Typically, three kinds of settings, under which decisions are made, are distinguished, certainty, uncertainty, and risk. In this view, uncertainty is defi ned narrowly, as a situation, in which the probability distribution is unknown. However, D. Ellsberg’s studies showed that ambiguity, defi ned as an intermediate condition between uncertainty and risk, could be considered as the fourth type of decision settings. Seen from this perspective, uncertainty is a more complex notion and it is commonly experienced with regard to important issues other than only total or partial lack of knowledge of probability. Following the review of concepts of uncertainty, we present examples of their impact on
everyday life economic decisions that are made in the domains of consumer behaviour, saving, investment, and entrepreneurship. Finally, we present some methods of coping with different kinds of uncertainty.

Why do political actors pass legislation that seemingly hurts them? Lustration laws limit access to public offi ce of the ancien regime's collaborators and hurt members of post-communist parties in East-Central Europe. So why has lustration in Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria been passed when post-communist parties held parliamentary majorities? Why did the postcommunist party in Romania switch from no-lustration to pro-lustration after the 1992 elections? We explain this phenomenon by electoral timing and rules of rocedure in legislatures. Specifi cally, we develop an agenda-setter model with a finite number of parties, imperfect information, and multiple potential medians. Our main argument can be summarized as follows: Suppose that the Postcommunists do not introduce any lustration bill and then lose proposal power in elections. If Anti-communists come to power, they are sure to introduce a harsher bill, and the median of the legislature may prefer such a bill to a no-bill status quo. Post-communists can prevent such a scenario by implementing a mild bill themselves. If they manage to appease the new parliamentary median, they will block a harsher bill that would be implemented after they lose power. Additional results show how electoral perspectives and uncertainty affect and modify this typical scenario. We test our model with an exhaustive analysis of all cases from East- Central Europe that meet our assumptions that a Postcommunist party is in power and no lustration bill is already in force.

In this article we attempt to summarize the fi ndings from a number of studies on the asymmetric dominance effect (attraction effect, decoy effect). This is a phenomenon where popularity of one of the decision alternatives increases when accompanied by a similar but inferior (dominated) option. Scientifi c research and numerous observational studies show that the attraction effect occurs in various fi elds, incl. the economy, politics, law or medicine. In the literature there are many ambiguities and contradictory theories about, for example, its determinants in the light of the dual-systems theory. It is not ntirely clear whether the phenomenon of asymmetric domination is the result of a refl ective, deliberative way of information processing or of quick and intuitive thinking. There is also no unequivocal answer to the question whether this effect is a manifestation of human irrationality or whether it is an adaptive and effective decision-making strategy in conditions of uncertainty and information noise. The article contains a broad overview of research on the effect of asymmetric dominance among people and animals. The hanges in the susceptibility to this effect across the lifespan are analysed. Finally, the paper discusses using the asymmetric dominance effect to achieve socially desirable goals as described in the theory of libertarian paternalism.

The goal of the present paper is to review recent theoretical models and empirical studies on the role of numeracy (i.e., cognitive ability in processing numerical information) in decision making under risk and uncertainty. The research conducted in the last decade points that numeracy is the most robust predictor of making good decisions, which predictions are independent of other psychological constructs or cognitive abilities (such as fluid Intelligence or cognitive reflection). The pivotal role of numeracy has been described in at least three theoretical models: Fuzzy-Trace Theory, Skilled Decision Theory, and Multiple Numeric Competencies model. Furthermore, the results of numerous research indicate that better decisions made by people with high numeracy are underpinned by various psychological mechanisms of the cognitive, motivational, and affective nature. Findings related to the performance of people with high and low numeracy served to develop both immediate (e.g., visual aids or an experience-based format of risk communication) and long-term (e.g.,cognitive training) methods of improving the decision-making process. Based on these decision aids, we can effectively support people with low numeracy in an accurate risk assessment, risk comprehension, and making better decisions.

This paper presents the new, interdisciplinary field of science called neuroeconomics. The first part of the paper shows relations between neuroeconomics, classical economics and behavioral economics. Next, the most popular measurement methods used in neuroeconomic experiments are described. Finally, the paper reviews results from neuroconomic research in four areas: 1) choices under risk and uncertainty, 2) moral decision making, 3) intertemporal decision making, 4) economic behavior in the social context.