The presented research shows that consumer choice of product depends on the sequence in which products are presented. When they were presented according to decreasing prices the customer chose more expensive products than in the case of increasing prices. However this happens only in case of paying cash not voucher. In order to rule out the alternative reasons of this effect another study was conducted. Participants of the second study were randomly acquainted with 10 product brands. Then they chose one of ten products which were sorted according to their prices: decreasing or increasing.
Again, when paying cash, participants chose more expensive products when they were sorted according to decreasing prices. The results of second research suggest that the presented differences in choosing products cannot be explained by anchoring heuristic, the effect of priority, or incomplete information processing.

People often face choices where outcomes are both delayed and uncertain. Numerous studies of delayed gains and losses show the hyperbolalike discounting process of delayed payoffs. We assumed that when evaluating a delayed lottery people act according to the prospect theory model, where payoffs are discounted according to a hyperbolic function. The problem that we addressed is whether the a parameter of the value function v( ) and the g parameter of the probability weighting function w( ) differ for evaluations of delayed and instant lotteries. We found that when people compare delayed certain payoffs with delayed risky payoffs they are more risk prone than in situations where both certain payoffs and risky payoffs are instant. However, when people compare
present certain payoffs with delayed risky payoffs they are less risk prone than in situations where both certain payoffs and risky payoffs are instant. Additionally, the probability weighting curves were more linear for delayed lotteries than for instant lotteries (people were more sensitive to changes of probability).

Celem tekstu jest ocena ekonomicznej teorii kary i powiązanego z nią modelu podejmowania decyzji z perspektywy empirycznych studiów nad prawem i behawioralnej analizy prawa. Ekonomiczna teoria kary w drugiej połowie XX wieku była podstawową teorią kary i miała znaczący wpływ na politykę karania w Stanach Zjednoczonych. Na początku XXI stulecia liczne badania statystyczne pokazały z jednej strony ograniczoną skuteczność ekonomicznego podejścia do prawa karnego, a z drugiej – szkodliwe efekty przetrzymywania w więzieniach dużej liczby osadzonych. Pojawiła się więc konieczność opracowania nowego modelu podejmowania decyzji przez przestępców. Psychologowie, ekonomiści behawioralni i zwolennicy behawioralnej analizy prawa zidentyfi kowali szereg czynników wpływających na podejmowanie decyzji o popełnieniu przestępstwa, by wymienić choćby dyskontowanie hiperboliczne, błąd nadmiernego optymizmu czy prognozowanie afektywne.

Niewielka różnica w sformułowaniu komunikatu może prowadzić do odmiennego zachowania jego odbiorcy. Zjawisko to nosi nazwę efektu sformułowania lub ramowania (ang. framing). W artykule opisano trzy rodzaje framingu: efekt sformułowania decyzji ryzykownych (ang. risky choice framing effect), efekt sformułowania cechy (ang. attribute framing effect) oraz efekt sformułowania celu (ang. goal framing). Pokazano, że zjawiskiem odpowiedzialnym za powstawanie efektu sformułowania jest, powszechnie występująca u ludzi, silna awersja do strat. Omówiono przykłady znaczenia zjawiska framingu w różnych obszarach gospodarczych, takich jak: kształtowanie cen, polityka podatkowa czy negocjowanie.

The paper presents the literature review on judicial decision making process and focuses particularly on sentencing decisions. The first paragraph has been devoted to legal directives that should inform the judge decisions about the decision weight of particular perpetrator/offence features in sentencing. Whatsoever the system of sentencing is immensely complicated even for judges: the definitions of the above mentioned directives seem to be fundamentally contentious and it remains obscure how much weight is and should be given to each of them. This situation makes different judges give different sentences for the same offence. Furthermore, the judicial practice reveals some turns-out-to-be aggravating factors that should never be taken into consideration in sentencing. Thus, in the same paragraph, the authors present methods which may help to identify the true factors and their weight in sentencing process. In the second paragraph the authors discuss the influence of judges’ cognitive dispositions (deeply rooted in psychophysics as well in heuristic reasoning) on sentencing decisions. The roles of Weber’s law and anchoring heuristic have been highlighted. Finally a discussion follows on the influence of dispositions rooted in Prospect Theory on parties’ propensity toward reaching a compromise even before the trial.

While making investment decisions, investors use different reference points that change their values dynamically. In this paper we investigate the impact of the deviation of the portfolio value from different reference points on the investment activity of participants of the investment game, as measured by the turnover volume during the day. We consider the following reference points: (1) the portfolio value before the previous transaction, (2) the initial portfolio value (3) the highest portfolio value and (4) the lowest portfolio value noticed during the time of the game, (5) the best result and (6) the worst result in the game during the transaction day, and (7) the value of the Warsaw Stock Exchange Index (WIG20). The strongest effects on the investment decisions appear to be the highest and the lowest portfolio value noticed during the time of participation in the game.

The article is a short review of interpretation of probability and its significance for risky decisions. It especially deals with a concept of subjective probability and decision weights introduced by the prospect theory. While dealing with both subjective deviation from objective probabilities as well as subjective probability transformation as probability weighting function it was observed that people treat low probabilities differently. In both situations people tend to overestimate rare events. Recently it has been said, that in the decision based on direct observations of frequency of events, overestimation is much weaker.