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Mancur Olson, collective action and the design of a federal state: The case of Ukraine

Peter Ordeshook

2015

( 24 )

DOI: 10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.65

https:/doi.org/10.7206/DEC.1733-0092.65

Abstract

Even if we ignore the consequences of Russia’s intervention into Ukraine’s internal affairs, Ukraine confronts some seemingly insurmountable problems in transitioning to a stable and prosperous state. Having inherited a top down and largely corrupt political structure, there are those who see decentralization in some form as a partial solution. Here, though, we argue that decentralization, even if crafted on the European Union template of subsidiarity, can introduce problems of collective action that would further undermine the country’s viability. To avoid exacerbating the problems of collective action occasioned by Ukraine’s fractured political economic system, decentralization must proceed with an understanding of how those problems are treated in successful federal states

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Paradoxes of liberalism and federalism

Grzegorz Lissowski

2007

( 7 )

https:/doi.org/

Abstract

An indispensable feature of a federation is autonomy of the parts of the federation. Federation systems differ in a degree of autonomy. Respecting group rights in social decision-making in federations can be in conflict with the Pareto optimality principle. It is the essence of the so-called federal paradox. The paradox of federalism, unlike the liberal paradox, i.e., a similar potential inconsistency between respecting individual rights and the efficiency of social decisions, has not yet been fully analyzed. In this paper, after presentation of the liberal paradox, well described in the literature, we present a formal characterization of the federal paradox. Moreover, some other problems connected to decision-making in federations are discussed.

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Collective and Individual Decisions

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