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Strategy and Paradoxes of Borda Count in Formula 1 Racing

Brian Kaiser

2019

( 31 )

DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.124

https:/doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.124

Abstract

Winning a championship is the highest achievement in Formula 1, and multiple titles can earn one a place in the pantheon of the sport. In this article I explore whether the scoring method for selecting a champion can be considered defi nitive, and how unstable results might be when the method’s parameters are slightly changed. I have employed case studies of paradoxes and historical recreations of seasons using alternative scoring systems. Finally, I argue that the Borda count is desirable system for scoring in Formula 1,
and that building strategies by teams around particular scoring systems is a legitimate aspect of the sport.

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Vulnerability of Selected Social Choice Methods to Strategic Voting

Piotr Pysiak

2006

( 6 )

https:/doi.org/

Abstract

Analysis of vulnerability of selected social choice methods to strategic voting is presented in the article. Selected methods are: plurality voting, the Borda count and approval voting. Applied procedure allowed strategic voting of unlimited number of voters. With each method voters knew the outcome of the sincere voting, consistent with their real preferences. 24 variants differed on voting parameters; for each variant 1000 random profiles of preferences have been analyzed. Results are different from expected.

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Collective and Individual Decisions

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