, e.g. regulations imposed to provide a greater transparency of the activity undertaken by investors in commodity markets.